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Summary 
This research explores the political factors that affect the allocation of antipoverty 
funds in Mexican municipalities. Specifically, it analyses whether the adoption of 
FAISM, a decentralised fiscal fund intended to reduce poverty, did, in fact, help 
provide better services for the poor or if it was capture by political influence. In this 
sense, my work addresses a classic question of when and how political institutions 
can effectively improve the allocation of antipoverty funds.  
In the last decade, an ambitious decentralisation process was promoted in Mexico 
as a way to strengthen local governance and hence improve basic service 
provision. The idea was to limit politician‟s influence on resource allocation and 
return decision making to the people. By looking at more than 57,000 FAISM 
projects carried out in 122 municipalities of Estado de Mexico between 1998 and 
2006 my work argues that political influence could not be circumvented and 
clientelism remained as a common political practice to allocate antipoverty funds. 
My findings demonstrate that the three major political parties relied on FAISM to 
obtain political benefits through the allocation of private goods. Regarding the 
effects of democratic institutions, my work demonstrates that greater party 
competition increases the probability that FAISM was used for public benefit. 
Similarly, there is a propensity towards greater spending on clientelism during 
elections. Although these factors influence the allocation of municipal funds, my 
work does not find concluding evidence to test the impact of fund allocation and 
poverty reduction.  
My dissertation makes three important contributions to the literature. Substantively, 
it qualifies the premise that clientelistic linkages between voters and politicians 
prevail and shows the conditions under which local politicians strategically allocate 
antipoverty funds for political gain. A second, methodological, contribution is the 
use of a more refined measure of social spending at the municipal level by looking 
at the split between public and private goods. Finally, this dissertation seeks to 
inform the longstanding debate about the ways in which democratic politics can 
contribute to effective poverty reduction. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Social policy in Mexico has experienced important changes in the last three 
decades. As a result of the adoption of a new market-oriented development model, 
the state has significantly reduced its participation in the economic life of the 
country and has focused on redistribution policies that aim at reducing poverty and 
to providing basic services to the poorest sectors of the population. Despite these 
transformations, large segments of the population still live in conditions that 
prevent them from enjoying a better quality of life through the fulfillment of their 
basic needs. Although Mexico is considered a country with a medium Human 
Development Index (HDI) value, very close to that of high-development countries, 
there remain remarkable differences between regions (De la Torre 2005). 
Moreover, Mexico has a higher level of income inequality relative to the rest of 
Latin America. 
One suggested explanation for the current high levels of poverty and inequality in 
Mexico is that the Mexican political system has shown and continues to show the 
prevalence of clientelistic relationships between politicians and citizens. The 
exchange of goods and services for votes has negative effects on economic 
development and undermines the construction of citizenship, though it continues to 
be the norm in the allocation of public funds (Dresser 2008). According to Ugalde 
(2010), the transition to democracy in Mexico brought about free and transparent 
elections but it did not alter the clientelistic nature of the political system. Mexicans 
enjoy periodic, free and transparent elections but the selective allocation of public 
funds for political gain persist. 
There is a great deal of literature that has documented how social policy in Mexico 
during the 1990s was influenced by political factors (Dresser 1994, Molinar & 
Weldom 1994, Fox 1995). Most studies have accounted for variations in the 
allocation of antipoverty funds across states, but little is known regarding the final 
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destination of these resources at the municipal level. Given that local governments 
in Mexico have been one of the institutions that have been most affected by 
democratisation and decentralisation, there is a strong need to explore the effects 
of local political institutions on the allocation of antipoverty funds. 
This research explores the political factors that affect the allocation of antipoverty 
funds in Mexican municipalities. Specifically, it analyses whether the adoption of 
the Fund for Municipal Social Infrastructure (FAISM), a decentralised fiscal fund 
intended to reduce poverty, did, in fact, help provide better services for the poor or 
if it was captured for political gain. In this sense, my work addresses a classic 
question of when and how political institutions can effectively improve the 
allocation of antipoverty funds.  
In the last decade, an ambitious decentralisation process was promoted in Mexico 
as a way to strengthen local governance and hence improve basic service 
provision. Decentralisation of public funds transformed the expenditure 
responsibilities over public spending. With the new transfer of resources, governors 
and municipal authorities started to „control 63 cents of each peso collected from 
fiscal revenues‟ (Pardinas 2005: 1). Under this new scheme of public spending, 
where local authorities are important actors in the allocation of public funds, the 
study of the effects of political institutions on the actual use of resources has 
gained great importance in the study of Mexican politics.  
Lack of access to reliable data on municipal spending has constituted a major 
obstacle in evaluating the performance of this level of government in Mexico. The 
collection of data for this project is a first attempt to examine the actual use of 
public funds by municipal authorities. My field visit to Mexico in 2006 provided a 
unique opportunity to acquire a detailed account of the final destination of public 
funds that aim to improve basic social infrastructure in poor communities. Access 
to data on more than 57, 000 FAISM projects carried out in 122 municipalities of 
one Mexican state, Estado de Mexico, between 1998 and 2006 allowed me to 
examine pro-poor spending at the local level in detail. It also allowed me to explore 
the possible links between political institutions and the allocation of public funds in 
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a context that has been recently affected by increasing levels of political 
competition. 
My work argues that political influence could not be circumvented and clientelism 
remained as a common political practice to allocate antipoverty funds at the local 
level. The findings of this dissertation demonstrate that the three major political 
parties competing at the local level in the municipalities of Estado de Mexico relied 
on FAISM to obtain political benefits through the allocation of private goods. It 
seems that the political manipulation of public funds that characterised previous 
social programs run by the federal government has been translated to the 
municipal level. Today, at least in the case of FAISM, it is not the central 
government which allocates public funds with political motivations; it is the 
municipal authorities, the lowest level of government in the Mexican federal 
system, who are targeting public resources for electoral ends. 
Regarding the effects of democratic institutions, my work demonstrates that greater 
party competition increases the probability that FAISM was used for public benefit. 
Democratic elections and, particularly, contested electoral battles create incentives 
for the programmatic use of public funds where municipal level allocations of public 
goods are more prevalent than of private excludable goods (clientelism). Similarly, 
there is a propensity towards greater spending on clientelism during elections. 
Local governments tend to use FAISM funds to finance public works that are more 
visible or that could be finished before an election. Although these factors influence 
the allocation of municipal funds, my work does not find concluding evidence on 
the impact of fund allocation and poverty reduction.  
This dissertation makes three important contributions to literature in the field. 
Substantively, it qualifies the premise that clientelistic linkages between voters and 
politicians prevail and shows the conditions under which local politicians 
strategically allocate antipoverty funds for political gain. Prospects that clientelism 
would be eradicated with the arrival of alternation of power have proved wrong. 
Clientelism is resilient and has adapted to the new conditions of democratic politics 
in Mexican municipalities. A second, methodological, contribution is the use of a 
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more refined measure of social spending at the municipal level by looking at the 
split between public and private goods in order to classify policy benefits that could 
be programmatic or particularistic and that could have different effects on poverty 
alleviation. Finally, this dissertation seeks to inform the longstanding debate about 
the ways in which democratic politics can contribute to effective poverty reduction. 
Despite the prevalence of clientelism as a common political practice among local 
political actors, there is some room to believe that pluralistic politics could, in fact, 
create incentives for the allocation of funds with more programmatic criteria and 
not according to discretionary decisions by local authorities. 
This chapter begins by discussing the linkages between democratisation and 
decentralisation in the process of resource allocation. Next, it addresses the need 
to study political institutions in order to understand why some local governments 
are more effective in delivering goods and services to their population than others. 
The next section offers a brief account of the reasons for studying the politics of 
antipoverty spending through an examination of the FAISM. And finally, the last 
part describes the contribution of this dissertation, the case selection and research 
methodology and provides an overview of the dissertation.    
 
1.1 The linkage between democratisation and decentralisation in the process 
of resource allocation  
 
In many Latin American countries during the 1980s, the third wave of 
democratisation provided opportunities to challenge the inefficiencies caused by 
centralisation leading to a trend of decentralisation in many countries in the region. 
Increasing political competition created pressures to devolve greater autonomy to 
subnational levels of government. At the same time, the shift towards stabilisation 
and structural adjustment policies –as a response to the deep economic crises that 
hit many countries in the region– created incentives for governments to delegate 
institutional capacities and administrative responsibilities to lower levels of 
government.  
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Democratisation transformed the political dynamics at the subnational level. 
Dramatic shifts occurred in the configuration of the political map due to the 
increasing competition in local elections which reshaped the relationship between 
central and lower levels of government. Subnational political actors elected through 
more democratic and transparent elections became aware of the importance of 
winning financial and political autonomy from the central government (Beer 2004).  
In federal systems, these significant shifts brought new challenges and 
opportunities to the institutional arrangements. The political and economic 
transformations experienced in federal countries represented important forces in 
favor of decentralisation, in some cases bringing new opportunities to make the 
federal arrangements work better (Willis, Garman & Haggard, 1999). As Gibson 
points out (2004: 10), once the process of decentralisation was initiated, „the 
political structures of federalism provided obvious built-in alternatives to the 
national government, as well as constitutional mechanisms to enhance the 
empowerment of subnational actors.‟ A few cases in Latin America show how the 
activation of the institutions of federalism „led to a vindication of the periphery vis-à-
vis the centre‟ (Díaz-Cayeros 2003: 2). Decentralisation of political and fiscal 
resources to subnational units of government through previously dormant 
constitutional powers drove a new redistribution of power within the different 
political actors in the federal countries of the region (Gibson 2004).  
In this way, the democratisation and decentralisation processes enhanced the 
influence that political interactions between subnational and national political actors 
had in the institutional arrangements, power dynamics and the redistribution of 
power within federal systems.  At the local level, these changes also transformed 
the ways in which local governments function, and the ways in which they 
distributed public resources for service delivery in particular. 
In practice, so long as local governments are receiving significant resources to 
fulfill the needs of their population, it is important to focus on the ways in which 
they carry out government policy and particularly on the ways in which resources 
are allocated once they reach the hands of increasingly powerful local political 
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authorities. In short, we must examine the effects of resource allocation in terms of 
improvements to the living conditions of the population. 
The study of political incentives for resource allocation is relevant because of how 
likely it is that public spending will be used for political gain. Thus, in order to 
understand the possible political uses of public spending it is important to have a 
better understanding of the political incentives that politicians face when allocating 
public funds. 
 
1.2 Political institutions, decentralised resource allocation and service 
provision 
 
How can political institutions alter politicians‟ incentives to allocate public funds at 
the local level? To what extent do these allocations impact local government 
performance in ways that can improve the living conditions of the poorest sectors 
of the population? 
These questions are particularly important today as we have recently witnessed 
how subnational governments in both developed and developing countries have 
become important actors in delivering services to the population.  
Advocates of decentralisation argue that it promotes better resource allocation 
because local authorities have more information about local conditions and are 
foster innovation. In addition, decentralisation is considered to elicit greater 
financial contributions from local and state governments. The argument that 
decentralisation promotes allocative efficiency assumes that „the devolution of 
functions occurs within an institutional environment that provides political, 
administrative, and financial authority to local governments, along with effective 
channels of local accountability and central oversight‟ (World Bank, 2001). 
As we saw in the previous section, both, democratisation and decentralisation were 
expected to bring important benefits to the population. In particular, there were 
great expectations that governments closer to the people and politicians elected 
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through democratic and transparent elections would improve government 
performance at the community level. 
While this statement might be true in some cases, in reality the political context at 
the local level entails a number of factors that could affect the prospects of 
decentralisation for democracy and development. In particular, countries that have 
a strong tradition of patronage and clientelistic practices face more challenges for 
the efficient allocation of public funds. 
Thus, while there are a number of reasons to support decentralisation as a way of 
enhancing „subnational autonomy by allowing local actors to allocate resources 
according to their own priorities‟ (Edmonds 1998: 1), in practice the evidence has 
shown that decentralisation has produced unforeseen and sometimes unwanted 
outcomes. In many cases, the transfer of resources and responsibilities to lower 
levels of government has been associated with an increased potential of capture of 
resources, functions and benefits by local political elites, thereby undermining 
accountability and participation and exacerbating the problems of service provision, 
particularly for the poor (Crook 2003).  
Given the undesired results that decentralisation reforms have had in practice, 
there is increasing awareness in the literature that political institutions are critical to 
understanding why some local governments are more effective in delivering goods 
and services to their citizens than others (Kauneckis & Andersson 2006). More 
specifically, as it is not clear that the decentralisation of policy making has 
improved policy outcomes, the study of resource allocation processes at the local 
level has become a key issue in recent debates. It is with this in mind that recent 
studies have focused on analysing how the local political environment can change 
the incentives that motivate politicians to allocate public funds among the 
population. Recently, attention has been paid to the ways in which local political 
leaders (politicians) allocate public funds and the consequences that those 
allocations have in terms of improving provision of basic services.  
Some studies have noted that, in certain countries, „the principal problem has not 
been a lack of economic resources‟ (Mizrahi 2004: 50). In recent years, 
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governments in both developed and developing countries have implemented 
various programs to transfer significant quantities of financial resources in order to 
promote development and combat poverty. But if this is so, what explains the poor 
results of decentralisation in improving service provision and alleviating poverty? 
In order to answer this question, Edmonds argues that decentralisation theories 
can easily oversimplify „the relationship between policy change and political 
change‟ (Edmonds 1998:1). This author underscores how decentralisation theory 
„does not take into account the political context‟ as a way to understand how the 
desired benefits of decentralisation do not materialise (Edmonds 1998:1).  
Thus, it is important to explore the linkages between political variables, 
decentralised policy making, and implementation. More specifically, it is necessary 
to examine the determinants of resource allocation as a way to better understand: 
a) what are the incentives that politicians have to allocate decentralised public 
funds, and b) to what extent such allocation, influenced by political factors, might 
improve service provision at the very local level.  
The following section offers a brief account of the reasons for studying the politics 
of antipoverty spending through an examination of the Fund for Municipal Social 
Infrastructure (FAISM) and the framework and main findings of this research.  
 
1.3 Studying antipoverty spending and political gain in Mexico 
 
The use of antipoverty funds for political gain has been a constant concern in both 
developed and developing countries. However, this concern seems to be more 
significant in emerging democracies where economic development is precarious 
and high levels of poverty and inequality prevail. In these countries, social 
programs constitute a significant part of the governments‟ development strategy. 
For this reason they normally imply a broad and widespread use of public funds 
that could be used with political motivations.   
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In Mexico, the most recent changes to the social development strategy brought 
about by democratisation and decentralisation have strengthened the institutional 
design of social programs. Important innovations in policy design such as the 
inclusion of formulas for distribution of antipoverty funds, the estimation of an 
official poverty measurement and evaluation and monitoring of federal social 
programs have taken place in order to close „previous information gaps about 
distribution of resources that may have permitted the rampant political use of the 
federal budget by the federal executive in the past‟ (Pérez 2007: 2). While these 
changes have allowed limited political influence on the distribution of federal 
program resources to the municipal level (Pérez 2007), it remains to be explored if 
the new institutional mechanisms of resource allocation have indeed eliminated the 
potential use of antipoverty resources for political gain by municipal authorities. 
A number of scholars have noted that, in general, the transition to democracy in 
Mexico and the gradual process of decentralisation experienced in the past three 
decades has not entailed the disappearance of the political and clientelistic use of 
social programs (Méndez 2007). Mendez argues that in the case of Mexico, the 
clientelistic relationships were monopolised by one political party, the PRI, which 
remained in power for more than 70 years. The transition to democracy 
represented a diversification of political choices and alternation of political power at 
all levels of government, but it did not imply the full withdrawal of clientelistic 
practices. According to this author, these clientelistic practices not only persist but 
have permeated the whole political spectrum. Apparently resource allocation has 
moved away from the traditional “monopolized clientelism” to “multiparty 
clientelism” (Méndez 2007). 
The long tradition of patronage and clientelistic exchanges between politicians and 
citizens in Mexico could mean that the devolution of resources and responsibilities 
to lower levels of government might not translate into more democratic forms of 
governance nor more efficient service provision.  
As significant amounts of resources have been transferred in recent years to 
municipal governments to improve the basic social infrastructure of poor 
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communities, studies have analysed the effectiveness of these federal transfers in 
reaching the poor. The empirical evidence shows how the distribution of 
antipoverty funds might not necessarily be reaching the poorest sectors of the 
population. Rather, it would seem as though decentralised antipoverty funds are 
allocated to the communities with large populations within a municipality without 
taking into account their infrastructure limitations (Hernández & Jarillo 2006).  
The recent focus on the study of subnational governments raises the question of 
how this level of government under conditions of political autonomy and resources 
availability can actually respond to the needs of the population. As it has been 
argued before, studying the effects of political institutions on resource allocation is 
critical to gaining a clearer image of the challenges that decentralised antipoverty 
spending entails for development.  
In this sense, the objective of this dissertation is to provide a detailed account of 
the political institutions that shape the incentives of the local actors who participate 
in the distribution of antipoverty funds, and how resource allocation, influenced by 
political factors, affects basic service provision.  
Through an examination of the most important decentralised fiscal fund to 
municipal governments whose express purpose is to provide social infrastructure 
to the poorest sectors of the population, the Fund for Municipal Social 
Infrastructure (FAISM), this dissertation explores the extent to which political 
institutions mediate the incentives that politicians have to allocate antipoverty 
funds. A second aspect examined in this dissertation is the extent to which these 
allocations, influenced by political motivations, have an impact on improvements of 
basic service provision. 
This dissertation offers a theoretical framework for the study of the effects of 
politics on antipoverty resource allocation. The framework seeks to explore what 
choices politician‟s make in allocating resources. It distinguishes between two 
types of resources: public and private goods. This distinction is important to 
characterise how municipal authorities in Mexico distribute resources among the 
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population. It also allows for the classification of thousands of projects that were 
financed with FAISM resources in a nine year period in 122 Mexican municipalities.  
In exploring the ways in which FAISM resources are distributed, this research has 
found that, despite the recent reforms to the social development strategy of the 
country, and as a result of democratisation and decentralisation, a significant part 
of this fund is allocated to private goods. In other words, clientelism persists as a 
political interaction between citizens and politicians and all political parties make 
use of this practice with vote seeking expectations. However, not all is bad news. 
As will be detailed in chapter four where this dissertation explores the political 
determinants of resource allocations, the existence of strong competition between 
political parties at the municipal level undermines the allocation of FAISM 
resources for private ends. Moreover, in agreement with previous studies on 
clientelism, this dissertation has found that private good provision is less prevalent 
in those municipalities with higher levels of economic development. An additional 
finding is related to the electoral calendar of local politicians. In this case, this 
research has found that private good provision tends to increase when local 
elections are scheduled. 
In exploring whether FAISM allocations, influenced by political factors, have had an 
impact on basic service provision, the statistical analysis in chapter five suggests 
that public goods allocations through FAISM have enabled local governments to 
improve access to basic services to the population. Although the findings in that 
chapter are far from conclusive it can be argued, apart from the beneficial effects of 
FAISM allocations, that meaningful elections seem to have beneficial effects in the 
provision of some basic services. 
 
1.4 Scholarly contributions 
 
First, this dissertation provides a better understanding of clientelism, how it works 
and the factors that impact upon it. Through an examination of social spending in 
Mexican municipalities this dissertation has finds that clientelism is mediated by the 
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political conditions and interactions between citizens and politicians within the local 
context. Pluralistic politics tend to have a positive effect on the allocation of 
antipoverty funds because the presence of more political parties tends to 
incentivise politicians to invest with public goods –programmatic spending– rather 
than with private goods –clientelism–. 
This dissertation also offers an exploration of the persistence of clientelistic 
interactions between citizens and politicians and confirms the fact that clientelism 
prevails even in contexts of increasingly democratic politics. The findings of this 
dissertation suggest that clientelistic practices have permeated the whole political 
spectrum, as clientelism is perceived, by some political actors, as an effective tool 
for achieving political success.  
It also contributes to the study on the effects of democracy on poverty reduction. 
One of the big development questions is to understand if/whether democratic 
politics can contribute to effective poverty reduction, and if so, what are the formal 
and informal mechanisms through which this takes place. In the process of 
resource allocation, this dissertation has found that, despite the prevalence of 
clientelistic practices, in contexts of pluralistic politics local governments tend to 
allocate public goods in ways that can improve the provision of basic services to 
the population. 
Finally, for students of local government, this dissertation offers an account of how 
social spending decisions are made at this level of government and what factors 
might influence the choices that local politicians make in the distribution of 
antipoverty funds. 
 
1.5 Case selection and methods 
 
Case selection 
Mexico is an ideal case study subject to examine the effects of politics on patterns 
of resource allocation within a middle income country that has a long tradition of 
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patronage and clientelistic exchanges between its citizens and politicians. Also, 
democratisation and decentralisation have recently had a major impact on the 
institutional arrangement of Mexico‟s federal system, and therefore on the social 
development strategy.  
For the last ten years, Mexican politics have been characterised by plurality and 
increasing levels of political competition „for the integration of powers and the 
representation of authorities in the three levels of government: federal, state and 
municipal‟ (Santín del Río 2004: 59). Democratisation has transformed the political 
dynamics at the local level. In the last decade, municipal elections have become 
increasingly contested battles between political parties and handing power over to 
the opposition (party alternation) has become the rule. As Grindle (2007: 63) notes: 
„Indeed, municipal elections became hotly contested races among parties 
and partisans; increasingly, the venerable party of Mexico‟s revolution, the 
PRI, lost these electoral battles. Where it did not lose, the old hegemonic 
party had to work harder to win. And, with time, parties challenging the PRI 
began to face significant electoral opposition once they proved their capacity 
to win municipal office. Indeed, by the mid-2000s, turning power over the 
opposition was the spectre behind every local election, one that haunted all 
parties, not just the PRI‟.  
Decentralisation of fiscal resources to subnational units of government represented 
a step forward in the strengthening of municipal authorities. With more resources at 
their disposal, local governments had, for the first time in contemporary Mexican 
history, more chances to become effective participants within the national federal 
structure. In sum, increasing pluralism, greater electoral transparency, partisan 
alternation, and the willingness of the centre to transfer powers and responsibilities 
to lower levels of government have all created incentives for activation of the 
traditionally abandoned local governments. These changes have allowed local 
governments to have a much more active role in the provision of services to the 
population. 
This investigation was designed to focus on the degree and ways in which public 
resources transferred under FAISM are used by municipal authorities, and in 
particular, the ways in which their uses are influenced by political motivations. For 
the purposes of this study it was important to choose a state that could reflect the 
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local Mexican reality as characterised by great socio-economic and political 
diversity among municipalities. Access to detailed social spending data by 
municipal governments was also an important issue since this type of information 
is, in most Mexican municipalities, unavailable.  
Estado de Mexico was selected for the purposes of this dissertation, as this state 
and its municipalities represent an approximation of the Mexican reality, where 
political competition has increased significantly in the past two decades and strong 
inequalities prevail at the municipal level. The variations found across the 
municipalities of Estado de Mexico provide a unique opportunity to compare 
different municipalities in terms of size, level of development and political 
competition. The study of Estado de Mexico also offers the opportunity to explore 
the extent to which local officials use FAISM for political gain in the most populated 
and, thus, politically important state of the country. In addition, apart from having a 
personal connection with the state, since the creation of FAISM, the Municipalities 
of Estado de Mexico have been among the very few in the country that have 
systematically reported the final destinations of FAISM allocations. Due to the 
difficulty of collecting information at the municipal level, antipoverty resource 
allocations by municipal authorities have been woefully under-studied. The data 
collected for this investigation makes a contribution to studies of municipal 
governments in Mexico as the data offers a detailed account of the ways in which 
municipal authorities allocate those public funds whose objective is to improve 
basic infrastructure in poor communities. 
On the political side, Estado de Mexico shows the current political context at the 
local level as characterised by the coexistence of different patterns of electoral 
competition. In the past decade, the electoral environment in many municipalities 
of this Mexican state has moved from complete one-party domination by the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to competitive multiparty politics, where 
opposition parties have been both able and allowed to win elections for municipal 
offices1.  
                                                 
1
 It is important to note that at the state level, the one party rule of the PRI continues unabated.  
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During the 1990 to 2006 period, 89 percent of the municipalities in Estado de 
Mexico were ruled by more than one political party. In only 14 municipalities was 
the PRI able to retain power. During this period, the days of PRI control over the 
vast majority of municipalities were gone. Notwithstanding the PRI was able to hold 
continuous power at the state level, in 82 municipalities, opposition political parties 
were able to defeat the PRI on at least one occasion. 
 
Table 1. Number of political parties in power 
Estado de Mexico 1990-2006 
No. of 
Political 
parties 
No. of 
Municipalities 
Percentage 
1 14 11.48 
2 82 67.21 
3 22 18.03 
4 4 3.28 
Total 122 100 
 
As mentioned before, apart from the important changes experienced in recent 
years in the political configuration of this Mexican state, the poverty levels and 
socio-economic composition of Estado de Mexico and its municipalities make it 
possible to empirically examine the effects of politics on the implementation of 
antipoverty spending in municipalities with different populations, levels of 
development and access to public services.  
Estado de Mexico is the most populous state in the country and an important 
economic centre. Estado de Mexico has an extension of 22, 500 square meters 
which represent 1.1 percent of the territory of Mexico. As a result of the socio-
economic characteristics of the state and its vicinity with the Federal District, 
Estado de Mexico has experienced rapid demographic growth. For the past four 
decades, Estado de Mexico has been an important receptor of population flows 
from other states such as Distrito Federal, Puebla and Oaxaca. Thus, today more 
than 14 million Mexicans live in this territory demanding goods and services from 
the state representing almost 14 percent of the total population of the country. The 
population of the state is concentrated in 20 percent of the land, particularly in two 
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large valleys: one, “Valle Cuatitlan – Texcoco”, has approximately 10 million 
inhabitants that, together with the Distrito Federal (Federal District), represent one 
of the largest metropolitan areas in the world. The second large valley, known as 
“Valle Toluca – Lerma”, has a population of approximately 1.5 million inhabitants 
and includes the municipality of Toluca which is the state capital and an important 
industrial centre.  
In economic terms, Estado de Mexico is the second largest economy in the country 
and the eighth largest in Latin America and it represents, approximately, 10 per 
cent of Mexico‟s GDP. The Estado de Mexico manufacturing sector is the most 
important in the country.  
In terms of development, according to data from the Consejo Nacional de 
Evaluación de la Política Social (CONEVAL), the Mexican Office in charge of the 
evaluation of social policy and poverty measurement in the country, Estado de 
Mexico shows similar levels of poverty to those of the country as a whole. 
CONEVAL divides poverty into three levels: food poverty (lack of income to cover 
basic food necessities); skills poverty (lack of income to cover basic food, health 
and education needs), and patrimonial poverty (inadequate income for covering 
health, food, education, clothing, housing and public transportation expenses). 
While food poverty in the country affects 18.7 million inhabitants, almost 18 percent 
of the population, in Estado de Mexico, 1.9 million inhabitants, or 14 percent of the 
population, do not have sufficient income to cover basic food necessities. Skills 
poverty in Mexico affects more than 29 million people, which represents 24 percent 
of the population of the country, while in Estado de Mexico it affects 3.1 million 
people or 22.4% of the population. A similar pattern is seen in the third level of 
poverty. In terms of patrimonial poverty, we find that 47 percent of Mexico‟s 
population and 49 percent of Estado de Mexico‟s population live in this condition. 
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The municipalities of Estado de Mexico show important contrasts that facilitate a 
comparative exploration among 1222 municipalities with different populations, 
degrees of marginalisation3 and access to public services.  
Among the municipalities of Estado de Mexico included in this study, 42 are 
considered rural and 80 urban4. Ecatepec and Nezahualcoyotl are the two most 
populated urban centres within the state and the first and third most populated of 
the country, with 1, 688 258 and 1, 140 528 inhabitants, respectively. At the same 
time, Estado de Mexico also includes municipalities with less than 5, 000 
inhabitants, such as Texcalyacac, Zacazonapan, Papalotla and Otzoloapan. 
Development levels also vary across the municipalities studied in this dissertation. 
According to data from the Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO), 30 
municipalities have high or very high deprivation levels in Estado de Mexico, which 
means that approximately 24 percent of the municipalities in this state have poor 
basic service provision, relatively high illiteracy rates and low levels of employment. 
The rest of the municipalities, including urban centres such as Huixquilucan and 
Metepec, which are considered to be among the most developed municipalities in 
the country, have medium to high levels of development. While there are 
municipalities in Estado de Mexico with levels of development comparable to the 
average of that of OECD countries, there are also some municipalities at the other 
end of the spectrum with levels of development similar to those in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
Methods 
Antipoverty programs in Mexico have been subject to numerous studies in the past 
years. However, the majority of studies or analyses of the country‟s social strategy 
have been focused on the national level. Despite the fact that the antipoverty 
                                                 
2
 Given the time period studied in this research, it was possible to collect information from 122 municipalities of 
Estado de Mexico, however, today Estado de Mexico has 125 municipalities. 
3
 The marginalisation index identifies the municipalities with lower economic and social development. This 
index considers four dimensions: education, housing, population and employment, and identifies five degrees 
of marginalisation: very low, low, medium, high and very high. 
4
 Municipalities with more than 50 percent of the population living in localities of more than 2,500 inhabitants 
are considered urban centres. 
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strategies implemented in Mexico since the late 1980s „have been primarily aimed 
at improving the provision of goods and services‟ (Diaz-Cayeros et al. forthcoming) 
at the local level, there have been limited efforts to examine the actual use of 
public funds by the lowest level of government.  
The difficulties of carrying out these analyses are, to a great extent, explained by 
the absence or lack of information on social spending at this level of government. 
As Rocha (2005: 355) notes, „one of the issues that makes a rigorous quantitative 
assessment of FAISM funds particularly difficult is a fundamental lack of reliable 
and comparable data across municipalities.‟ The lack of transparency in Mexico at 
the municipal level has made it practically impossible to evaluate the policies 
implemented by municipal authorities (Pardinas & Granados 2010).  
The data obtained during my field visit to Estado de Mexico in the summer of 2006 
provides a unique opportunity to examine municipal spending in Mexico and, in 
particular, to carry out a formal and systematic evaluation of FAISM. According to 
officials from the federal Ministry of Social Development, Estado de Mexico is one 
of the few Mexican states that have systematically collected data on FAISM 
spending since 1998. Through monthly reports regarding the use of FAISM 
resources, the Ministry of Finance of Estado de Mexico has been able to 
concentrate all the programs and projects financed with these funds since the 
creation of FAISM in 1998 by the municipalities.  
The database on FAISM used for this research project was provided by the 
Directorate of Planning and Public Expenditure of the government of Estado de 
Mexico. The database includes all the information provided to the Ministry of 
Finance of Estado de Mexico by the municipal governments about FAISM projects 
and programs carried out during the period 1998 to 2006. The database contains 
information about more than 57, 000 projects. The information detailed in the 
database includes: the type of public work, location, cost, number of beneficiaries, 
beginning and completion of the works, programme, etc.  
The availability of data on municipal spending for basic social infrastructure during 
a period of almost ten years in one Mexican state offered the possibility to test, on 
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a systematic and quantitative basis, some premises regarding the use of public 
funds that aim to fight poverty and inequality through the provision of basic 
services to the poorest communities. It allowed a comparative analysis of a large 
number of cases over a period of almost ten years „that make it possible to 
distinguish hypotheses regarding variables that in small n studies tend to be highly 
correlated (for example, level of development and patterns of multiparty 
competition) and thus difficult to assess simultaneously‟ (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 
forthcoming).  
As mentioned before, one of the concerns of this dissertation is to investigate the 
extent to which the allocation of FAISM funds by municipal authorities is affected 
by electoral considerations and to explore the extent to which clientelistic practices 
prevail despite the most recent efforts to depoliticised antipoverty programs. 
Focusing on municipalities as units of analysis enables us to measure 
improvements in public service provision as a consequence of public spending. A 
comparative analysis across municipalities facilitates an exploration of how local 
political conditions have an impact on the actual use of pro-poor spending.  
It is important to mention that, as Rocha (2005) argues, an exploration of individual 
cases of the use of FAISM could show some tendencies that may be 
generalisable. It could also help to identify in greater detail the dynamics of the 
process of pro-poor policy interventions and to shed light on the perception of 
citizens with regards to the provision of public services by municipal authorities. 
However, given the data on municipal social spending over a period of ten years, 
focusing on aggregate indicators provides the opportunity to analyse actual 
spending patterns (through public or private goods provision) in contexts with 
different levels of development and variations in political configuration. As Diaz-
Cayeros et al. (forthcoming: 71) note, „comparing municipalities characterised by 
different political and socioeconomic profiles, not just individual differences 
between survey respondents, allows us to infer how local conditions, as reflected in 
factors such as the number of parties, the partisan identity of the local government 
or the competitiveness of municipal electoral races, enable or disable practices of 
clientelism‟. 
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In this sense, in order to address the question of the effects of politics on 
antipoverty funds this dissertation used panel data analysis to assess the degree to 
which political institutions influenced the use of FAISM by the municipalities. The 
statistical analysis shows how political considerations have impacted on the 
allocation of FAISM resources for political gain among 122 municipalities (cross 
sectional elements) over a nine year period (time series).  The data used for this 
study includes over 57,000 projects carried out between 1998 and 2006. The data 
set also includes socio-demographic information from the 122 municipalities, and 
electoral information from the last four municipal elections and the last two 
gubernatorial elections. It also includes different indices that measure the degree 
and level of political fragmentation. 
I used regression analysis to explore the second goal of this dissertation whether 
these allocations, influenced by political factors, have had an impact on basic 
service provision. The data used for the statistical analysis includes FAISM 
allocations on three basic services: water, sewerage and electricity as reported by 
122 municipalities in Estado de Mexico between 2000 and 2005. Measures of 
electoral competition, party ideology, political participation and state capacity are 
used for the analysis. 
 
1.6 Dissertation overview 
 
Chapter two explains how the transition towards democratic politics and the 
decentralisation of powers and responsibilities to subnational governments in 
Mexico have transformed the antipoverty strategy of the country. It includes a brief 
account of the democratisation and decentralisation processes in Mexico in order 
to gain a better understanding of how great an impact these two broad political 
processes have had on the institutional functioning of the federal system, and 
hence they have created incentives for the transformation of social policy. It 
describes the most popular antipoverty program implemented during the mid-
1980s and 1990s, Solidaridad, and how this program opened the door for the 
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deepening of the decentralisation of social spending to the municipal level through 
the creation of the Fund for Municipal Social Infrastructure (FAISM). Following that, 
FAISM is explored by looking at its main characteristics and limitations, and by 
focusing on the potential political use of this fund. 
Chapter three provides a theoretical framework to analyse the effects of politics on 
antipoverty resource allocations. It starts with a discussion on clientelism, its 
effects on democracy and development, and its prevalence as a type of interaction 
between citizens and politicians. Following that, it discusses the distinction 
between private goods –clientelism– and public goods, their main characteristics 
and their possible effects on policy outcomes. It then explores how political 
institutions are linked to resource allocation and how this interaction influences 
government performance. Based on the distinction between private and public 
goods, the chapter develops a framework for studying antipoverty spending that 
proposes to look at the incentives politicians have to make choices regarding the 
allocation of public funds. The framework allows for the disaggregation of municipal 
social spending data and hence helps to disentangle the links between political 
institutions and resource allocation in Mexico.  
Chapter four explores the links between politics and resource allocation. Through 
and exploration of the allocation of FAISM resources in 122 municipalities of the 
most populated Mexican state over a period of nine years, the chapter examines 
the extent to which decentralised antipoverty funds are allocated with political 
motivations. Using a Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) Model the chapter 
tests the effects of three sets of variables–political competition, electoral cycles, 
and partisanship– on the allocation of antipoverty funds. It is argued in that chapter 
that despite recent changes to the social development strategy of the country to 
depoliticise antipoverty resource allocation, the distribution of goods and services 
continues to be influenced by the political motivations of elected officials and their 
political allies. 
Once the case has been made for the links between politics and antipoverty 
resource allocation, chapter five addresses the degree to which political institutions 
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and their influence on resource allocation affects improvements on basic service 
provision. The chapter offers a comparative analysis of FAISM public goods 
allocations. Particular attention is paid to the degree to which service provision is 
influenced by the new conditions of democratic politics and decentralisation of 
fiscal funds for basic service provision. Regression analysis is used to explain 
changes in the percentage of the population that has access to three basic 
services: potable water, sewerage and electricity. Finally, the chapter attempts to 
explain how state capacity, electoral politics and participation affect public service 
provision. Chapter six concludes by summarising the most important findings of 
this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICIES IN MEXICO 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to explore how pressures brought about by increasing levels of 
political competition (democratisation) and a gradual transfer of powers and 
responsibilities to lower levels of government (decentralisation), within a context of 
neoliberal reform, have shaped the restructuring of the antipoverty strategy of the 
federal government in Mexico. 
Mexico is a federal republic composed of thirty-one states –each divided into 
municipalities– plus a Federal District. Yet, for decades Mexico was characterised 
by a high degree of political and economic centralism. This centralism „encouraged 
by the peculiar dynamics of a one-party regime and the absence of an effective 
democratic arrangement, subordinated [subnational governments] to a secondary 
position in terms of governance and in terms of their influence on national policies‟ 
(Aguilar & Cullen 1997: 1). Since the 1980s though, Mexico has embarked on 
various economic and political reforms that have had a significant impact on the 
antipoverty strategy of the country.  
The 1980s was a decade of profound transformation in Mexico. Economically, the 
country faced a deep economic crisis. This sparked the beginning of the 
implementation of austerity and adjustment programmes. Politically, the lack of 
state‟s capacity to respond to the demands of the citizens increased opposition to 
the regime. Political liberalisation was thus accelerated, prompting a move away 
from political centralism toward a more open, pluralistic and democratic form of 
government. Included in these changes, the federal government initiated a process 
of transfer of power, responsibilities and resources to the state and municipal 
levels.  
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Faced with economic crisis, pressures for political liberalisation and greater 
demands for better public services from its citizens, the Mexican government had 
no option but to adopt decentralisation in an attempt to reduce financial pressures 
on the federal government, confront the increasing opposition to the regime, and 
increase the efficiency of public service provision. Under this context, Solidaridad 
program was created during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. This 
program became the basis of the government‟s social development strategy. 
Although that the program aimed to combat poverty through transferring funds 
directly to municipalities based on proposals from community organisations and 
municipal governments, in practice Solidaridad was highly centralised and the 
president exerted a major influence over the allocation of resources.   
During the 1990s, increasing political and economic liberalisation and strong 
criticism of Solidaridad for its political manipulation from the centre pushed the 
federal government to restructure the social development strategy of the country. 
Within this context the decentralisation process deepened, allowing for a stronger 
participation from lower levels of government in the provision of public services. 
Education and healthcare services were largely transferred to state governments 
and with the creation of FAISM in the late 1990s, municipal governments became 
effective providers of basic public services. 
In many ways, social policy in Mexico has been an instrument to guarantee 
governability rather than a mechanism to improve the living conditions of the 
population (Pardo 2009). This chapter argues that during the last two decades, 
social policy has been adjusted to the criteria and priorities of each presidential 
term in order to respond to the emerging challenges brought about by increasing 
levels of political competition and the increasing demands, from lower levels of 
government for more powers and resources to deliver services to the population. 
This chapter shows how, on the one hand, during the 1988-1994 period social 
policy was used as a political tool to legitimise the political regime and to guarantee 
political control from the centre. On the other hand, since 1997, when the 
centralistic structure of the federal system started to show signs of exhaustion, the 
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federal government has established a new social development strategy that allows 
for more active participation from lower levels of government in the delivery of 
basic public services. 
Despite the most recent efforts to provide lower levels of government a more active 
role in the implementation of the social policy, Mexico‟s long tradition of patronage 
and clientelistic exchanges between politicians and citizens, might have 
undermined the prospects that the devolution of resources and responsibilities 
entail for basic service provision. It is the aim of this dissertation to evaluate the 
extent to which the most recent political changes brought about by decentralisation 
and democratisation have impacted the implementation of social policy at the very 
local level. 
The chapter is divided as follows: the following sections provide an overview of 
democratisation and decentralisation in Mexico; then, I succinctly review the most 
recent social development strategies implemented since the late 1980s by the 
federal government by focusing on the factors that triggered their implementation, 
how they worked and what they achieved; this will be followed by a brief discussion 
on the political manipulation of decentralised antipoverty spending; finally, the last 
section concludes. 
 
2.2 The transition to democracy in Mexico 
 
Mexico‟s transition to democracy has been a long process of change and continuity 
(Elizondo & Nacif 2002). On the one hand, the political institutions established in 
the 1920s, particularly the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), showed an 
unusual capacity to survive for 70 years; on the other hand, the regime was flexible 
enough to reform and change in response to the interests of the political elite and 
to the diverse and increasing forms of social and political opposition. As Schedler 
(2001: 6) suggests, „the Mexican transition went through the unusual experience of 
a regime change without a change of government. A “silent revolution” transformed 
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its electoral infrastructure, its party system, its legislative politics, and its federal 
system under the deceptive surface of constitutional and government continuity‟. 
The Mexican regime experienced a slow but incremental transition without the high 
levels of uncertainty and instability that have characterised processes of 
democratic rupture5 (Whitehead 1994: 124). 
According to Ortega (2000: 82), during „the 1950s and 1960s Mexico experienced 
rapid economic growth and thus an increase in the size of the middle class, 
bringing new social actors to the fore to confront the Mexican state‟. By the late 
1960s, a major student mobilisation took place. The „state‟s response to the 
student movement raised broader questions about the legitimacy and the fallibility 
of the state and incumbents‟ (Craig 1990: 271). For a number of scholars, the 
student movement of 1968 is considered the watershed that marked the beginning 
of the evolution of a more democratic regime. In this sense, the origins of more 
recent political changes in Mexico‟s political life can be traced to this year.  
The state‟s repression of the movement prompted several groups to take up arms, 
thus characterising the 1970s as a decade of urban and rural warfare. The state‟s 
response to these movements accelerated the political liberalisation6 of the regime 
and opened windows of opportunity for political engagement.  
In 1973 and 1977, the government negotiated a series of electoral reforms seeking 
to integrate these new forms of political and social opposition into the political 
system. The 1977 political reforms of President Lopez Portillo increased the 
number and diversity of political parties, altered the rules governing elections, 
augmented opposition parties‟ representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies 
as well as in state and local governments and expanded opposition parties‟ access 
                                                 
5
 The Mexican experience, in contrast to some South American countries -where the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy implied the disappearance of the former authoritarian regime and its 
replacement by new leaders and by a new democratic order- mirrors the experiences of some states during the 
1990s in Mexico, and how the defeat of the PRI in the 2 de julio presidential election have not produced a 
collapsed of the entire system (Elizondo and Nacif 2002: 1). 
6
 Political liberalisation is characterised by a series of reforms which involve greater respect for individual and 
collective rights, greater freedom of association and expression and the institution of constitutional changes 
such as the replacement of a single-party system with a multi- party systems and the introduction of regular, 
free and fair elections for political succession. 
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to mass communications (Middlebrook 1986: 123). This was the first significant 
political reform in the regime‟s history (Olvera 2000a). 
The politics of this political liberalisation were carried out in the context of a 
prolonged economic crisis where the policies to deal with the crisis ended a period 
of nationalistic and protectionist economic policies. A shift towards a market-
oriented economy marked the beginning of a new era. In the beginning of the 
1980s, Mexico was the world‟s first and foremost debtor nation; at that time the 
country faced what came to be called the “Debt Crisis”. The country owed private 
and public foreign creditors US$80 billion and even the interest payments could not 
be met. Inflation was running at an annualised rate of 100 percent, unemployment 
was rising, the real minimum wage had undergone drastic reductions, and the 
deterioration in public sector finance had severely curtailed the government‟s ability 
to manage the crisis (Ramirez 1989: 98). This led to significant government 
unpopularity. 
Within this economic context elections started to evolve into a real mechanism of 
competition among political forces. The economic crisis „unleashed the underlying 
social pressures for greater political participation, spurred a major increase in the 
level of politisation and galvanised society against the state‟ (Chand 2000: 26). For 
the business community and middle class it was a turning point; instead of seeking 
to resolve their differences with the government through traditional channels, they 
opted for direct involvement in opposition politics, mainly through the PAN, the 
right-wing party. 
As a consequence of the economic crisis, despite the 1977 political reforms that 
were designed and determined by the government in response to the relative rise 
of social and political opposition to the regime (particularly the leftist forces) it was 
not the left, but the right-wing opposition led by PAN that first capitalised on the 
reforms (Ortega 2000: 82-83). Opposition parties registered important gains in 
federal and local elections around the country and the PRI faced rising challenges 
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to maintain its traditional electoral support. By the mid-1980s, the PAN was an 
important contender in some local elections7. 
In 1986 there was massive public protest against irregularities in several elections 
in the north of Mexico8. Particularly in the border state of Chihuahua, electoral 
irregularities lead to a major protest movement. „Business organisations, the 
Catholic Church, civic associations, housewives, urban marginals, workers, 
intellectuals, and opposition political parties of varying persuasions joined hands to 
condemn the electoral process as fraudulent and to fight for its annulment‟ (Chand 
2000: 38). 
Under this context of the mobilization of civil society within the country, the 
government negotiated a package of new political reforms with the opposition. The 
reforms had two principal purposes. On the one hand, they introduced the principle 
of proportional representation into Mexican federal and state legislatures, opening 
the possibility for opposition political parties to have some political role in every 
state via legislative representation. On the other hand, due to the increasingly 
competitive profile of the PAN in some state elections, it introduced the so-called 
“governability clause”9 which would guarantee the PRI majoritarian control of the 
Chamber of Deputies (Lujambio 1998). 
Although these reforms prevented a major change in the composition of the 
Chamber of Deputies, it successfully changed the incentive structures within the 
PRI and weakened its political discipline. Defectors from the PRI found fertile 
ground for some electoral representation in opposition parties. In addition, the 
reforms increased the independence of the left-wing parties which were regarded 
as very tame (Philip 2002:138).  
                                                 
7
 At this time, the PAN won some local elections particularly in urban cities in the states of Baja California, 
Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Jalisco, Durango, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Yucatán and Estado de 
México. 
8
 Due to the significant political gains of the right wing party (PAN) in the beginning of the 1980s, the 
government was afraid that a victory of this opposition party would have a domino effect on other states. Thus, 
the government‟s strategy during the 1986 elections was to stop this trend. 
9
 The “governability clause” established that if no party obtained more than 50%+1 of the effective votes, and if 
it was unable to achieve at least 251 out of 300 plurality seats, then enough proportional representation seats 
would be allotted to the largest party (Lujambio 1998: 173). 
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As a result, although the reforms were not intended to be significant, greater 
autonomy of left-wing parties and the reduction of political discipline within the PRI 
enabled the formation of an alliance between dissidents within the PRI and the left-
wing opposition. 
The consolidation of the coalition also caught the attention of a number of social 
and civic organisations. Traditionally, these organisations rejected to participation 
in electoral politics. However, Cárdenas‟ candidacy opened a particular political 
conjuncture for their direct participation in the electoral arena. Others believed that 
the coalition „was in some sense a response to popular mobilisation‟ (Foweraker 
1990: 54). Therefore, the 1988 presidential election set an historical political 
precedent: the political encounter between the parties and organised Mexican civil 
society.  
Although the PRI remained in power, the 1988 election marked the beginning of a 
new era in the political system. As Olvera (2000b: 7) states: 
„A party system on a national scale was created, in which the National 
Action Party (PAN) was placed as a democratic right-wing party. The PRD 
(1989) absorbed the populist currents of the PRI, the majority of the 
organised leftist party groups and numerous social movements‟ leaders, 
especially those of popular urban movements, peasant organisations and 
students‟ movements. The civil society represented by the nongovernmental 
organisations chose not to join this process, keeping their political and 
organisational autonomy‟. 
From this moment, and with an expanded representation in Mexican politics, 
parties started to matter. Furthermore, with the new composition of the Congress 
political forces were able to promote broader political reforms. At the same time, 
several civil society organisations spread across the country with the aim of 
promoting democracy, fair elections and human rights. In short, the 
democratisation of Mexico was underway. 
The 1990s in Mexico were characterised by three main factors. First, this period 
confirmed the shift towards a market-oriented economy and marked the beginning 
of a process of economic liberalisation. Second, the political liberalisation initiated 
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in the 1970s as a result of the efforts of organised civil society and political parties 
was accelerated. Third, the decade was „marked by an explosion of activity by a 
wide variety of civic associations dedicated to the promotion of democracy, clean 
elections, and human rights‟ (Chand 2000: 205). At the same time, social 
movements emerged in response to the increasing inequalities created by the 
neoliberal policies. These factors accelerated the democratisation process in 
Mexico. 
The 1988 presidential election marked a new crisis for the Mexican political system 
and for the PRI. Under this context, President Salinas' administration faced new 
challenges. The newly elected government10 was under internal pressure and 
outside scrutiny. On the one hand, with stronger social and political forces and a 
party system in the process of consolidation, the regime faced great pressures for 
democratisation. On the other hand, with the need to attract foreign investment in 
order to further economic liberalisation and sign a free trade agreement with the 
United States and Canada, the government was desperate to show that Mexico 
was a country undergoing a process of economic and political liberalisation.  
At this time, wide sectors of Mexican society found an opportunity to accelerate 
change in the political system. As a result of social and political struggles, 
the1990s saw a profound reform of the Mexican state, incrementally abolishing 
authoritarian forms of power through decentralisation, reforming economic 
structures, and instituting political reform.  
As Prud‟home (1998: 147) argues, the „problems of legitimacy, combined with the 
new configuration of power among political parties and the necessities for 
governance, led to an intense process of electoral reform during the Salinas 
administration: no less than three major electoral reforms were enacted between 
1989 and 1994‟. The electoral reforms resulted from the struggle among political 
parties to build trust among them and with the clear objective of enhancing the 
autonomy and impartiality of electoral institutions within Mexico. This process of 
institutional change marked a new era in electoral politics. In 1989, the PAN won 
                                                 
10
 The 1988 presidential election results were contested by all opposition parties, and important mobilisations 
took place to protest against election fraud. 
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its first governorship, which was follow by several other gubernatorial victories in 
the early 1990s.  
Two major events took place in 1994 that challenged the stability of the regime. On 
New Year‟s Day, the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) staged an 
uprising in the Southern State of Chiapas in response to the discrimination, 
marginalisation and violence against the indigenous people. In March, Luis 
Donaldo Colosio the PRI nominee for the Presidency was murdered. Both events 
sent shockwaves through the financial markets and the political system. 
At the same time, as these negative events took place „local and national civic 
associations formed a prodemocracy coalition, Alianza Cívica, which mobilised 
more than 18 thousand electoral monitors in the 1994 election to combat fraud‟ 
(Tulchin and Selee 2002: 10). 
Finally, in December 1994 Mexico suffered a new financial crisis that showed 
clearly the weaknesses of the economy. For a number of scholars, by the end of 
1994, conditions were given for the collapse of the Mexican economy due to the 
implementation of structural adjustment reforms. As Veltmeyer, et al. (1997: 161) 
argues, „the vulnerability of Mexico‟s economy was built on the policies and 
structure engendered by neoliberals‟. 
Once again, the government faced a period of high instability. This time, pressures 
from the opposition political parties, Alianza Cívica, the EZLN, and other forces in 
society led to the creation of the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE). This new 
electoral institution proved to be a key element in establishing free and fair 
elections. Thus, in the 1997 congressional elections, the PRI lost its absolute 
majority in the Deputies Chamber. For the first time in electoral history in Mexico, 
the PAN consolidated its position as the second electoral force and the PRD won 
the first electoral race in Mexico City. These events were a pre-cursor to the 2000 
election, when the PRI lost the presidential election for the first time since its 
foundation. 
During the 1990s important social forces emerged and political parties entered a 
period of consolidation, gaining more political representation throughout the 
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country. Thus, with strong social and political forces pressing for change in the 
context of political and economic uncertainty, the regime experienced major 
institutional transformation. The process of political liberalisation during this period 
radically transformed the political system. By the 2000 presidential election, 
political institutions and the economy had experienced years of intense 
transformation that would allow regime change without rupture (Mayer-Serra & 
Nacif 2002). 
 
2.3 Decentralisation in Mexico 
 
As mentioned before, Mexico has been a centralised country. Despite the federal 
structure established in the Constitution and other secondary legislation11 that 
emphasises the autonomy of municipalities as entities of government, Mexico has 
been characterised as a highly centralised system both politically and economically 
such that subnational governments have been structurally limited from participating 
in the general advantages of federal regimes12 (Aguilar and Cullen 1997).  
For decades, this centralism has meant that each level of government was 
substantially weaker and less autonomous than the levels above. Municipalities, 
the lowest level of government, have been the most dependent and least politically 
and financially autonomous. As Cornelius (1988: 206) notes, for years „the federal 
government has controlled about 85 percent of public revenues, the state 
governments have controlled less than 12 percent, and the municipios scarcely 3 
percent‟. In fiscal terms, compared to other federal governments around the world, 
Mexico has been characterised by a relatively high degree of expenditure 
centralisation and by limited revenue-raising powers of subnational governments 
(Gamboa 1999; Amieva-Huerta 1997). The centralisation of financial resources 
was a crucial in the strategy to maintain the „stability‟ of the political regime. 
                                                 
11
 Constitutionally, Mexico is a democratic, representative, federal territorial structure, consisting of 31 free and 
sovereign states and a federal district united under a federation. 
12
 Authentic federal systems are normally recognised by their flexibility. Federal systems allow subnational 
governments to set their own internal rules and institutions, to respond to the particular needs of their citizens, 
and to adapt to new external conditions, as long as the federal pact is respected (Aguilar and Cullen 1997). 
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For a number of scholars, the reasons for the contradiction between federalism on 
paper and de facto centralism have been, on the one hand, the deep historical 
roots of the Spanish colonial and even pre-colonial periods (Cornelius, 1988: 16) 
and, on the other hand, the constitutional powers of the president and the features 
of the party system (the dominance of the ruling party, the strong party discipline 
and the metaconstitutional powers of the president, for instance) (Willis, Garman & 
Haggard, 1999: 42). The political system was recognised for its capacity to 
maintain social stability but also for the impressive concentration of power in the 
executive branch. 
For nearly 80 years, the PRI dominated the Mexican political system at virtually all 
levels of government. According to Nickson (1995: 200), the PRI „came to 
monopolise the political life of the country. The PRI pursued a rapid state-led 
industrialisation strategy that was implemented by a highly centralised 
administrative system (...)‟ whose officials were accountable to higher levels of 
government: legislators, federal officials, ministers and the president, but not to the 
citizens13. Under this system the President was empowered to undermine the 
institutional separation of powers that permits a three branch system of checks and 
balances to function on paper. The political system in Mexico allowed the President 
to have „enormous power to implement policy changes‟ (Nacif, 2002, p. 1); 
Mexican Presidents were able to modify the Constitution just by sending an 
initiative to the Congress. In addition, the President had the power to designate his 
successor, the governors of the 31 states, the members of the bicameral 
Congress, and the most important members of the Supreme Court14. Thus, Mexico 
was characterised by a strong presidency and a very weak party system, though 
with a very strong single party organisation. 
However, as mentioned in the previous section, the prolonged transition to 
democracy entailed a fundamental change in the institutional functioning of the 
party system. As a result of this transformation, the party system was strengthened 
                                                 
13
 For example, as Cornelius (1988) describes, municipal presidents were handpicked by higher-ups within the 
PRI-government apparatus. Once the candidate was selected the local PRI committees were informed and 
then had to announce that so-and-so had been chosen to be the party‟s nominee in that municipality. 
14
 At the state level, the pattern is repeated. Governors designated by the president select the candidates for 
municipal presidencies and for the members of local Congresses. 
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and the presidency weakened. The role of the executive became much more 
limited as the three party system made it harder for the PRI to enjoy absolute 
majorities in the Congress or among state governors (Philip 2002: 131).  
In sum, the third wave of democratisation in Latin America, as well as the strong 
economic difficulties faced in the beginning of the 1980s and the economic reforms 
carried out in response to them, accelerated the transformation of many 
institutional structures and processes in Mexico. One important component of this 
transformation has been decentralisation -the transfer of some decision-making 
powers and responsibilities from central government agencies to subnational units. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the country increasingly transferred resources, 
responsibilities and decision-making powers to lower levels of government. By the 
mid 1990s, revenue-sharing increased, government agencies became more 
decentralised, and state and municipalities gained a few fiscal powers. As part of 
these changes, an important transformation in social policy took place that created 
new incentives for the allocation of public funds for the provision of public services 
at the municipal level. 
 
2.4 Antipoverty policies in Mexico 
 
Mexico has undergone significant „changes in the policy and politics of its federal 
antipoverty programs‟ during the last three decades (Yarahuán 2007). These 
changes occurred in the context of growing democratisation and decentralisation 
with important implications in terms of policy design and implementation.  
During the 1980s, it was broadly believed that „a major obstacle to the effective 
performance of public bureaucracies in most developing countries is the excessive 
concentration of decision-making and authority within central government‟ (Turner 
& Hulme 1997: 151). Since then, decentralisation policies have been implemented 
to devolve public decision-making from the centre to local areas with the aim to 
improve the efficiency, distribution, and quality of public services.  
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The reasons for this trend are many. Yet, as Litvack, Ahmad & Bird (1998: 4) 
suggest, decentralisation has been the result of a broader process of political and 
economic reform: „[p]olitical changes worldwide have given voice to local demands 
and the need to bring economic and political systems closer to local communities. 
(...) In addition, technological changes and global integration of factor markets 
have changed the size of government needed to manage economic systems‟. 
In many Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s, democratisation 
and increasing political competition created pressures to devolve greater autonomy 
to subnational levels of government. Gradual political liberalisation provided 
opportunities to challenge the inefficiencies caused by centralisation. At the same 
time, the fiscal crisis and economic liberalisation created incentives for 
governments to delegate institutional capacities and administrative responsibilities 
to lower levels of government (Willis, Garman & Haggard, 1999: 16). Additionally, 
„[s]tagnant economies and inefficient central bureaucracies led researchers to 
reconsider centralisation as a solution to the problems of developing countries, and 
multilateral institutions began to include decentralisation in many of their 
programmes15‟ (Schneider 2003: 5).  
In Mexico, pressures for democratisation, economic crisis and the implementation 
of market-oriented economic reforms implied the transforms of the social 
development strategy of the country through the decentralisation of antipoverty 
spending. The debt crisis of the early 1980s, the introduction of structural 
adjustment policies, and the lack of capacity and resources from the regime to 
channel and/or manage growing opposition to the ruling party, put decentralisation 
at the centre of the social and political agenda. As Cornelius (2000: 121) suggests, 
the causes of the breaking down of centralised presidential control „were the 
growing competitiveness of elections at the local level and a national economic 
crisis that forced the federal government to make major changes in the way in 
which public services were provided‟.  
                                                 
15
 According to Nickson (1995: 24), by the 1980s international development agencies „suddenly rediscovered 
the value of subnational governments‟. Yet these agencies „emphasised the benefits of decentralisation in 
terms of fiscal cleansing rather than citizen participation‟. 
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Thus, over the last two decades, decentralised antipoverty spending has been one 
of the major components of the government‟s development strategy. By the end of 
the 1980s it „had become a primary element in the political discourse‟ (Rodríguez 
1993: 136). Into the 1990s the trend towards decentralisation of antipoverty 
spending continued and was strengthened by an active transfer of funds directly to 
lower levels of government to improve the social infrastructure needs of the 
poorest communities. Although funds were initially allocated under strict 
supervision and according to the „political needs‟ of the centre, by the mid 1990s 
(under President Zedillo‟s administration) there was an increasing tolerance for 
political pluralism at all levels of government16 (municipalities, local congresses and 
the federal congress). The transfer of funds started to be more transparent, 
representing an important deepening of the decentralisation of antipoverty 
spending.  
The following section focuses on the analysis of the most recent antipoverty 
strategies introduced by the Mexican government since the end of the 1980s. It 
shows how, until the mid 1990s, social policy was used as a mechanism to 
strengthen the political stability of the regime and how it was linked to the political 
priorities of the presidential term (Pardo 2009: 141). Yet, in the years to follow, the 
political and economic conditions of the country would accelerate the 
transformation of the social policy of the country. In the late 1990s social policy 
would be largely decentralised giving local governments a more active role in 
allocating antipoverty funds that aim to improve access to basic services to the 
poorest sectors of the population.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Evidence of this progress includes the election of the nation‟s first opposition majority Congress in 1997, the 
recognition of nearly a dozen opposition governors, hundreds of opposition mayors, and thousands of 
opposition legislators and city council members. 
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2.4.1 The Solidaridad Program 
 
According to Gonzalez (1994: 63), „the 1980s marked the end of one stage in 
Mexico‟s modern history. In the course of the decade, an economic model and a 
style of doing politics ended, and many of the social actors that arose and evolved 
under the organizational structure of the old model were marginalized‟. Over this 
decade, as a result of the implementation of neoliberal reforms and economic 
restructuring, the traditional political coalitions that maintained the stability of the 
regimen during the period of import substitution industrialization (ISI) began to 
erode. As Dresser points out, the traditional system of resource allocation that 
„created a broad-based “populist-distributive” coalition17 of organised interests‟ 
during the years of the “Mexican miracle” started to be replaced „with efficient 
market-led capitalism‟ (Dresser 1994: 145). From this moment onwards, „social 
policymakers tried to manage a transition away from traditional patronage and 
generalised subsidies while strengthening the more targeted social programs that 
held up what was left of Mexico‟s social safety nets‟ (Fox 1994a: 182).  
Mexico‟s reforms and economic restructuring „were among the most far-reaching in 
[Latin America] and were consequently among the most painful‟ (Haldelman 1997: 
134). The new strategy, which aimed to lower inflation and reduce fiscal deficits, 
implied significant social costs for the population. Between 1982 and 1988 most 
economic activities collapsed and income per capita and salaries declined by 
approximately 50% (Pardo 2009: 164). Moreover, during the most critical years of 
the economic crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican government cancelled the social 
programs created by previous governments. The reasons for this drastic change 
were to rationalise public spending and reduce the size of the state. The same 
reasons were given in order to return resources and responsibilities to those 
departments that had been in charge of them in the past and to demand more 
cooperation from local governments (Pardo 2009: 162). During this decade, social 
                                                 
17
 According to Dresser (1994: 145), this coalition was formed fundamentally by „private enterprise protected 
from international competition, the organised working class, and the intelligentsia‟. 
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development spending experienced one of the deepest declines in contemporary 
Mexico. This decline, which remained stagnant for most of the 1980s, imposed 
enormous economic pressure on the population generally, but the effects were 
especially acute for the poor.  
Politically, the implementation of this strategy meant that, by the end of the decade, 
„the traditional alliance of interests and loyalties (…) [had begun] to crumble‟ 
(Dresser 1994: 146), thus challenging the stability and continuity of the political 
regime that the PRI had dominated for decades. The social costs of these changes 
led to increasing opposition from different sectors of society. New civil society 
organisations developed rapidly in opposition to the new economic model; labor 
unions and social movements shifted to supporting increasingly important left-wing 
parties in response to the government‟s abandonment of a state dominated 
economic model. At the same time, by the mid 1980s the ruling party was under 
unprecedented electoral pressure from the PAN, in many northern states where 
the economic crises and the nationalization of the banks had „had a 
disproportionate impact‟ (Ard 2003: 106) that produced „a massive swing of the 
business sector away from the PRI and to the PAN‟ (Rodriguez & Ward 1994: 13).  
These political challenges were more visible during the 1988 presidential election 
when „the prospect of continued austerity and neoliberal restructuring caused a 
major split within the PRI and led to the most serious crisis of political support in 
the PRI‟s sixty year history‟ (Bruhn 1996: 154). Thus, in 1987 a group of PRIístas 
from the Corriente Democrática, led by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and in clear 
opposition to the economic model adopted by the government and to the non-
democratic practices of the ruling party, split from the PRI and a leftist, former PRI-
satellite party nominated him for the presidency. For many Mexicans, the 1988 
presidential election was seen as an opportunity to promote changes and to voice 
their disapproval over the economic measures of the federal government. 
Increasing popular support for the Cárdenas candidacy opened the door to the 
emergence of a coalition of leftist parties (Frente Democrático Nacional) that came 
close to putting an end to the PRI‟s federal electoral supremacy.  
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As a result, in 1988 „President Carlos Salinas took office declaring the end of the 
one-party system. He promised a new relationship between state and society‟ (Fox 
1994b: 165). Given the deep political crisis during the time in which Salinas took 
office in December 1988 it was difficult to consider that further economic reform 
would be possible without the support of an alliance with important sectors of 
society (Perez: 2007: 6). As Dresser (1994: 146) notes, „the 1988 election revealed 
that the top-down change without the support of organized constituencies could 
probably not be sustained.‟  In particular, the PRI‟s notorious electoral declined in 
urban centres revealed how the party „had failed to build solid clientelistic networks 
with the growing masses of the urban poor‟ (Díaz-Cayeros; et al, forthcoming: 42).   
In this sense, the newly elected president embraced social policy as a core 
component of the country‟s development strategy. The strong opposition to the 
government‟s neoliberal agenda particularly from the leftist candidate Cuauhtémoc 
Cardenas, put pressure on the newly elected president to incorporate into his 
government strategy „not only policies to renew economic growth and lower 
inflation, but also [Solidaridad], an innovative social spending program designed to 
win back popular support for the government in a context of neoliberal policies‟ 
(Bruhn 1996: 152). The creation of this program represented „a turning point in the 
Mexican government‟s social policy‟ (Contreras & Bennett 1994: 281). As Pardo 
(2009:135) argues, facing the increasing problem of poverty and marginalisation 
with compensatory policies was the result of the growing pressure produced by the 
aggravation of the crisis since the 1980s, when austerity measures and structural 
adjustment programmes were implemented. In that moment, social policy was 
seen as a range of measures oriented to compensate for the negative effects of 
macroeconomic adjustment in certain sectors of the population. It was seen as a 
mechanism to compensate for the deterioration of employment, salaries and the 
reduction of social spending. 
During this sexenio social policy experienced one of the most notable changes in 
modern history and was used to guarantee the legitimacy and governability of the 
political regimen (Dresser 1994). Under the economic and political circumstances 
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described above, for the new government, it was clear that social expenditures in 
the previous years were not working and that a new approach to social 
development was needed. In this sense, the social policy-makers of the new 
government put forward a new model of antipoverty resource allocation that aimed 
to benefit the population living in poor urban and rural communities.    
Officially, Solidaridad, as the program was known, had the stated objective to 
combat poverty. It aimed to improve the conditions of poor people, to promote 
regional development, and to promote and strengthen the participation of social 
organisations and local governments by increasing social spending and 
channelling it to the local level. An important characteristic of the new strategy was 
that it incorporated citizen participation as a central element in decision making and 
implementation, and was expected to „give people a sense of belonging‟ (Lustig 
1994: 79). Solidaridad would call upon communities to organise for their own 
benefit. As one former top-level official during the Salinas administration noted:  
„[Solidaridad] serves suprafamilial social groups: neighborhood social 
organizations, cultural, consumer and civic organizations; local political 
organizations. Together these comprise a network that makes it possible to 
channel demands, represents interests, frame problems, and implement 
projects. Supported by this network, individuals can advance their social 
demands without recurring to the upper levels of the federal administration. 
This transformation removes the obstacles imposed by centralism and also 
provides the appropriate dimension for resolving regional and local 
problems‟   (Gonzalez 1994: 73).  
 
During the implementation of the program „more than 340 thousand committees 
were formed at the local level with the active participation of nearly 2 million people 
in 433 municipalities‟ (Perez 2007: 7). The committees became the link between 
the local communities and the federal government. Through these committees 
local demands were discussed and resources allocated to implement projects for 
social infrastructure. The program covered „a wide variety of projects designed to 
improve the income-generating capacity of the rural and urban poor and their 
access to public services‟ (Lustig 1994: 79). 
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Some policy analysts considered that Solidaridad „introduced a new thrust to the 
overall decentralisation program, especially through its municipal program, Fondos 
Municipales de Solidaridad, which provided grants for social welfare and 
agricultural and basic infrastructure projects‟ (Nickson 1995: 201). 
Yet, under this program, „generous resources‟ were transferred to the municipal 
level but with „negative outcomes for the poor‟ (Crook & Sverrison 2001: 45). 
According to Rocha (2005: 347), Solidaridad „lacked any kind of pre-established 
and systematic formula to identify beneficiaries, and funds frequently seemed to be 
dispersed on a selective basis, allocating resources not to the communities that 
needed them most but rather to communities where the opposition, especially the 
PRD, threatened the hegemony of the PRI.‟ Moreover, there were serious doubts 
„whether the most vocal and organized communities or groups within communities 
[were] also the poorest‟ (Lustig 1994: 94). The successful recipients of Solidaridad 
were not necessarily those with the greatest needs of the population (Kaufman & 
Trejo 1997). In general, the outcomes of Solidaridad were „poor in spite of 
significant central funding allocations: equity, spatial equity and Human 
Development (HD) [were] undermined by political patronage considerations and 
“basketball court” syndrome‟18 (Crook & Sverrison 2001: 49).  
In addition to the poor results, this short-lived program was broadly criticized for 
being a political instrument to legitimise the new government and to recuperate 
what electoral support the PRI had lost in the previous federal election. A number 
of scholars (Fox 1995; Cornelius 2000; Rodríguez 1993) have argued that, 
Solidaridad was politically motivated and was used as an instrument to restore 
presidential legitimacy19 and to enhance presidential power for electoral ends20. 
For Fox (1994b: 179), „[Solidaridad‟s] electoral targeting (…) helped to buffer the 
political impact of the government‟s controversial macroeconomic program, 
                                                 
18
 For the Federal government, building unnecessary infrastructure was better than nothing (Crook & Sverrison 
2001). 
19
 As mentioned before, the 1988 presidential election is the most questioned in Mexican modern history. A 
major postelectoral conflict weakened the new elected presidency. Thus, since the beginning, the new 
government tried to legitimise the questioned electoral victory by various means.  
20
 According to Rodríguez (1993: 141), „the states that received the most support in 1991 were Yucatán, 
México, Oaxaca, Jalisco and Puebla (SEDESOL, 1993: 167); of these, and of the country as a whole, México 
and Jalisco are particularly wealthy‟. 
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weakening the opposition in the short run in some areas‟, but did not achieve the 
stated goal of alleviating poverty.  
In practice, Solidaridad promoted the figure of the President and offered a 
response to the challenges of PRI hegemony, especially in electorally important 
and vulnerable states. Molinar and Weldon found some evidence that supports this 
claim; in their analysis of the political determinants of resource allocation under 
Solidaridad, these authors found that „[Solidaridad was] not only electorally driven, 
but that it [was] also electorally effective‟ (1994: 139). In particular, Solidaridad was 
used to stop the left from gaining more political spaces. As Dresser argues (1994: 
155), „reversing the 1988 electoral victories of the PRD appeared to be a significant 
part of [Solidaridad‟s] political agenda‟.  
Solidaridad funds were also used to favor the political allies of the president. As 
Bailey notes, „in many cases specific projects and even program concepts were 
identified in presidential tours or election campaigns of administration favorites. In 
the case of Nuevo Leon (…) the prime beneficiary of [Solidaridad] was Socrates 
Rizzo, mayor of Monterrey (1986-91) and subsequently elected governor for the 
term 1991-1997‟ (1994: 112). Molinar and Weldon (1994: 140) also found that 
there is some evidence to believe that „PRIísta gubernatorial candidates benefit 
from increased [Solidaridad] expenditures‟.  
In other states, the central government granted state authorities –particularly the 
governors– more autonomy to use Solidaridad funds. In these cases, „some hard-
line governors (...) succumbed to the temptation to use their discretionary power 
over a greatly enlarged pot of federal funds to reward political allies and local 
economic interests bound to the PRI‟s state-level machines‟ (Cornelius 2000: 120). 
In the state of Chiapas, one of the largest beneficiaries of Solidarity, the transfer of 
funds from the federal government failed to prevent the uprising of the Zapatista 
rebellion in January 1994. It seems that the state governor used these funds for 
political purposes, ignoring the marginalised groups that supported the Zapatista 
movement. 
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Some policy analysts have pointed out that one of Solidaridad‟s important features 
–a feature that differentiated it from former antipoverty strategies– was its „explicit 
emphasis on strengthening the municipality, in an effort to decentralise 
responsibility for service delivery‟ (Fox 1994a: 186). Although during the 
implementation of this social policy some degree of decentralisation occurred, 
there were important limitations that undermined the role local governments played 
in providing social infrastructure to their communities. Although the federal 
government spent vast resources at the municipal level, this did not mean that 
municipal authorities were actually deciding how to allocate such funds. There is 
some evidence to suggest that, for instance, many opposition municipal 
governments received significant amounts of resources that had already been 
allocated to particular projects and/or individuals without any consultation with 
municipal authorities (Fox 1994a: 187). In the light of this view, as Shirk (1999: 5) 
suggests, „Solidarity (...) served to reinforce the centre‟s power through 
deconcentration, because it deliberately bypassed state and local governments (...) 
by extending the federal government‟s linkages all the way to the community level.‟ 
Despite this political bias, revenue-sharing and the transfer of resources to lower 
levels of government increased considerably and government agencies were 
decentralised. Thus as Cornelius (2000: 119) argues, „Solidarity, which started out 
as a quintessentially centralising, presidential program ended up being a major 
vehicle for decentralisation, especially the kind that transfers power to the state 
level.‟ 
These trends broadened the political opening and shaped new relationships 
between the federal government, the states and the municipalities. Thus, although 
one major objective of the programme was „to stem the erosion of control of the 
centre‟ (Rodriguez 1993: 142), some decentralisation occurred and would continue 
in the following years.  
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2.4.2 FAISM and the decentralisation of antipoverty spending to the 
municipal level 
 
Despite the poor performance of Solidaridad in terms of improving the living 
conditions of the poor population of the country, „its political use as a neo-
clientelistic tool to generate support for the PRI seemed to have paid off‟ (Rocha 
2005: 348). Not only was the PRI able to recover much of the electoral territory it 
had lost to the PRD in 1988 during the 1991 mid-term elections, but its presidential 
candidate, Ernesto Zedillo, was also able to win the election for the 1994-2000 
presidential term.  
While the PRI was able to retain power at the national level, President Zedillo 
inherited a country facing political chaos, the worst economic crisis of Mexico‟s 
modern history and increasing pressure from the opposition and from within his 
own political party for the devolution of resources and responsibilities to lower 
levels of government. All these factors represented an important challenge to the 
President‟s political authority.  
In the mid 1990s, the presidency that traditionally enjoyed enormous power within 
the political system started to experience the melt down of the centralised political 
structure through the dispersion of power among different actors and across 
institutions of the federal arrangement. As Kaufman and Trejo point out (1997: 
717): 
„Challenges to Mexico‟s authoritarian system had been mounting for 
decades, but until 1994 the powerful presidents who dominated the regime 
had successfully deflected these challenges with political and economic 
reforms managed „from above‟. However, presidential authority declined 
substantially during and after the transfer of office from Carlos Salinas 
(1988-1994) to his successor, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). This declined 
(…) opened the way for more complex forms of centre-periphery bargaining, 
in which regional power contenders (…) gained substantial leverage‟.  
 
During his administration, President Zedillo had little choice but to carry out a de 
facto redistribution of political and fiscal power during his term and to deepen 
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democratisation (Shirk 1999; Cornelius 2000). Facing a negative political and 
economic environment, President Zedillo was obliged to make some significant 
political concessions to opposition parties and to devolve more resources and 
autonomy to subnational governments. 
The increasing tolerance for political liberalisation that was accelerated during the 
1990s allowed the election of the first opposition-dominated Chamber of Deputies 
in 1997. This meant a divided government at the federal level to complement the 
increasing pluralism evident at the state and local level (Wallis, 2001: 307). For the 
first time, the President had to negotiate with opposition political parties to 
implement policy changes. The long-time demands of the opposition political 
parties to expand subnational autonomy started to be truly discussed. Therefore, 
since 1997 the opposition-dominated Chamber has led to serious efforts for 
devolution by approving a constitutional reform to promote municipal autonomy21. 
Moreover, the opposition-dominated Congress insisted on much larger transfers of 
funds from the federal to the state and municipal treasuries.  
Additionally, the increasing number of opposition governments at the state and 
local level in the 1990s led to increasing pressure on the centre as governors22 and 
mayors began to appeal for greater and more equitable resource distribution and 
administrative autonomy. In the years following, „state governors [would be] the 
political actors who [were] strengthened most by recent changes in the federal 
revenue-sharing formula23‟ (Cornelius 2000: 118).  
These new political and economic conditions and the criticism to Solidaridad, 
brought about a major restructuring of the social policy of the federal government 
through decentralisation.  
                                                 
21
 Article 115 of the Constitution was reformed in order to raise the municipality to the level of “government”.  
22
 It is important to mention that in some states (Puebla, Yucatan and Tabasco for example) the governors 
used the “New Federalism” discourse to challenge the federal government and the electoral institutions. They 
argued that the federal government, as well as the federal electoral institutions should respect the autonomy of 
the states and not interfere in their local affairs. 
23
 In 1997 a new Fiscal Coordination Law was promulgated. It introduced into the budget Item (Ramo) 33, 
composed of conditional transfers to states and municipalities. The new system established seven funds, the 
most important of which being health and education. 
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The social policy of President Zedillo highlighted two objectives: to improve the 
provision and quality of social services, and to provide specific attention to 
populations suffering greater economic and social disadvantages24 (Yascine 1999: 
52). In order to achieve the first objective, President Zedillo promoted 
decentralisation as a key element of his administration. Under the “New 
Federalism” program revenue-sharing mechanisms from the federal government, 
the capacity to raise revenue through taxation, and the control of regional and 
social development were all increased for the states. In addition, administrative 
functions for all levels of government were clarified, and, most important, 
education, health care and basic public goods provision were largely transferred to 
the state and municipal governments (Shirk 1999: 6; Cornelius 2000: 122).  
The changes in the social policy meant the dismantling of Solidaridad and the 
implementation of „a new, much curtailed federal poverty alleviation programme 
called Progresa, and the creation of Ramo 33, or Budget Item 33 Contributions, 
which decentralised most of the welfare funds previously assigned to [Solidaridad] 
and other federal programmes‟ (Rocha 2005: 348). These changes meant the 
deepening of the decentralisation strategy that previous governments had 
undertaken for several years.  
Since 1998, state and municipal governments have provided the main goods and 
services in Mexico. These goods and services are financed with resources that 
come from the central government through conditional decentralised transfers 
included in Item 33 of the federal budget. This Item entails seven programs, 
including FAISM, which is the most recent and important reform that has 
strengthened basic municipal service provision for the poor. FAISM was created in 
the national budget in order to transfer more resources to the municipalities so that 
they can finance social infrastructure projects.  
The basic argument for the creation of FAISM in December 1997 was that the 
resources traditionally allocated under item 26 of the federal budget which in 
                                                 
24
 The anti-poverty policy stressed the need to benefit individuals and to promote the formation of human 
capital. In 1997 PROGRESA (Program for Education, Health and Nutrition) was created to achieve these 
objectives. 
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previous federal administrations had included the total amount of resources 
assigned to Solidaridad programs, should be transferred to states and 
municipalities for direct allocation and implementation. As a result of the strong 
criticisms and the lack of results of Solidaridad to benefit the poor, and in response 
to the claims that the program had been driven by political objectives of the federal 
government, the new federal administration created the FAISM as a mechanism of 
distribution and allocation that, in principle, would, at least in principle, be less 
vulnerable to political manipulation. 
Since its inception FAISM has been the main source of fiscal transfers to 
municipalities. The fund was designed to provide funds for local projects selected 
by the municipalities. Through this fund the federal government allocates resources 
to the municipalities, which in turn assign them to a set of social projects promoting 
basic social infrastructure. According to the Fiscal Coordination Law (FCL) these 
funds should be targeted at the poorest communities in each municipality to carry 
out physical infrastructure projects such as: potable water, sewers, drainage, 
urbanisation, electrification in rural areas, basic education and health infrastructure, 
roads, housing improvements and other productive rural infrastructure25. In the 
vocabulary used in the literature on federal transfers, the funds of the FAISM are 
conditional transfers earmarked for specific sectors in which municipalities have 
autonomy to pick which particular projects will be funded. 
In this sense, the federal government assigns resources to each state, and the 
state governments assign resources to each municipality. In both cases, resource 
allocation is determined by explicit public formulas that are written in the FCL. The 
formulas consider two criteria: 1) an Index of Global Poverty and 2) an equity 
criterion. 
Once the states allocate the FAISM across their municipalities, the FCL requires 
that each municipality should decide, in concert with the local population, how they 
are going to spend these resources on the specific projects allowed by the FCL. In 
particular, the FCL establishes that the municipalities should:  
                                                 
25
 It is also stated that municipalities may use up to 2% of the resources to finance their institutional programs 
(i.e. training of personnel, acquiring new managerial techniques, etc.) 
48 
 
 
a) Inform the population about the amount of resources received under 
FAISM, the projects to be carry out, their cost, location, objectives and 
beneficiaries;  
b) promote the participation of the communities that will benefit from the 
project;  
c) inform the population, at the end of every fiscal year, about the results 
achieved; 
d) and, provide information about the use of the FAISM resources to the 
Ministry of Social Development. 
Historically, FAISM resources have exceeded the total budget of the Federal 
Ministry of Social Development. However, although there are no clear evaluations 
of the uses of these resources at the state or municipal levels, there is some 
evidence showing that, in at least a few cases, the resources were channeled to 
activities that could not be considered as social infrastructure (Hernández, Merino 
& Rascón 2003: 33. In addition, accountability has been weak due to the lack of 
information at the municipal level about the use of the resources. In fact, only some 
municipalities properly report the ultimate destination of the monies.  
Despite the importance of the fund and the new mechanism for the distribution of 
FAISM resources through specific formulae, the implementation of effective 
mechanisms to hold local officials accountable and to provide information about the 
actual use of the resources have been left behind. In fact, since 1998 when the 
fund was created, only a few municipalities have properly reported the actual use 
of the resources.  
Due to difficulties into collecting information at the municipal level, the performance 
of municipalities in Mexico has only been partially studied. A few studies have 
analysed the impact of the FAISM on tax efforts in some municipalities (Raich 
2000), but they have only partially explored the impact of FAISM on the poor. Other 
studies (Cabrero & Carrera 2004) have centred on the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation and institutional weaknesses or on particular decentralisation 
processes, such as education and health (Merino 1997, Ornelas 2000, Cabrero & 
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Martinez 2000), while others have explored decentralised expenditures and their 
impact on Human Development at the state level (De la Torre 2005). 
Without effective mechanisms of accountability and transparency, the potential for 
using FAISM resources for objectives outside of those indicated in the FCL is high. 
As municipal authorities have a great deal of autonomy in the use of decentralised 
resources, antipoverty spending could be used as an important political instrument 
to capture votes from the most vulnerable sectors of the population. The following 
section provides a brief discussion on the political manipulation of decentralized 
antipoverty spending. 
 
2.5 Change and continuity: the political manipulation of decentralised 
antipoverty spending 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, a number of studies have 
explored the link between social policy and political variables within Mexico‟s most 
recent antipoverty strategies. The studies underscore the potential political use of 
antipoverty funds from two of the most important decentralised antipoverty 
strategies of Mexico‟s federal government. Most of the studies have explored the 
political manipulation of Solidaridad during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari and show how the central government was able to benefit from the political 
use of antipoverty funds.  
More recently, a number of scholars have focused their attention on FAISM, the 
formula based program that aims to tackle the political shortcomings of 
Solidaridad. In general, it is argued that the distribution and allocation of resources 
for political gain has become a difficult task for federal and state level politicians. 
However, it has been found (Perez 2005: 27) that „beneath formulas for distribution 
there may still be room for discretionary allocation that favors political parties at the 
municipal level.‟ It seems to be the case that once these antipoverty funds reach 
local level officials, the incentives to use them for political gain are considerably 
stronger. Limitations of the accountability and transparency of antipoverty spending 
50 
 
 
have undermined the roles of citizens and other institutional mechanisms of 
ensuring accountability and effectively monitoring and evaluating the use of these 
resources.  
Further studies have also explored the political and institutional constraints of 
FAISM. In their study on the effects of the use of FAISM on investment in public 
infrastructure, Díaz-Cayeros & Silva (2004) point out that contrary to other federal 
social programs, monitoring and evaluation systems for the use of FAISM are 
extremely weak. As a result, it is not clear how local governments actually 
distribute the funds. They also note limitations in the allocation of resources from 
the states to the municipalities that undermine the prospects that the funds will be 
used for development. Regarding the possible links between the fund and electoral 
variables, a recent study (Somuano; et al. 2006) concluded that there are important 
variations in the distribution of resources from the states to the municipalities that 
might not be explained by the criteria established in the formula from the FCL. The 
study suggests that the explanations of such variations could instead be found at 
the municipal level.  
These studies are important and show one side of the story regarding the 
effectiveness of social programs in fighting poverty at the local level. However, as 
Somuano; et al. (2006) point out, it is at the municipal level where we should focus 
our attention in order to have a better understanding of the influence of politics on 
antipoverty resource allocation and its effects on improving basic service provision. 
In light of this, whereas most of the studies have examined the distribution of 
antipoverty funds at the municipal level, little is known regarding the actual use of 
these funds by municipal authorities. We already know that the distribution of 
resources to the municipalities can be influenced by political variables, but we do 
not know what exactly are the effects of those political variables on the actual use 
of antipoverty funds by the local political authorities who have a great deal of 
autonomy and decision-making power over their disbursement.  
Although the FCL details a number of projects that can be carried out with FAISM 
resources, municipal authorities still have the ability to influence the allocation of 
51 
 
 
these funds in ways that might bring political advantages to them, and their political 
parties. We also know very little regarding the effects of increasing pluralisation 
within local politics on antipoverty policy or on the effects in increasing access to 
basic services that could improve the living conditions of the population living in 
poverty. 
It is the aim of this research to gain a better understanding of the use of FAISM 
and to explore the extent to which electoral politics influence the use and allocation 
of this fund. The remaining chapters of this dissertation are dedicated to these 
issues through the exploration of FAISM in Estado de Mexico. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have seen how the recent political and economic developments 
in Mexico have shaped the social policy of the federal government. It has shown 
how the neoliberal reforms initiated in the 1980s created incentives for the creation 
of a new social program Solidaridad that would fight the social costs of austerity 
and adjustment. This strategy also played a fundamental role in politically 
legitimising the authority of the central government and was used to undermine the 
growing opposition to the political regime. Solidaridad was the most important 
social policy of Salinas‟ presidential term and it suffered an important 
transformation during the sexenio. From a program that aimed to improve the living 
conditions of an important sector of the population, Solidaridad became the centre 
of the Salinas administration‟s political strategy. It aimed to maintain the legitimacy 
of the political regime, and guarantee political control. 
While the political side of Solidaridad was successful in terms of the ability of the 
federal government to retain the Presidency, the political and economic earthquake 
that the country experienced in the mid 1990s, the hard criticism regarding the 
political use of the social policy during the Salinas administration, and the gradual 
erosion of the centralistic structure of the federal system obliged the central 
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government to reformulate its social policy. Thus, from the mid 1990s, social policy 
started to be deeply decentralised and empowered state and municipal authorities 
to provide basic services. In contrast to the period when structural adjustment  
included significant reductions to state and municipal budgets, the 1990s were 
characterised by a steadily increase in the amount of resources that local 
governments had at their disposal as part of their municipal budget.  
Since 1997, the dramatic increase in decentralised antipoverty transfers meant that 
local authorities had more powers responsibilities and resources at their disposal 
than at any other time in Mexico‟s recent history. In particular, through item 33 of 
the federal budget and particularly through FAISM, the new provisions allowed 
municipal governments to channel important resources to fight poverty and 
inequality in poor communities through social infrastructure investments. Local 
authorities were empowered through the policy process to promote local 
participation in the allocation of anti-poverty funds.  
In theory, it was expected that, exploiting the local knowledge that authorities had 
about their localities, would enable the resources to reach those sectors facing the 
strongest limitations on local social infrastructure. Through better linkages between 
community participation and local governments, the allocation of resources was 
expected to be closely related to the needs of the local poor. 
In practice, however, it seems that the prospects for decentralised antipoverty 
spending have not translated into effective mechanisms that will lead to more 
effective poverty eradication. Problems of accountability, lack of information and 
lack of transparency appear to have overshadowed the developmental outcomes 
of decentralised antipoverty spending.  
Today, municipal presidents enjoy more powers and command more resources 
than ever before. They decide where to allocate antipoverty funds together with the 
communities and might be using antipoverty spending as an electoral tool for their 
political gain, just as the central government did two decades ago. It seems that 
the shortcomings of the Mexican political system, in particular the allocation of 
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resources through clientelistic exchanges between politicians and citizens that has 
characterised Mexican politics for decades, continue to challenge the prospects for 
decentralised antipoverty spending at the local level despite democratisation and 
decentralisation.  
The empirical chapters explore the puzzle of the actual use of FAISM as a strategy 
to provide basic social infrastructure to the poorest communities. The main themes 
of those chapters are: a) the political determinants of antipoverty spending, and b) 
the effectiveness of decentralised antipoverty spending to improve access to basic 
services. The next chapter will provide a theoretical discussion about the use of 
antipoverty funds for political gain. It will provide a discussion on clientelism and 
will provide a framework for the analysis of the links between political institutions 
and resource allocation. 
 
54 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation studies the impact of politics on antipoverty resource allocation at 
the municipal level. It takes a detailed look at the political institutions that shape the 
incentives of political actors who participate at the local level that participate in the 
allocation of antipoverty funds. It then explores the way in which the political 
process of resource allocation shapes social policy outcomes. 
Antipoverty spending offers a valuable case study to test certain premises 
regarding the effects of local political institutions on resource allocation. One such 
premise examined in this dissertation is that incumbents, in seeking political 
support, may distribute goods and services to the electorate with political 
motivations –clientelism26–. This makes the study of social policy an ideal case 
study since this policy arena is most vulnerable to clientelistic practices.  
This chapter‟s contribution is to offer a theoretical framework for the study of the 
political determinants of antipoverty spending. Borrowing from Magaloni et al. 
(2007), this theoretical framework distinguishes between two types of goods: public 
and private. Private goods –clientelism– target benefits to individuals and small 
groups; they are excludable and politicians can stop or withdraw them at any time. 
In contrast, public goods benefit large groups or all the members of the community 
and, therefore are non-excludable and cannot be withdrawn (Magaloni et al. 2007; 
Persson and Tabellini 2000).This distinction is of great value as it allows to classify, 
for the first time, disaggregated data on social spending from 122 municipalities of 
one Mexican State.  
                                                 
26
 According to Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007: 11), the provision of private goods through political exchange 
invariably signals the existence of clientelism. 
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Thus, the theoretical framework explores the politician‟s choice to allocate 
resources for political gain –clientelism– or public goods provision. It claims that 
politicians will allocate antipoverty funds through the two types of goods, even if 
they are earmarked for the construction of basic social infrastructure. The 
proposed theoretical framework will allow us to test some theoretical premises 
regarding the extent to which political variables influence resource allocation. 
The next section elaborates on the study of clientelism, its effects on development 
and democracy, and the resilience of this political practice. The third part focuses 
on the distinction between private and public goods with the aim of securing a 
better understanding of the different forms that public spending can take and how 
these two types of goods create different relationships between politicians and 
citizens. Next, it provides a brief account of the studies on political institutions, 
resource allocations, and good governance. The fourth part provides a theoretical 
framework for the study the politics of antipoverty resource allocation at the local 
level. The final section concludes.   
 
3.2 Clientelism and development  
 
No matter what levels of economic and political development a country may have 
attained, the exchange of goods and services for votes is a common political 
practice. The fact that politicians and citizens engage in clientelistic practices even 
within some economically developed countries and stable democracies has 
renewed interest in the study of the reasons that lie behind this type of interactions 
(Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007).  
Although „clientelism was viewed as a typical phenomenon of underdeveloped 
political systems, usually at early phases of institutionalisation, often under 
authoritarian or colonial regimes‟ (Magaloni et al. 2002: 1), recent economic and 
political developments around the globe have shown that clientelism persists as a 
political practice. The expectation that developing countries would eradicate 
clientelism as they achieved greater levels of economic and political development 
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has been proven wrong (Magaloni et al. 2002: 2). As Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 
(2004: 67) note, in Argentina, even „the recent shift to pro-market policies and the 
downsizing of the state seem not to have eliminated political clientelism‟. Moreover, 
not only has clientelism not disappeared, but some studies point out that 
clientelism is not a feature of the political systems exclusive to the developing 
world (Magaloni et al. 2002). Today, even established democracies show signs 
that clientelism prevails as a type of interaction between citizens and politicians27 
(Kitschelt 2007). 
In light of this, recent research has paid particular attention to the study of 
clientelism in order to provide important insights into the conditions under which 
politicians seek political support through this political practice –the provision of 
targeted excludable private goods– as opposed to more programmatic forms of 
public spending. This section offers a brief account of clientelism, its possible 
effects on development, and the reasons behind the resilience of this political 
practice.  
 
3.2.1 What is clientelism? 
 
According to Stokes (forthcoming: 2), clientelism is „the proffering of material goods 
in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron 
uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?28‟  
For Fox (1994b: 153), clientelism is „a relationship based on political subordination 
in exchange for material rewards‟. For Wantchekon (2003: 400), „clientelism is 
defined as transactions between politicians and citizens whereby material favors 
                                                 
27
 In his study of four capitalist democracies (Austria, Belgium, Italy and Japan), Kitschelt (2007:298-299) has 
found that „state interventionists modes of business governance and/or social policy schemes conductive to 
clientelistic politics were prevalent I all four (…) countries‟. 
28
 For this author „it is the distributive criterion of electoral support that distinguishes clientelism from other 
materially oriented political strategies‟ (Stokes 2007: 3). Thus, clientelism is different from pork-barrel politics 
since in that type of interaction the benefits are distributed to one or a few geographical districts, and the costs 
are shared by all the members of the district (Stokes 2007: 3; Weitz-Shapiro 2007: 4). In this case „the implicit 
criterion for the distribution of pork is: do you live in my district?‟ (Stokes 2007: 3). Clientelism is also distinct to 
patronage which entails a more specific relationship of the exchange of jobs for political support. 
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are offered in return for political support at the polls. Thus, clientelism is a form of 
interest-group politics (…)‟. 
In sum, clientelism is a form of political bargaining that involves exchanges 
between politicians and citizens where political support is traded for goods and 
services. As Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007: 2) note, clientelistic relationships „based 
on direct material inducements targeted to individuals and small groups of citizens 
whom politicians know to be highly responsive to such side-payments and willing to 
surrender their vote for the right price.‟ 
A central feature of this bargaining is the asymmetry and inequality experienced 
between “patrons” and “clients” where „power relations induce compliance more by 
the threat of the withdrawal of carrots than by the use of sticks‟ (Fox 1994b: 157).  
The intrinsic characteristics of clientelistic relationships entail a series of 
characteristics that have an effect on democracy and development. The following 
section deals with these issues. 
 
3.2.2 The effects of clientelism on democracy and economic development 
 
A great deal of literature has discussed the allocation of private goods with 
negative connotations. Clientelism is considered to have a negative effect on the 
consolidation of democracy. Scholars have pointed out that in many political 
systems, citizens, particularly the poor, are obliged to sacrifice their political rights 
in order to have access to welfare programs (Fox 1994b: 152). This conditionality 
affects „the exercise of citizenship rights and therefore undermines the 
consolidation of democratic regimes‟ (Fox 1994b: 153). Thus, for some scholars, 
clientelism is an authoritarian form of gaining political support that implies an 
asymmetrical relationship between citizens and politicians where public funds are 
used for private ends (Romero 2007: 6).  
Other authors have noted that the use of public resources with political motivations 
threatens the democratic system as a whole. When the accountability linkages 
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between citizens and politicians are broken through clientelistic exchanges, the 
motivations that politicians have to respond to the social needs of the population 
are at risk. This fact not only undermines the performance of the democratic 
system, but there is also the potential peril that citizens will be disillusioned with a 
democratic form of government (Ackerman & Sandoval 2007).  
Clientelism is also among a number of factors that lie behind the failure of the state 
to promote economic development (Stokes forthcoming) and is even considered as 
one of the causes of economic crises (Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004: 67). As 
Chubb has noted in her analysis of the relationship between clientelistic politics 
and the process of economic development in the City of Palermo, when the 
selection and implementation of public works is determined by the political interests 
of local elites and the maintenance of local clienteles rather by a criteria of 
economic rationality, the ability to promote and sustain economic development is 
undermined (Chubb 1981). 
Despite the negative implications of clientelism for development, in some contexts 
it could bring certain benefits to the population. As Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 
(2004: 84) note: 
„Clientelistic networks (…) are sort of a poor country‟s welfare state. Reform 
such systems too soon (…) and you run the danger of depriving “clients” of 
the only organisations and networks capable of responding to their needs 
(…). (A)lthough mattresses, corrugated roofing, and bags of food might 
appear to middle-class analysts as the sordid detritus of a backward polity, 
those receiving these items are presumably better off getting them than 
nothing‟. 
Whatever effects on development clientelism may have, it has not been eliminated. 
The next section will explore the reasons behind the resilience of clientelism. 
 
3.2.3 The persistence of clientelism 
 
The capacity of politicians to continue in office is related to the willingness of the 
members of society to support or remove them through democratic elections. 
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Therefore, politicians seek to maximise the likelihood of their holding on to power 
through winning elections, and in doing so they may choose to carry out actions 
that support clientelistic practices.  
Although clientelism is perceived as an inefficient, unequal, and sometimes corrupt 
relationship between politicians and citizens, the exchange of specific benefits for 
political support –votes– is seen as an option that reinforces a sense of reciprocity 
between actors; citizens feel obliged to support those who have helped them 
(Stokes forthcoming: 8) and politicians „must deliver in order to sustain the support 
of their clienteles‟ (Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2003: 19). Apart from reciprocity, the 
„fear that the flow of benefits will be cut off‟ (Stokes forthcoming: 9) is also 
considered a motivation that might cement the client citizen relationship and 
maintain it over time. Particularly among the poorest sectors of the population, 
„citizens are stuck in a prisoner‟s dilemma: people abandoning a clientelistic 
exchange opportunity may therefore be punished and left empty-handed‟ (Kitschelt 
& Wilkinson 2007: 25).  
An additional reason for the prevalence of clientelism is explained by the fact that 
this form of political engagement „is not incompatible with “civic society”‟ (Diaz-
Cayeros & Magaloni 2003: 22). As Stokes notes, „[t]he “gift giving” of clientelism 
and patronage does not only motivate people to vote for the patron‟s party directly 
but also reinforces a social network in which patron and client are embedded‟ 
(forthcoming: 15).  
The prevalence of clientelistic practices has called scholarly attention to the links 
between political institutions and the choices that politicians make in allocating 
public funds for political gain. Before discussing the links between political 
institutions and resource allocation, the following section will distinguish between 
clientelism and other forms of resource allocation, namely public goods provision 
and programmatic spending. 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
3.3 Clientelism vs the allocation of public goods  
 
Public policies and the ways in which formal and informal institutions shape them is 
one of the main concerns of political scientists. According to Dawson & Robinson 
(1963: 266), policy „is the outcome of activity or interaction among external 
conditions, political system, and political process.‟ 
One way of looking at the effects of politics on policies has been through the study 
of the allocation of public funds. According to Persson and Tabellini (2000: 7), „the 
government raises taxes and spends the resulting revenue in three alternative 
ways: (a) on general public goods (…) or broadly targeted redistributive transfer 
programs benefiting a large number of individuals; (b) on narrowly targeted 
redistribution to well-defined groups, through specific programs, benefiting only a 
narrow constituency; (c) on rents for politicians or their close associates.‟ 
Other scholars (Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2003) also consider that politicians can 
use public funds in three different ways: a) they can allocate resources towards the 
provision of public goods that benefit all members of society (also known as 
universal public goods); b) they can allocate public goods to regions or localities 
(what they call local public goods); or c) they can allocate private goods in a 
selective manner to individuals and well-defined sectors of society29 –clientelism–.  
Public –programmatic– and private goods –clientelism– have intrinsic 
characteristics that imply different relationships between society and the political 
authorities. The distribution of public goods implies that the members of the group 
of people who are entitled to receive the benefits of those goods cannot be 
excluded. This type of pubic good provision, also known as pork-barrel politics, 
implies that the criteria for resource allocation is based upon belonging to a given 
class of beneficiaries that, in most cases, are members of the same political district 
or jurisdiction. Although there are usually political or electoral considerations in the 
allocation of these type of resources, they have what Stokes (forthcoming: 3) calls 
                                                 
29
 Some scholars include an additional type of goods called “club goods” which „provide benefits for subsets of 
citizens and impose costs on other subsets‟ (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007: 11). For the purposes of this 
research, this type of goods will be identified with clientelism.  
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a public-good quality insofar as they „redistribute benefits from classes of non-
beneficiaries to classes of beneficiaries, but within a class of beneficiaries, 
particular people who qualify cannot be excluded‟ (Stokes forthcoming: 3). In this 
sense, the allocation of this type of goods implies that large sectors of the 
population will benefit without fear of being excluded from receiving those same 
benefits in the future. 
Whereas public goods benefit all members of society, the allocation of private 
goods (clientelism) covers a wide range of government policies and actions that 
produce benefits for individuals. These benefits have a particularity that implies a 
different relation between citizens and politicians; in the case of private goods 
allocations, there is an expected „quid-pro-quo‟ where the benefits are only 
available „on condition that the client complies by providing political support‟ 
(Stokes forthcoming: 3).  
These two types of services have important effects on policy outcomes and 
development in general. According to Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni (2003: 17), 
„clientelism does not bring the social benefits that public goods, even if politically 
manipulated in their allocation, can.‟ These authors note that although most 
disadvantaged sectors of the population would benefit from private good provision, 
they would probably be better off benefiting from programmatic spending (Diaz-
Cayeros & Magaloni 2003: 17).  
The decisions taken by political leaders in allocating resources can have an 
enormous impact on the effectiveness of public spending benefits to the poor 
through improve service delivery. According to Wantchekon (2003: 401), 
„clientelism generates excessive redistribution at the expense of the provision of 
public goods, as politicians wastefully divert government resources to favored 
segments of the electorate. Second, since budgetary procedures in many countries 
either lack transparency or are discretionary, clientelism tends to favor those 
already in control of the government and therefore consolidates incumbency 
advantage in democratic elections.‟ Thus, incumbents tend to benefit most from 
clientelistic spending since they can use their discretionary power over public funds 
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to strategically allocate private goods and persuade voters support them rather 
than the opposition at the polls. 
Now that we have identified the main characteristics of the two types of resource 
allocation and the incentives that politicians have to choose according to their 
political gain, the following section will focus on how political institutions shape 
resource allocation and the possible effects of resource allocation on good 
governance. 
 
3.4 Political institutions, resource allocation and good governance 
 
The studies detailed below explore two dimensions of the effects of politics on 
resource allocation. First, there is strong evidence to believe that politics are linked 
to the different patterns that resource allocation can take namely public goods or 
private goods –clientelism–. The second set of studies shows how political 
institutions can potentially influence the consequences for development when 
resources are allocated in ways that improve government performance.  
 
3.4.1 The links between politics and resource allocation 
 
How do politicians allocate public funds when they have a significant autonomy 
over their use? Given the strong impulse which decentralisation reforms have had 
in the last three decades, there has been renewed interest in exploring the effects 
of politics on resource allocation. Thus, a number of scholars have started to look 
at how political institutions impact the types of policies that politicians pursue 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002).  
A number of studies have concentrated on exploring the effects of political 
institutions on incumbents‟ policy decisions as a way to better understand what 
political factors might be linked to resource allocation. As many countries have 
moved towards increasingly democratic political regimes, there has been recent 
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interest in the literature in exploring whether or not these changes have had a 
positive effect on improving the distribution of public funds, hence improving basic 
service provision.  
There is a great deal of literature that attempts to explore the relationship between 
political institutions and the allocation public spending. Most empirical studies have 
examined how the allocation of public and private goods is affected by political 
factors inherent to a particular jurisdiction. In most cases political factors determine 
the final destination of public funds.  
The studies exploring the effects of political variables on public investment suggest 
that politicians tend to allocate resources in exchange for political support (Finan 
2004) and to maximise their probabilities of winning elections (Moser 2004). In 
exploring how deputies in Brazil allocate their budgetary amendments, Finan 
(2004) suggests that the share of votes in a municipality influences the type of 
project to be financed. In particular, this author has found that „politicians are more 
likely to promote projects that are harder to target narrowly in the municipalities 
where they receive a higher share of votes‟ (Finan 2004: 13). In other words, 
politicians with high levels of political support in the polls tend to allocate more 
resource for the provision of public goods as opposed to other types of investment.  
Even in the so-called “developmental states” that were characterised as being 
highly insulated from political pressures, Yong (2001) found that political factors 
had indeed affected distributive patterns of allocation of resources. Throughout an 
examination of South Korea‟s public spending between 1987 and 1997 Yong 
shows how the electoral cycles and the level of political competition impacted the 
patterns of resource redistribution. In particular, he found that government 
expenditure increased during pre-election periods. Costa, Rodriguez & Luna 
(1995) also emphasise the role of political competition in local elections in Mexico 
on determining the allocation of public investment. They suggested that „public 
investment was used as a way to enhance support for the incumbent, or to 
compensate local governments for not changing their support to the opposition 
party‟ (Costa, Rodriguez & Luna 1995: 19). 
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In her study of a food distribution program across 130 Argentine cities, Weitz-
Shapiro (2007) argues that the interaction between demographics and political 
competition can explain why some governments spend more in private goods 
(clientelism) than others. Her findings note that „high levels of political competition 
decrease the use of clientelism in predominantly middle class settings, while 
having little impact on (…) the reliance on clientelism in settings with large poor 
populations‟ (2007: 28).  
 
3.4.2 Politics, resource allocation and government performance 
 
The influence of political institutions on resource allocation could also mediate the 
effectiveness of policies to improve government performance. Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. (2002) have explored how institutional electoral arrangements influence the 
types of policies that politicians pursue. They have found strong evidence in favor 
of the claim that the size of the winning coalitions in an election determines how 
effective public policies are. The larger the winning coalitions, they argue, the 
greater the emphasis leaders place on effective public policies. On the contrary, if 
the winning coalition is small, politicians will focus on providing private goods to 
their supporters. In their study on how the electoral system shapes government 
spending, Milesi-Ferret et al. (2000) have also found out that majoritarian systems 
are prone to more public good spending. 
In exploring the politics of resource allocation recent studies have paid particular 
attention to political competition as a possible political variable that could shed light 
on the incentives that politicians have in allocating certain types of goods to the 
population. The reasons for the study of political competition can be understood if 
we look at the importance of competitive elections for a political regime. According 
to Boyne (1998: 210), „[p]arty competition is central to the operation of 
representative democracy. Just as competition between firms in private markets is 
supposed to ensure the efficient provision of services required by consumers, so 
competition between parties delivers the policies desired by the electorate.‟ 
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Democratic elections are the mechanism by which citizens have the power to avoid 
the perpetuation of politicians, since democratic elections lead to the replacement 
of undesired politicians by the electorate. It is believed that „if competition works 
then the ruling party is fearful of loss of office and seeks to produce policies that 
satisfy the electorate‟ (Boyne 1998: 210). 
In this sense, Ashworth et al. (2006: 12) suggests that „electoral competition –
measured in terms of the number of parties that participate in the election– has a 
significant and positive effect on the efficiency of municipal policy.‟ In his study on 
demand-based development and local electoral environments in Mexico, Hiskey 
(2003) also argues that „there is strong evidence that local environments are 
potentially critical determinants of the effectiveness of demand-based programs in 
achieving their development goals‟ (Hiskey 2003: 51). He notes that high levels of 
political competition „[are] far more conductive to attaining real development 
successes through the demand-based approach‟ (Hiskey 2003: 53).  
The literature on participation has also shed light on the positive effects of political 
competition on government performance. In his study on public participation and 
poverty alleviation in West Bengal, Echeverri-Gent (1992) found that while the 
implementation of antipoverty programs through local elected bodies has made 
policy more responsive to the needs of the poor, elite capture seems to prevail in 
distorting the implementation of programmes in favor of ruling parties at the local 
level. In this sense, Echeverri-Gent (1992) suggests that democratic political 
competition, among other factors, is essential for maximising responsiveness to the 
poor. 
Politicians attempt to attract political support through the allocation of goods 
regardless of welfare outcomes. In other words, politicians (incumbents) use public 
spending to win the most possible votes with negative outcomes in terms of service 
delivery (quality and quantity).  
The contribution of this dissertation is to explore two dimensions of the politics of 
resource allocation through an exploration of antipoverty spending in Mexico. I 
believe that Mexico is an ideal case study in which to examine these two 
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dimensions as the country has recently experienced a gradual transition to 
democracy and has undergone a significant decentralisation process that has 
enhanced the role played by local governments in the delivery of basic services to 
the population. Both democratisation and decentralisation have had a major impact 
on the development strategy of the country. An important part of the social policy of 
the country has been decentralised and for the last decade Mexican municipalities 
have been responsible for the provision of most basic services to the population. In 
this sense, this study sheds light on the political consequences of the shift from 
centralised to decentralised distribution of antipoverty funds. It could also 
contribute to the debate regarding the importance of incorporating local political 
institutions and the analysis of effective policy implementation and pro-poor policy. 
The following section offers a theoretical framework for the study of the political 
determinants of antipoverty spending. Borrowing from the literature on the politics 
of resource allocation, this theoretical framework distinguishes between public and 
private good allocations. This theoretical framework allows us to test the extent to 
which political institutions influence the allocation of public investment. Once we 
have examined the links between politics and resource allocation, we will test how 
the influence of political institutions on resource allocations can impact basic 
service provision. 
 
3.5. A framework for studying antipoverty spending and political gain 
 
Given that social policy is the most vulnerable policy areas in the use of public 
funds for political gain –i.e. elite capture– and given the increasing involvement of 
local governments in the allocation of decentralised fiscal transfers with a social 
orientation, there is a strong need to investigate the ways in which municipalities 
use decentralised funds, what factors influence resource allocation at the very local 
level, and how the dynamics between local politics and resource allocation may 
determine improvements in access to basic services.  
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The objective of this theoretical framework is to: first, analyse how local 
governments use decentralised fiscal funds that aim to benefit the poor to explore 
the degree and way in which politics influence inter-jurisdictional policy variations; 
and second, explore the extent to which political institutions and their influence on 
resource allocation has an effect on basic service provision.  
In this theoretical framework it is assumed that politicians will allocate public and 
private goods with political motivations. As politicians may allocate resources with 
political motivations, it is worth exploring the links between political institutions and 
resource allocation. Through the examination of the different ways in which 
politicians can allocate public funds, this dissertation attempts to analyse the 
effects of politics on resource allocation at the very local level in Mexico. In 
particular, as the poorest sectors of the population „are more likely than the 
electorate as a whole to be targeted by clientelistic appeals30‟ (Brusco, Nazareno & 
Stokes 2004: 72) this dissertation will focus on the study of social policy, the policy 
arena thought to be most susceptible to political manipulation.  
The following section provides an account of the goals of politicians and how these 
goals might shape their resource allocation decisions. 
 
3.5.1 What do politicians want?  
 
For Mendez (2007: 6), governments invest their whole political and human capital 
in order to be rewarded by the electorate or avoid being “punished” during 
democratic elections. He suggests that given that politicians are in constant search 
for political support during their mandates and that public policies will, inevitably, 
lack neutrality. Mendez (2007: 6) also suggests that all public policies have political 
aims; behind public policies there are political goals that are recognised as valid, 
legal, and legitimate in a democracy. Political parties‟ unique objective is to win 
elections. Candidates within the party system view winning elections not only as a 
                                                 
30
 Through the analysis of political clientelism in Argentina, these authors found that low income Argentines are 
more likely to receive private goods in exchange for votes. 
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goal per se, but also as a means of implementing  better policy for their respective 
constituencies (Mendez 2007: 6). 
Thus, most theoretical models exploring the choices that politicians make in the 
allocation of public spending assume that politicians seek to hold office through the 
distribution of resources using diverse forms of public spending (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al 2002: 561). It is argued that political leaders will allocate public 
funds „in ways that can improve their chances of winning elections or in non-
democratic settings, of keeping a coalition that is invulnerable to challengers‟ 
(Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2003: 16).  
According to Magaloni et al. (2002), political leaders will seek the optimal political 
allocation of public funds that could provide them the most political advantages 
against their opponents. Using a portfolio diversification model these authors 
analyse how political leaders decide to allocate a basket of funds to voters in order 
to secure their support in the polls. The central idea of this model is that „an 
incumbent party must decide how to allocate a basket of discretionary transfers to 
voters in an attempt to get re-elected‟ (Magaloni et al. 2002: 4). Key to this model is 
the type of goods that politicians can allocate to the population. In this case, the 
model distinguishes between a range of goods that could take the form of: a) 
private excludable outlays (clientelism) that can be individually targeted; or, b) 
public non-excludable public goods that are targeted to a jurisdiction or to be 
consumed by voters across several jurisdictions. 
Their theoretical model focuses on clientelism „as a strategic choice made by 
politicians.‟ Private goods are considered to lower electoral risks, but are more 
expensive than public goods. As Weitz-Shapiro (2007) notes, public goods 
provision entails targeting benefits to large sectors of society (voters) with the 
expectation that some individuals will be persuaded by this distribution to vote for 
them. In this case there is some uncertainty over the number of people who will 
actually support the politicians as a result of the allocation. Thus the risk that 
individuals might not support politicians allocating these goods is higher. In 
contrast, private goods (clientelism) „consists of the individualised exchange of 
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goods for votes, where the recipients of such goods are (…) monitored for 
compliance with this bargain‟ (Weitz-Shapiro 2007: 7), and therefore the risk is 
lower. 
The model assumes that politicians seek to minimise electoral risk but at the same 
time guarantee an expected threshold of electoral return. Therefore incumbent 
parties strategically diversify their „portfolio‟ of the two types of goods to the 
electorate: core supporters and swing voters. In contrast to other models that 
predict that politicians will either allocate discretionary transfers to a core or a 
swing voter, this „model predicts “mixed policy baskets”, by which both core and 
swing voters are favored‟ (Magaloni et al. 2002: 6) according to the political interest 
of political leaders. In other words, political parties (and more specifically 
incumbents) diversify their resources investing decisions depending on the 
different constituencies they target (Calvo & Murillo 2004: 745). 
 
3.5.2 The Mexican case  
 
In order to study antipoverty spending in Mexico we need to emphasise the 
incentives that politicians have to allocate public funds. Using Magaloni‟s et al. 
(2007) portfolio diversification model, my analysis assumes that politicians can 
choose to allocate public and/or private goods according to their political needs. In 
other words, I treat public and private good allocations as alternative ways in which 
politicians may provide goods and services to the population in exchange for votes.  
The focus on public and private goods allows the disaggregation of data on public 
spending. In particular, this classification allowed me to classify, for the first time, 
specific data on one of the most important sources of municipal spending for basic 
social infrastructure, FAISM. As the norms that regulate the use of FAISM include 
a variety of projects that can be carried out with these resources, the use of this 
typology makes possible the observation of the forms that social transfers actually 
take as a result of the decisions made by local authorities.  
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As politicians allocate resources according to their political needs, there are a 
number of factors that could mediate their decisions over the final destination of 
antipoverty funds. As the literature suggests, political competition might determine 
the degree to which social policy takes the form of clientelistic exchanges or public 
goods provision. A second aspect that could influence incumbents‟ decisions over 
public funds allocations is related to the electoral cycle. It is relevant to test if, in 
democratic contexts, antipoverty spending is undermined by the political interest of 
incumbents and their political allies. In particular it is important to test the extent to 
which antipoverty funds are manipulated according to the electoral calendar of 
subnational political actors (state governors and municipal authorities) and their 
political parties. A third aspect that could be observed is whether the type of 
political party in power can tell us something about allocations patterns across 
municipalities that have elected political representatives from opposing political 
parties. Chapter four will test the extent to which these political variables have an 
effect on clientelism and public goods provision. 
 
3.5.3 Does democracy leads to poverty reduction? 
 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, a second aim of this theoretical 
framework is to allow us to study the extent to which political institutions and their 
influence on resource allocation has an effect on basic service provision. As 
FAISM‟s official mandate is to allocate resources for the provision of social 
infrastructure31, our framework and detailed classification of projects allows us to 
look at to the implications of this allocations for basic service provision. 
Broadly speaking, as will be detailed in chapter five, three types of variables might 
mediate the effects of antipoverty spending on public good provision. The first set 
of variables attempt to account for the role played by political variables on 
improving basic service provision –electoral competition and party alignment will be 
                                                 
31
 Social infrastructure includes, among other things, the provision of water, sewerage and electricity to poor 
communities. 
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tested. The second set of variables test whether state capacity has an effect on the 
ability of local governments to increase access to public services. In this case, this 
chapter tests for the effects that FAISM resources have had in improving public 
service provision. Since FAISM emphasises community participation, the effects of 
political participation on service delivery will be also tested.  
This theoretical framework and its use to explore policy outcomes could shed some 
light on the broader development question of the effects on democracy of pro-poor 
outcomes.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
As we have seen in the previous sections, clientelism persists even where 
democratic conditions have improved. We have also seen how the politics of public 
spending have important policy implications. These implications are more 
significant in those policy areas where the allocation of resources has a direct 
impact on improvements to the basic service provision that the population needs. 
In other words, social policy is a policy area where political incentives can have a 
major impact on those sectors of the population that face serious barriers to 
gaining access to key public services.  
Given that local governments have more information about the basic needs of a 
population, and given the importance that local political actors have gained as a 
result of decentralisation and democratisation, there is a need to carry out studies 
that disaggregate data regarding social spending at the very local level. Doing this 
allows us to better know the possible ways in which politicians decide what to do 
with antipoverty spending, and the particular incentives that motivate these 
decisions.  
In this sense, it is through exploring the ways in which local authorities allocate 
public funds and their incentives that we could have a better idea of the challenges 
that the implementation of decentralisation reforms entail at the very local level. It 
could also provide a better understanding of the effects of democratic politics on 
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policy implementation. As Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007: 2) note, „[t]he current World 
Bank and bilateral donor focus on governance and transparency (…) is doomed to 
failure unless it takes more account of the often opposing incentives facing 
politicians charged with implementing reforms in patronage-based systems (…).‟ 
The framework developed in this chapter could help in the understanding of the 
political factors linked to better service provision. It could also contribute to the 
debate regarding the effects of democratic politics on reducing poverty at the local 
level. The next chapter will explore the political determinants of antipoverty 
spending. Through an examination of FAISM allocation in 122 municipalities the 
chapter will explore the effects of political institutions on the final destination of 
FAISM resources.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM MEXICAN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the political conditions that affect resource allocation at the 
municipal level. It seeks to promote a better understanding of the various political 
elements that determine the way in which politicians decide what to do with 
resources allocated to reducing poverty and inequality by providing social 
infrastructure to the poorest communities. It aims „to understand how policy 
decisions are made [and] what shapes the incentives and constraints of the 
policymakers taking those decisions‟ (Persson and Tabellini 2000: 2). 
The allocation of antipoverty funds with political motivations has been a feature of 
many countries around the world. In recent years, many developing countries have 
carried out deep decentralisation processes with the aim of shifting resources to 
governments closer to the people as a means of fostering development and 
reducing poverty. As such, academic interest in the study of resource allocation 
has gained major importance. In particular, there has been growing concern 
regarding the weak effectiveness of decentralised transfers and, most importantly, 
regarding the possible political motivations of politicians to use certain types of 
funds when they have a great amount of autonomy.  
The literature on the politics of resource allocation points out that politicians 
„attempt to allocate public spending in ways that can improve their chances of 
winning elections, or in non-democratic settings, of keeping a coalition that is 
invulnerable to challengers‟ (Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2003: 16). Recent studies 
have explored the political incentives that politicians face when allocating public 
funds. In his study on political patronage and local development in Brazil, Finan 
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(2004) has found that the type of public work the municipality receives is 
determined by political motivations and not by its local needs. He points out that 
„because these public goods vary in their degree of exclusion, politicians prefer to 
allocate goods that are less excludable to municipalities where they received more 
political support‟ (2004:32). Other studies have explored the effects of competitive 
elections on public good provision. In her study of goods allocation in Madagascar, 
Moser (2004) concludes that FID (a World Bank fund primarily concerned with the 
construction of basic infrastructure) projects were „particularly vulnerable to political 
influence and displayed evidence of both patronage and vote-buying behavior‟ 
(Moser 2004: 18). Throughout an examination of South Korea‟s public spending 
between 1987 and 1997, Yong (2001) shows how the electoral cycles and the level 
of political competition impact patterns of resource redistribution. Similarly, in their 
study of Mexico during the 1990-1995 period, Costa, Rodriguez & Luna (1995) 
point out that „the main political party [the PRI] employed the allocation of public 
funds as an incentive to avoid the loss of support in regions where political 
competition was rising.‟ 
The type of electoral contestation at the subnational level could also explain how 
local governments use decentralised funds and could also explain possible 
variations across different cases. In his study on municipal budget choices in 
Bolivia, Singer (2006) argues that analysis of the use of municipal funds should 
focus on exploring the nature of the electoral arena as well as on the preferences 
of the electoral constituencies.  
In developing countries, the increasing levels of political competition at the local 
level have raised new questions about the impact of this change on development. 
It is important to look at new political local conditions where different types of 
contestation are found and to see how these variations could shape policy choices.  
In this sense, in studying the politics of antipoverty funds, it is important to have a 
clear idea about the political conditions that prevail at one particular setting. In the 
case of this research, the focus is on one state in one country characterised by a 
long tradition of clientelistic and authoritarian politics.  
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This research focuses on the politics of resource allocation in Mexican 
municipalities from 1998-2006. By looking at 122 municipalities in one Mexican 
state (Estado de Mexico), this research attempts to explore how despite the recent 
efforts to depoliticised antipoverty funds, resource allocation continues to be deeply 
affected by the political interests of local officials. It aims to characterise the way in 
which local governments in Mexico use a certain type of decentralised fiscal funds 
that aim to benefit the poor, and to explore the extent to which electoral politics 
play a role in its final destination. Through an examination of FAISM, this 
investigation seeks to understand how electoral politics influence the allocation of 
anti-poverty funds at the municipal level. 
 
4.2 The politics of antipoverty funds in Mexico: The case of FAISM 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, in the last two decades, Mexico has experienced 
fundamental transformations to the institutional design of decentralised antipoverty 
transfers. During the 1988-1994 presidential period, Solidaridad was created to 
improve the conditions of poor people, to promote regional development and to 
promote and strengthen the participation of social organisations and local 
governments by increasing social spending and channeling it to the municipal 
level. However the programme was politically motivated. At the local level, 
Solidaridad served as a response to the electoral challenges to the PRI hegemony, 
especially in electorally important and vulnerable municipalities that were 
experiencing a major presence of opposition political parties (Molinar & Weldom 
1994).  
During the 1990s Mexico initiated a deep process of decentralisation where most 
basic services responsibilities and infrastructure expenditures were transferred to 
states and municipalities. In the early 1990's, education and healthcare services 
were largely transferred to the state governments. In 1997, when the opposition 
political parties won the majority of the National Congress for the first time, FAISM 
was created to substitute Solidaridad. It became the main mechanism by which the 
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central government transfers resources to municipalities to finance basic 
infrastructure projects: potable water, sewers, drainage, urbanisation, 
electrification, basic education and health infrastructure, roads, housing 
improvements and productive rural infrastructure. Since then, the Federation has 
started to transfer more resources to the municipalities than ever before to finance 
social infrastructure, using a formula that assigns resources based on the relative 
position of the municipalities according to the deprivation index (Hernandez, 
Merino & Rascón 2003: 33).  
The new formula-based fund aims to increase social infrastructure as a key aspect 
of Mexico‟s poverty reduction strategy. It was created as a response to the 
clientelistic nature of Solidaridad and marked an important step towards 
transparency and stability in municipal funding as three important steps were taken 
to further decentralisation. First, transfers were tied to the total amount of federal 
revenues, generating more stability. Second, the participation of the central 
government through the Ministry of Social Development in the choice and 
execution of projects was ended; under FAISM decisions are taken by the 
municipalities. Third, a specific calendar for disbursing the funds was established, 
giving states and municipalities the certainty that budgeted resources would reach 
them during the fiscal year. 
Since its creation FAISM resources have been increasing in real terms. Yet, 
despite the increasing flux of resources transferred since 1998, municipalities 
continue to face strong limitations to fulfill the infrastructure needs of their 
communities. After 9 years since the creation of FAISM the capacity of local 
governments to solve the problem of limited basic infrastructure remains unsolved, 
therefore the effective use of such resources has been major issue in public 
debates.  
The lack of effectiveness in the use of FAISM is explained by the fact that this fund 
has an inherent design problem. Contrary to other federal social programs, 
monitoring and evaluation systems for the use of FAISM are extremely weak as the 
federal government and the federal Congress cannot verify the use and destination 
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of these resources. Although the FCL states that municipalities must report their 
use of resources to the Ministry of Social Development, this does not happened as 
the law does not establish a sanction for lack of compliance (i.e. in 2005 only 7 
states reported any involvement in FAISM funded projects). There is also a lack of 
downward accountability. According to the FCL local governments should promote 
community participation in programming, implementing, monitoring and evaluating 
the projects financed through FAISM. Unfortunately this regulation, in practice, has 
become only a recommendation that most municipalities have decided not to follow 
(World Bank 2006b: 181). 
The weak legal and institutional design of FAISM has encouraged opportunistic 
behavior by political elites (Hernández & Jarillo 2006). The lack of transparency 
and weak accountability of FAISM has encouraged politicians to use the fund for 
political gain. Municipal officials with a great deal of autonomy to decide what to do 
with the share of resources received through FAISM have found it to be politically 
rewarding to channel the resources to those constituencies that could maximise 
the possibility of their party remain in power.  
This investigation seeks to explore the extent to which local officials use FAISM for 
political gain by considering the case of Estado de Mexico, the most populated and 
politically important state of the country. Estado de Mexico is also a case study of a 
political setting that has recently moved from a political system dominated by one 
political party towards one where, in most local elections, opposition political 
parties have been able and allowed to win. It is also among the few states that 
have a systematic account of the use of FAISM since 1998.  
 
4.3 Resource allocation and use of FAISM  
 
As mentioned in the theoretical discussion the allocation of resources can take two 
forms: public and private goods. Although both types of investments have a “vote-
buying potential”, there are important differences between these types of goods. 
Private goods target benefits to individuals and small groups who support, or are 
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expected to support, politicians with control over resources whereas public goods 
benefit large groups or all the members of the community. A second difference is 
that private goods are excludable which means that politicians „can effectively 
screen voters to distinguish between supporters and opponents‟ (Díaz-Cayeros et 
al. forthcoming). A third difference refers to the fact that politicians can decide 
whether to continue or to stop delivering private goods (scholarships, construction 
materials, equipment, etc.) at any time. In contrast, public goods (hospitals, 
schools, bridges, sewerages, etc.) stay in the community; they cannot be 
withdrawn even if the voters decide to vote for a different party.  
Recent studies on particularism and service provision have stressed the need to 
focus on the distinction between programmatic and particularistic spending on 
„procedural grounds‟, where the measurement of „particularistic spending would 
require information on each transaction, to asses if resources are being assigned 
according to codified rules or otherwise as the result of discretionary mechanisms‟ 
(Armesto 2008: 7). According to this approach „spending in (…) public goods is 
universalistic when resources are assigned according to the rules and criteria of 
the party platform or the program of government of the administration; conversely, 
the provision of (…) goods is particularistic when allocation decisions deviate from 
the established rules and criteria (Armesto 2008: 7).  
Although this approach offers an alternative and useful way to understand public 
spending that could also account for universalistic allocations with political 
motivations – cases in which politicians could allocate public or non excludable 
goods for political gain –, the lack of information regarding the process by which 
funds are allocated makes it difficult to assess whether a particular allocation was 
made on particularistic or programmatic criteria (Armesto 2008: 7). 
In order to explore the potential electoral impact of the projects financed through 
FAISM resources in Estado de Mexico, I have grouped the projects into two 
categories: public goods – that benefit all voters –, and private goods targeted to 
specific groups or types of voters to the exclusion of others. This classification 
allows us to differentiate between the different material benefits that political 
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leaders might be able to offer the population. It constitutes a useful distinction 
between clientelistic and programmatic politics. As mentioned above, the two types 
of goods have fundamental political characteristics that make it possible to identify 
those allocations whose beneficiaries are individuals from those which represent 
long term investments that benefit the community as a whole (annex 1 provides a 
detailed description of the types of FAISM projects involved in each of the 
programs and the way they have been classified32).  
The public and private goods categories offer the best mean of classifying the data 
on FAISM spending and identifying possible use of these funds for political gain. 
According to data on FAISM allocations in 122 municipalities of Estado de Mexico, 
food supply, scholarships, and housing improvement are the most common forms 
of private goods allocation by local politicians. As mentioned before, these projects 
are considered private goods allocations, as they can be targeted to specific 
individuals, households or groups of individuals, and denied to others.  
In the case of food supply, the data shows how those municipalities with the lowest 
level of development allocate important amounts of resources per capita on this 
type of project; only the municipality of Teoloyucan, which is considered among the 
municipalities with lower levels of deprivation, has designated significant amounts 
of resources to allocating this type of private goods. In the case of scholarships, we 
find municipalities with different levels of development and political competition with 
high levels of spending on this type of private good. On one side of the spectrum, 
we find cases such as Toluca and Ecatepec –important municipalities in terms of 
population and development that have experienced alternation of power– as 
among the municipalities that rely on the use of scholarships to benefit individuals. 
On the other side of the spectrum, we find municipalities such as Chimalhuacan 
and San Felipe del Progreso – with high levels of deprivation and politically 
dominated by the PRI – allocating important funds to grant scholarships to basic 
education students. A similar pattern is observed in the case of housing 
improvements, where municipalities as rich as Huixquilucan and as poor as 
                                                 
32
 This distinction was borrowed from Magaloni‟s et al. (2007: 203) classification of Solidaridad projects where 
„the main indicator used for the classification was information regarding the unit of measurement of the project 
on which basis they contrast private goods and (…) public goods‟. 
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Tlatlaya spend significant resources on urban and rural housing improvement 
programs.  
In the case of public goods provision, water, sewerage, electricity, schools, health 
centers and urbanisation are the most common projects carried out by municipal 
authorities with benefits for large sectors of the population. It is worth mentioning 
that, to a certain extent, water and electricity projects can benefit individual 
households. However, as these type of benefits „can hardly be denied to 
individuals or households once a water or electricity network is in place‟ (Armesto 
2009: 3), I have classified them as public goods.  
In the case of Estado de Mexico, if the allocation of resources were apolitical, or in 
other words, if resources were allocated in programmatic terms according to the 
rules that indicate how FAISM resources should be used (with the aim to provide 
infrastructure services that benefit large sectors of the population instead of 
allocating excludable goods –clientelism–), we would expect to find no significant 
amounts of funds allocated to projects that aim to benefit specific sectors of the 
population. However in Estado de Mexico from 1998-2006, spending on clientelism 
constituted 18 percent of the total funds received by municipalities through FAISM. 
In this sense, as the general concern of this investigation in to understand the 
impact of electoral politics on antipoverty spending in Estado de Mexico, the 
allocation of resources for political gain (clientelism) at the municipal level will be 
the dependent variable.  
As public goods could also be used with political motivations through the 
construction of social infrastructure projects that benefit large sectors of the 
population, thereby expanding the possible political impact of government actions, I 
also analyse the extent to which electoral politics determine “public goods” 
allocation. This effort marks a first attempt to explore whether or not these types of 
goods could be also allocated with political motivations or whether or not these 
resources could be allocated with the aim of supporting specific political agendas, 
particularly those of the state and national governments. For this analysis, I will use 
public goods as a second dependent variable.  
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4.4. The data set 
 
For purposes of this investigation, and using information collected during my field 
visit to Mexico, I compiled a data set that includes FAISM allocations by project 
based on information reported from the municipalities to the Ministry of Finance of 
Estado de Mexico33. The data set contains more than 57,000 projects carried out 
between January 1998 and September 2006 in 122 municipalities of Estado de 
Mexico. The following information is included for each of the projects: name, 
sector, programme, subprogramme, type of project, locality, beginning and end of 
project, duration, number of beneficiaries, amount and type of resources used for 
the project (from citizens or from other budget items) and status of the project.  
 
Table 2.   Number of FAISM projects by program 
Programme 
No. of 
projects. 
Urbanisation 17,685 
Basic education infrastructure 13,650 
Basic education support 
(scholarships) 
3,036 
Communication infrastructure 4,323 
Potable water 3,783 
Drainage and sewerage 4,250 
Electricity 3,138 
Housing 2,142 
Municipal Strengthening  991 
Health infrastructure 925 
Irrigation  2,665 
Environment 257 
Public buildings  352 
Community development 75 
Others  44 
Total 57,316 
 
                                                 
33
 It is worth mentioning that since the fund was created, the municipalities of this state have been asked to 
report monthly on the physical and financial status of the projects undertaken with FAISM resources. The 
government of Estado de Mexico has issued a standardised reporting procedure for its municipalities and has 
provided technical assistance for its implementation.  
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The data-set also includes socio-demographic information from the 122 
municipalities and electoral information from the last four municipal elections and 
the last two gubernatorial elections. I have calculated two different indices that 
measure the degree and level of political fragmentation (Rae index of political 
competition and the effective number of parties (ENP) from Laakso and 
Taagepera).  
For purposes of this study, the key variables of interest are the type of project 
chosen by each municipality, the time of the execution of the project and the 
political party in power at the moment of the allocations. Other socioeconomic 
variables such as the deprivation index are also considered in the analysis. 
The following section explores how, despite the fact that the distribution of FAISM 
resources is based on poverty levels and aims to provide social infrastructure 
projects to poor communities, the actual allocation of resources is driven by 
political motivations. 
 
4.5 Testing the evidence 
 
When FAISM was created, it was expected that by giving more resources and 
responsibilities to governments closer to the people, participation and 
accountability would improve. Unfortunately the lack of transparency and the 
institutional framework deficiencies of the fund have encouraged opportunistic 
behavior that has reduced the effectiveness of the fund. It is in this context where 
the study of investment for political gains in Estado de Mexico matters. It can help 
us to map out the types of investments that best characterise certain political 
contexts and the conditions that determine the allocation of resources.  
In order to explore the political determinants of FAISM allocations, the following 
section examines three political variables: electoral competition, electoral cycles 
and partisan considerations. The analysis incorporates both types of goods: public 
and private. 
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4.5.1 Electoral competition 
 
In studying antipoverty funds in one Mexican state, one objective of this research is 
to uncover the political logic driving the allocation of resources by municipal 
governments. It is argued that the allocation of resources by municipal authorities 
is determined by the level of development of the community and the interaction 
between the nature of the party system and the degree of political competition. 
Recent studies of political competition and allocation of public resources suggest 
that competitive elections alone are not sufficient to ensure that governments will 
effectively provide public goods (Singer, 2004). Singer (2004: 3) argues that 
increasing levels of political competition provide incentives for politicians to act with 
anticipation of electoral evaluation and that the type of electoral competition facing 
parties will determine the types of demands to which the governments are 
responsive. It is the local electoral environment that determines the degree to 
which local governments invest their scarce resources for political gain instead of 
programmatic and long-term government services (Hiskey, 2000). Other studies 
investigating whether political competition induces efficient outcomes have found 
that, under certain circumstances, electoral competition could constrain the ability 
of political actors to gain political rents (Polo 1998).  
Figure 1 shows the average per capita allocation of FAISM on clientelism 
disaggregated by the level of development and the type of political competition. 
The level of development is measured by the deprivation index from the Consejo 
Nacional de Población (CONAPO)34. The level of political competition is measured 
using the effective number of parties index (ENP) developed by Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979). This index measures the level of political fragmentation and has 
become the standard numerical measure for the comparative analysis of party 
systems, as it takes both the number of parties and their relative weights into 
account to compute a unique variable. When seats are equally distributed among 
                                                 
34
 The deprivation index is constructed with a number of socioeconomic variables commonly associated with 
deprivation: illiteracy, access to basic education, lacking access to basic services (electricity, potable water and 
sewerage), quality of housing construction, population living in rural areas and income) 
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the different political parties, the ENP coincides with the raw number of parties (i.e. 
if all five parties of a system each get 20 percent of the votes or seats, the effective 
number of parties is exactly 5.00). The value given by the ENP can be interpreted 
as the number of hypothetical equal-sized parties competing or being influential for 
the building of a majority government (Dumont & Caulier: 2003). The figure 
distinguishes between municipalities with two effective political parties competing 
in local elections, municipalities with three effective political parties; and 
municipalities with more than three effective political parties.  
According to the figure, FAISM spending on clientelism tends to increase as the 
deprivation level increases. This might suggest that, as noted by Magaloni et al. 
(2007), people living in rich localities prefer public goods provision to private goods, 
which makes it too difficult for a political party to try to buy them off through 
clientelism. 
 
Figure 1. FAISM spending on private goods per capita by level of development 
 
 
 
The figure also shows that rich municipalities (deprivation level 1 and 2) and poor 
municipalities (deprivation levels 4 and 5) with two effective political parties –
bipartidism– tend to spend more on clientelism per capita than those with three or 
more political parties. However, municipalities with a medium level of 
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socioeconomic development (deprivation level 3) with two effective political parties 
appear to spend less than those municipalities with three effective political parties.  
The combination of bipartidism and low levels of development indicates that 
municipalities that share these two characteristics allocate important amounts of 
resources per capita on clientelism. Apparently pluralistic politics at the local level 
tend to persuade politicians in municipalities with low levels of development to 
spend less on clientelism than the other two types of political competition. 
The allocation of public goods could also be affected by the type of political 
competition in the municipalities. Figure 2 shows the average per capita allocation 
of FAISM to public goods disaggregated by the level of development and type of 
political competition at the municipal level. In this case, public spending on public 
(non-excludable) goods increases when the level of development is low. This 
suggests that municipalities with a higher degree of poverty are spending more 
resources per capita on social infrastructure projects than those with a higher level 
of development. 
 
Figure 2. FAISM spending on public goods per capita by level of development 
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Regarding the type of political competition at the municipal level, the spending 
pattern on public goods is very similar across the three different types of political 
fragmentation. Apparently, the effective number of parties competing at the local 
level does not have an impact on the allocation of public goods. This statement will 
be tested when we run the statistical model.  
 
4.5.2 Electoral cycles  
 
Proponents of the electoral cycle hypothesis point out that electoral competition in 
a democratic context motivates political actors in power to carry out actions that 
could create favorable conditions for the electorate just before the election date, 
thereby favoring the party in power (Molinar & Weldom 1994). It is argued that 
there are rational voters, with limited information, that can assess government 
performance with their votes. This political behavior from voters creates strong 
incentives for politicians to find ways in which voters could perceive and assess 
their administration favorably just prior to the election date, increasing their 
chances of an electoral victory.  
Figure 3 shows the percentage of FAISM spending on clientelism by party during 
1998-2005 period. Although the PRI appears to spend less on clientelism in most 
of the years, it is striking how clientelism increases when gubernatorial elections 
are scheduled: 1995 and 2005. This finding suggests that municipalities with a PRI 
government favor investment in clientelism during gubernatorial elections in an 
attempt to win votes through the provision of excludable goods, and thus 
guarantee the permanence of their party at the state level.  
Electoral law in Estado de Mexico prohibits the promotion of projects and actions 
during electoral campaigns; however, there are documented cases where 
municipal authorities were found actively promoting the PRI candidate for the 
governorship during the 2005 electoral process. According to a resolution from the 
Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, who is the highest authority 
on electoral matters in Mexico, members of 41 municipalities (governed by the 
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PRI) subscribed “as witnesses” a document that included the campaign promises 
of the PRI candidate. This act was accredited as proselytism in favor of the PRI 
candidate35 (Acosta 2006: 12).  
 
Figure 3. Percentage of FAISM spending on clientelism by party 
 
 
In the case of municipalities governed by the PAN, the figure suggests that after 
the year 2000, when the PAN defeated the PRI at the national level, these 
municipalities started to spend more on clientelism than previous years. This could 
be explained by the fact that these municipalities changed their spending priorities 
in accordance with the priorities of the federal government. A main concern for the 
recently elected President Fox, who defeated the PRI candidate for the first time in 
more than seven decades, was to reach a majority of the seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies in order to carry out his political agenda. It is possible that in an attempt 
to win more votes during the 2003 mid-term congressional election, municipalities 
with this political affiliation decided to spend more on clientelism in order to 
improve the chances of their candidates to secure a seat at the National Congress 
in lines with the President‟s political interest.  
                                                 
35
 There are also other documented cases where members of the Legislative Chamber that belong to the PRI 
were found delivering benefits during the electoral process of 2005 in the municipalities of Soyaniquilpan and 
Villa Victoria (Acosta 2006: 12). 
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In general terms, the three main political parties represented at the municipal level 
in Estado de Mexico use significant amounts of resources in financing private 
goods. This is an important finding as the resources received by the municipal 
governments through FAISM should be used to finance social infrastructure 
projects in line with the social objectives of the fund. In other words, the intended 
aim to guarantee an apolitical use of these resources has not been accomplished. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of FAISM spending on public goods by party 
 
 
In terms of FAISM spending on public goods, figure 4 illustrates how the PRI spent 
more on public goods than the other two political parties. The left wing party, the 
PRD, spent less on public goods than the PRI and the PAN, which reflects its 
orientation to support projects that benefit specific sectors of the population in 
order to keep unity among its different factions.  
It is worth noting that despite the fact that the three major political parties spent 
most FAISM resources on public goods provision, a recent monitoring of social 
programs in a number of municipalities of Estado de Mexico has found that the 
resources allocated to specific projects tend to favor groups or communities that 
offer political support to the head of the municipality (FUNDAR 2006: 22). The 
control and monitoring mechanisms that regulate the use of FAISM resources 
through active participation of the citizenship have proved to be unsuccessful even 
in contexts that have recently experienced political change. As Grindle notes 
89 
 
 
(2007: 174), „in a country that had, through many years of authoritarian 
government, encouraged clientelism in the distribution of public benefits, it is 
perhaps not surprising that much citizen activity under more democratic conditions 
mimicked previous mechanisms of making connections and presenting petitions‟. 
 
4.5.3 Partisan considerations 
 
One aspect which has acquired more relevance within Mexican local politics has 
been the increasing number of municipalities that have experienced alternance in 
power. As we have mentioned before, after years of one-party domination in local 
elections in Estado de Mexico, during the 1990‟s the political landscape started to 
change. In the 1990 local election the opposition political parties were able to 
defeat the PRI in 5 municipalities. By the 1993 municipal election the number 
increased to 11 municipalities; the majority of these municipalities were small in 
size, with low population density and a low level of economic development.  
In the local election of 1996 the PRI lost in 49 municipalities, representing 40% of 
the 122 municipalities of the state. It was in this election when important 
municipalities –in terms of size, population and development- were won by the 
PAN and the PRD. 
For the 2000 and 2003 local election the political landscape became more 
complex. Not only were the PAN and PRD able to win elections but also the PRI 
was able to take back a few municipalities and others were won by small political 
parties. By 2003 alternance became evident as only 24% of the municipalities had 
never experienced alternance in power, and in the 2006 election the number 
reduced to only 13 municipalities, most of them are of a medium size, with low 
population density and are located in the north west and southwest of the state. 
Alongside the increasing cases of alternance experienced in the last 4 local 
elections, a new trend of new party domination has emerged. There are a number 
of municipalities where the PAN and PRD are now consolidated, as they have 
been able to win consecutive elections since 1996 and 2000. 
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With a political map with important variations with respect to political competition it 
is possible to observe whether or not the type of political party in power can also 
have an impact on the way in which FAISM resources are allocated. The political 
party‟s ideology might determine the type of projects or actions to be funded.  
Figure 5 shows how the three major political parties in Estado de Mexico spend 
more on clientelism when the level of development of the municipalities is low. 
Again, this suggests that voters in poor municipalities are extremely vulnerable to 
vote buying and that the three political parties take advantage of this. Contrary to 
the aims of FAISM funds to benefit the poorest localities by providing social 
infrastructure services, the figure reports that political considerations matter when 
political officials decide how to use antipoverty funds. 
One clear example of the political use of FAISM resources by the three major 
political parties is the extensive allocation of resources for basic education support 
(scholarships). In those municipalities where the two major opposition political 
parties, the right-wing PAN and the left-wing PRD, have been able to win in the last 
three electoral contests (new dominant parties in these localities), the 
disbursements for scholarships account for 17 percent (PAN), and 27 percent 
(PRD), of FAISM total spending. The use of FAISM resources to provide individual 
benefits shows the resilience of clientelism in local contexts that have undergone 
political change. In these contexts, local politicians that care about the electoral 
returns of resource allocations have supplied particularistic goods that are more 
tangible and immediate to poor constituencies for political gain. 
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Figure 5. FAISM spending on clientelism per capita by level of development 
 
 
In terms of public goods provision, the allocation of resources increases as the 
level of development decreases. Apparently the three political parties in power in 
poor municipalities spend more on public goods per capita than those in power in 
municipalities with a high level of development. 
 
Figure 6. FAISM spending on public goods per capita by level of development 
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Public goods provision could be also used with political motivations to improve or 
maintain the electoral prospects of the incumbent party. In this sense it is not 
surprising that the PRI is the political party that spends more per capita on public 
goods in poor municipalities. It could be argued that it is the interest of the state 
government to support those projects that could eventually benefit large sections of 
the population.  
Even if municipal governments are responsible for the projects, for years the state 
government (governor) has put pressure on municipal authorities belonging to the 
same party (PRI) to inform the population that the projects are carried out in 
conjunction with the state. As Armesto (2009: 5) notes, „partisan alignment 
between municipal and state or provincial governments matters because mayors 
stand between the state/provincial government and voters in each municipality‟. 
Given the proximity of municipal authorities to the population, state governments 
have strong incentives to influence the allocation of public goods by municipal 
authorities that belong to the same political party. At the same time, the prohibition 
of immediate reelection at the municipal level and the fact that the governor exerts 
important influence on the PRI appointments of candidates to municipal office, 
stimulate municipal authorities to carry out actions in line with the interest of the 
state government that could guarantee the future success of their political party. 
Mayors have more incentives to respond to the interest of the governor than to 
paying attention to the needs of the population, thus undermining „the linkages 
between citizen satisfaction and local accountability‟ (Grindle 2007: 180). 
In these contexts, mayors become key actors for the political interests of the 
governor as they „share credit with state/provincial government and they fulfill the 
role of political brokers‟ (Armesto 2009: 5). This is the case of the municipalities of 
Estado de Mexico governed by the PRI where, through the provision of services or 
development of public works, both local and state governments were able to get 
some credit for the benefits delivered to the population. For instance, during the 
1999 to 2005 governorship, cabinet members were responsible for monitoring the 
development of projects carried out in the municipalities of the state. In full 
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coordination with municipal officials (and in some cases in collaboration with local 
members of the PRI), cabinet members and high level state officials had to ensure 
that all the projects were finished and that the population was informed about the 
project, highlighting the participation of the state government (governor) in the 
construction of the projects. In this way the state government could „rely on mayors 
and their political machines to narrow targets‟ (Armesto 2005: 5).  
An additional finding on the municipal allocation of FAISM funds resources is the 
significant amount of resources for urbanisation projects. In this case, it is the right-
wing party, the PAN, which spends more on urbanisation than the other two major 
parties. By looking at those municipalities where this political party has won the last 
five consecutive elections, almost 35 percent of FAISM resources is allocated to 
urbanisation projects. 
Figure 7. FAISM spending on public goods by dominant party 
 
 
The reason for this trend is explained by the fact that the municipalities ruled by 
this political party are large urban centres with low deprivation levels. In this case, 
the municipal government priorities are to satisfy the demands of a large, middle 
class constituency that demands good roads to circulate within the municipality. It 
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seems that in those municipalities where the PAN has become the dominant 
political actor, the party finds more politically reward in improving the urban 
infrastructure of the communities. 
 
4.6 Panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) model 
 
In addressing the political logic of resource allocation in Mexican municipalities, the 
model attempts to explore how the number of parties competing at the local level, 
the electoral cycle and partisan considerations affect the allocation of FAISM for 
political gain. It is assumed that political considerations do play a role in the actual 
use of FAISM resources at the municipal level in Mexico and that these 
considerations, in fact, are important in a program which aims to allocate resources 
on the basis of pro-poor spending to benefit large sectors of the population by 
providing social infrastructure services. 
The model explains how political considerations have an impact on the allocation 
of FAISM resources for political gain among 122 municipalities of Estado de 
Mexico (cross sectional elements) over a nine year period (time series). The 
allocation of resources for political gain at the municipal level is the dependent 
variable and is measured by the FAISM spending per capita on private goods –
clientelism– for each municipality for each year. I have also run the model using 
FAISM spending per capita on public goods as an attempt to explore the extent to 
which the projects that fall in this category might also be used with political 
motivations (see table 3).  
With regards to the number of parties, the model confirms the hypothesis that 
clientelism tends to be eroded as the number of political parties competing in local 
elections increases (see model 1 in table 2). The model suggests that the 
increasing number of parties participating in local elections has a positive impact 
on the allocation of antipoverty funds, as the presence of more political parties 
might induce politicians to invest less in clientelism.  
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Contrary to Singer‟s (2004) findings that municipalities facing strong competition 
might have great incentives to distribute private goods to maintain clientelistic 
networks and to maintain a small but united constituency, it seems that in the case 
of FAISM resources in more pluralistic political arenas, local officials tend to 
compromise less with the provision of excludable (short term) private goods. 
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Table 3. The political determinants of FAISM spending on clientelism 
 
DV: FAISM spending per capita on clientelism 
 Model 1 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
ENP -1.70*** 
(.68) 
 
-1.71*** 
(.63) 
 
 
 
Rae index of political 
competition 
 
 
 
 
-22.60*** 
(8.5) 
Electoral cycle (municipal)  -.92*** 
(.44) 
 
 
Electoral cycle (state) -.08 
(.08) 
 
 
-.08 
(.09) 
PAN federal government -097 
(2.04) 
 
-.21 
(1.85) 
 
-3.55 
(2.16) 
PRI 
  
2.94 
(2.12) 
 
 
PAN 
  
5.59*** 
(2.75) 
 
PRD 
  
4.92*** 
(2.41) 
 
Population -1.77 
(1.15) 
 
-1.69 
(1.14) 
2.11 
(1.12) 
Illiteracy .89*** 
(.14) 
 
.87*** 
(.14) 
 
 
 
 
% Population lacking access 
to drinking water 
.17*** 
(.049) 
 
.18*** 
(.049) 
 
 
Quality of housing 
construction 
-.19*** 
(.073) 
 
-020*** 
(.07) 
 
 
 
Workers earning less than 2 
minimum wages 
.18** 
(.07) 
 
.20*** 
(.07) 
 
 
Deprivation index 
  
9.61*** 
(.83) 
 
Intercept 3.32 
(4.51) 
1.06 
(4.46) 
36.54*** 
(7.30) 
No. of observations  1038 1038 1038 
R-squared  0.27 0.28 0.26 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 
follows: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
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The model also shows how the level of development affects FAISM spending on 
clientelism. By measuring development through the deprivation index, it seems that 
there is a positive relationship between the deprivation index and clientelism. It 
seems that the poorest municipalities (categorised with a deprivation level of „very 
high‟) spend more on clientelism than those with a higher level of development. 
This suggests that voters in poor municipalities are highly susceptible to vote 
buying. 
A second political element that has an effect on FAISM spending on clientelism is 
the timing of elections. It is argued that when elections are scheduled, municipal 
officials might have incentives to spend public funds on projects that could benefit 
their political party or group. It is possible that politicians will choose to spend funds 
closer to the election date in an attempt to win elections, using private goods –
clientelism– to maintain and construct partisan loyalties. In the case of Estado de 
Mexico, municipal officials have found in FAISM a source of funds for which they 
have a great deal of autonomy to allocate, and which lack effective mechanisms of 
accountability. Since 1998, municipal officials know with certainty that budgeted 
resources will reach them during the fiscal year, thus they can easily scheduled 
their execution according to their political interests.  
I ran the model to test if FAISM spending on clientelism does in fact respond to the 
timing of elections. I created a dummy variable which assumes a value of 0 when a 
local election was scheduled, 1 for the first year of the municipal government term 
and 2 for the second. The results reveal (see table 3) that there is a significant 
relationship between the per capita level of FAISM spending on clientelism and the 
electoral calendar. Apparently, clientelism tends to increase when local elections 
are scheduled. The results also show that the number of parties and the 
deprivation index continue to have an effect on FAISM spending on clientelism. 
The political party in power at the time of the execution of the projects is a third 
element in this investigation. As mentioned above, the political map in Estado de 
Mexico has dramatically changed in the last two decades.  
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Table 4. The political determinants of FAISM spending on public goods 
 
DV: FAISM spending per capita on public goods 
 Model 1 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
ENP 1.77 
(4.16) 
 
1.20 
(3.96) 
 
 
 
Rae index of political 
competition 
 
 
 
 
-22.14 
(43.4) 
Electoral cycle (municipal)  -7.65** 
(3.10) 
 
 
Electoral cycle (state) -4.16 
(.64) 
 
 
1.49 
(2.76) 
PAN federal government 69.52*** 
(16.15) 
 
77.20*** 
(13.5) 
 
46.73*** 
(12.53) 
PRI 
  
-4.70 
(8.77) 
 
 
PAN 
  
2.48 
(7.57) 
 
PRD 
  
-17.00** 
(7.55) 
 
Population -3.65 
(4.62) 
 
-2.67 
(3.93) 
.00*** 
(3.96) 
Illiteracy 9.52*** 
(1.04) 
 
9.27*** 
(1.00) 
 
 
 
 
% Population lacking access 
to drinking water 
.28 
(.20) 
 
.34* 
(.20) 
 
 
Quality of housing 
construction 
.59* 
(.34) 
 
.63* 
(.34) 
 
 
 
Workers earning less than 2 
minimum wages 
.44 
(.56) 
 
.58 
(.50) 
 
 
Deprivation index 
  
100.76*** 
(10.71) 
 
Intercept -123.89 
(37.98) 
145.26 
(37.73) 
117.94*** 
(30.25) 
No. of observations  1038 1038 1038 
R-squared  0.65 0.66 0.70 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 
follows: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
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From 1990-2006, most municipal governments have experienced alternance in 
power (in this period more than two thirds of the municipalities have been ruled by 
more than one political party). With opposition political parties ruling municipal 
governments, and with the creation in 1997 of new rules to allocate decentralised 
resources at the municipal level, it was expected that it would be more difficult for 
municipal officials to use antipoverty funds for political gain. The data, however, 
suggests that this is not the case. By incorporating the party in power at the time of 
the allocation of the funds into the model, it seems that the three major political 
parties in Estado de Mexico (PAN, PRI and PRD) allocate FAISM resources with 
political motivations.  
Regarding the possible impact of political elements on the allocation of public 
goods, the model (see table 4) suggests that the effective number of parties does 
not have an impact on the allocation of these types of goods. It is clear that there 
are other political factors that determine the allocation of these funds. For instance, 
the presence of the right-wing party, the PAN, at the national level appears to have 
an impact on FAISM spending on public goods. A second political variable that 
influences FAISM allocations on public goods is the timing of elections. When 
elections are scheduled municipal governments tend to spend more on public 
goods.  
In terms of the political party in power at the time of the allocation, the model 
shows that the PRD is the political party that tends to spend less on public goods. 
In all the cases, the level of development appears to have a significant impact on 
the provision of public goods.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In Mexico, the dramatic increase in decentralised transfers in the last two decades 
has meant that local authorities have more powers, responsibilities and resources 
at their disposal. In particular, the new provisions have allowed local governments 
to channel important resources to actions to fight poverty and inequality in poor 
communities. Regarding the policy process, local authorities were empowered to 
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promote local participation in the allocation of anti-poverty funds. It was expected 
that by exploiting the knowledge of local authorities of their municipalities, 
resources would reach those sectors facing strong limitations related to local social 
infrastructure. Through better linkages between community participation and local 
governments, the allocation of resources was expected to be closely related to the 
local needs of the poor. 
Unfortunately, the prospects of antipoverty funds have not been translated into 
effective mechanisms that could lead to a more effective combat against poverty. It 
seems that the clientelistic nature of the Mexican political system has been 
reinforced at the very local level. Today municipal authorities, enjoying more 
powers and resources than before, allocate important amounts of resources with 
the aim of guaranteeing their survival, and/or that of their parties, in the political 
arena.  
The statistical model shows how political considerations are important 
determinants of FAISM spending on clientelism. Some of the initial findings are as 
follows: 
 The level of political competition can tell us something about the budget 
priorities of the municipalities. As we have seen by looking at the level of 
political competition and the use of FAISM, the number of parties competing 
in local elections influences clientelism.  
 Electoral cycles matter. Political parties might use public funds with political 
considerations, particularly in electoral years. By looking at the electoral 
calendar it seems that the PAN spent more on private goods after the year 
2000 –the year the PAN won the presidency–. The PRI shows a similar 
spending pattern but in the gubernatorial elections. 
 Political parties tend to invest important amounts of resources on projects 
that guarantee that their supporters will benefit from them. Not only the PRI 
but also opposition political parties spend a great deal on clientelism.  
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 The level of development matters. There is significant evidence of increased 
spending on clientelism in poor municipalities and that clientelism tends to 
erode as municipalities develop. 
In sum, political choices and local contexts play a large role in determining the way 
in which local governments allocate decentralised antipoverty funds. Electoral 
competition, the timing of elections and partisan considerations have an impact on 
the antipoverty spending of local governments.  
The following chapter uses statistical analysis to test the extent to which FAISM 
allocation have an effect on improving access to basic services.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRO-POOR SPENDING AND BASIC SERVICE PROVISION  
IN MEXICAN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
According to the World Bank (2006a: 69) „access to basic services such as water, 
sewerage and electricity are important to reduce poverty and improve the well-
being of families‟. In chapter two  it was argued that over the past two decades, 
pressures brought about by increased political competition and a gradual transfer 
of resources to lower levels of government have led to an important restructuring of 
poverty alleviation efforts in Mexico. In particular, the changes to the social policy 
of the country have brought new life to subnational governments and today they 
have become effective providers of basic services to their populations. 
At the municipal level, an important aspect of this restructuring has been the 
increasing transfer of resources with the objective of funding investments in basic 
social infrastructure that directly benefits the poorer population. Since the mid-
1990s, with the creation of the FAISM municipal governments have received more 
resources than ever before to improve basic infrastructure services for their 
communities. In the years that followed the creation of FAISM, this fund became 
„the most important funding source for local social infrastructure for poor 
municipalities‟ (World Bank 2006a: 71).  
But have these changes led to improvements in access to basic services at the 
local level in Mexico? This chapter addresses this question by offering a 
comparative analysis focused on municipal basic service provision in 122 
municipalities of Estado de Mexico between 2000 and 2005. Increase access to 
water, sewerage and electricity are tested. Given that „the nature and extent of the 
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relationship between local political institutions and the outcome of development 
programs have been little examined empirically‟ (Hiskey 2003: 41), this chapter 
pays particular attention to the extent to which service delivery in Mexican 
municipalities is also linked to the new conditions of multi-party politics and 
decentralisation. In particular, it tests for the effects of electoral competition and 
party alignment on the capacity of local governments to increase basic service 
provision. A second aspect is related to the impact of social transfers (state 
capacity) on the ability of local governments to increase access to public services. 
In this case, this chapter tests for the effects that FAISM resources have had in 
improving public service provision. As FAISM emphasises community participation, 
the chapter also explores the effects of political participation on service delivery. 
Other aspects will also be considered related to the extent to which modernisation 
population growth and poverty levels have impact basic service provision at the 
municipal level.  
The previous chapter of this dissertation examined the extent to which the political 
interest of local politicians continues to be a determinant for the allocation of 
FAISM resources. The analysis shows that despite recent reforms designed to 
depoliticise poverty alleviation programs, a significant amount of FAISM funds were 
distributed in a selective manner to advance the political gain of incumbent parties 
at the municipal level. It seems that, a significant number of resources continues to 
be allocated for the provision of private goods –characterised by targeted benefits 
to individuals or identifiable small groups in exchanged for electoral support 
(Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007: 10). Thus, the most decentralised program for poverty 
alleviation in Mexico faces the problem of resource allocation with electoral rather 
than programmatic motivations. Clientelistic practices seem to prevail at the local 
level in Mexico. Yet, a positive sign for the distribution of antipoverty funds is 
associated with increasing levels of electoral competition and higher levels of 
socioeconomic development. These two factors appear to be significantly 
associated with reducing the provision of private goods. It remains to be seen if 
these factors are also linked to increase access to basic services.  
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While exploring the political determinants of antipoverty spending at the local level 
is important to understand how recent changes brought about by democratisation 
and decentralisation have shaped the implementation of social policy in Mexico at 
the municipal level. The extent to which public goods provision is increasing 
access to basic services that could also improve the living conditions of the 
population remains to be explored. 
In Mexico previous programmes that channeled resources to the local level have 
been regarded as an example of the failure of decentralised transfers to help the 
poor (Crook & Sverrisson 2001; Rocha 2005). Under these circumstances, the 
question of how effective the most recent type of antipoverty allocations have been 
in providing better services for the poor population is key to understanding the 
possible challenges that the new political environment level has brought to 
decentralised antipoverty spending. In particular, while exploring the political 
factors that affect resource allocation at the local level might help to understand the 
political incentives under which local politicians favor private service provision 
(clientelism), it is worth examining the extent to which such allocations have 
improved the effective provision of basic public goods and services by municipal 
authorities. 
Scholars have addressed the issue of the determinants of good service provision 
providing important insights. In studying the Mexican case, Hiskey (2003) 
examines the impact of pro-poor spending in the provision of basic services (water, 
sewerage and electricity). His findings suggest that local level democracy is critical 
for the success of pro-poor spending. Where there is multiparty competition, he 
found that antipoverty spending improved the access to public services. Ashworth 
et al. (2006) also provides evidence of the performance in public good provision of 
Flemish municipalities. His findings suggest that political competition at elections 
does have a beneficial effect on the capacity of local governments to generate a 
high level of public goods provision. His study also argues that the beneficial 
effects brought about by political competition might be mitigated if such competition 
leads to fragmented governments. Fragmentation, he argues, could work against 
efficiency. 
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Other studies have focused their attention on the association between other 
dimensions of democracy and public goods provision. Cleary (2007) for example, 
using a comprehensive analysis of public goods provision for all of Mexico‟s 
municipalities, incorporates participation as an additional factor that could affect the 
performance of local governments. Cleary‟s findings suggest that there is no 
significant relationship between electoral competition and public goods provision. 
He found that non-electoral participation, rather than competition between political 
parties, is associated with improvements in access to basic services (Cleary 2007).  
Apart from these studies about how political competition and participation affect 
public goods provision, a number of scholars have paid particular attention to other 
structural elements as possible explanations for the failures in public service 
provision by municipal authorities. Thus, the literature on state capacity suggests 
that „failures in the provision of public goods reflect underlying problems arising 
from weak states that are incapable of taxing, running a bureaucracy, or in general, 
fulfilling basic public functions (Diaz-Cayeros et al. forthcoming: 263).  
This chapter explores the most recent effort to decentralise antipoverty spending 
for social infrastructure to the municipal level in Estado de Mexico. The following 
section offers a general overview of the literature about the factors that influence 
effective public goods provision. It also addresses several other factors (alternative 
explanations) that potentially explain local government‟s capacity to effectively 
deliver public services to their population. The third section includes the main 
hypothesis of this study and the justification for the study of Mexico‟s municipal 
governments.  The fourth section describes measurement issues and the fifth 
presents some preliminary statistics and tests the main hypothesis. The sixth 
section concludes. 
 
5.2 Literature review  
 
The last three decades „have witnessed a huge increase in the number of 
democratic governments in the world, but not concomitant improvements in 
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services for the poor‟ (Hasnain 2008: 130). As such, there has been increasing 
awareness among academics and policymakers that political institutions are critical 
to understanding why some local governments are more successful than others in 
delivering public goods to their populations (Kauneckis & Andersson 2006).   
One political variable that is linked to better service provision is political 
competition. There is broad theoretical literature that highlights a number of 
reasons for the positive effect of political competition on local governments‟ 
performance (efficiency). First, „a large electoral advantage or a lack of (significant) 
political competitors is likely to decrease the electoral accountability of politicians‟ 
(Ashworth et al.: 2006: 4). It is argued that as citizens are better informed regarding 
the performance of their respective local governments, competitive elections would 
give them „opportunities to reward and punish those now directly responsible for 
administration and public services‟ (Grindle 2007: 63) In other words, political 
competition increases government performance through the selection of more 
efficient politicians. Second, political competition is considered a central aspect of 
representative democracy as strong competition between parties is expected to 
push politicians and government officials to deliver the policies desired by the 
electorate (Boyne 1998: 210).  
The World Bank has also noted that „elections, informed voting, and other 
traditional voice mechanisms should be strengthened because these processes 
(…) can make political commitments more credible, helping to produce better 
service outcomes‟ (WDR 2004: 78). The World Bank suggests that increasing the 
influence of poor citizens in policymaking and aligning their interests with those of 
the non-poor is expected to hold politicians accountable and hence improve 
service delivery (WDR 2004: 78).  
Some empirical evidence has found that greater political competition is associated 
with better performance of local governments (Rodriguez and Ward 1994; Hiskey 
2003). Recent research has found that officials elected, through transparent, open 
and competitive electoral processes, respond better to citizens‟ demands than non-
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elected officials or those elected through non-competitive electoral processes 
(Crook & Manor 1998). 
Regarding the particular effects of electoral competition on public goods provision, 
a number of scholars have found that the higher the levels of political competition, 
the higher the possibilities of a political party (politician) to serve the interests of 
their constituencies through better public goods provision. Through an empirical 
study o a set of 308 Flemish municipalities, Ashworth et al. (2006) found that 
electoral competition (measured in terms of the number of parties that participate in 
the election) has a significant and positive effect on service delivery by municipal 
authorities. These authors suggest that „more stringent political competition 
between parties (or politicians) may lead to a reduction in rent extraction and 
inefficient provision of public goods‟ (Ashworth et al.: 2006: 4). In exploring the 
impact of antipoverty spending in the provision of electricity, potable water and 
sewerage in the municipalities of two Mexican states, Hiskey (2003) argues that 
when there is multiparty competition at the municipal level pro poor investment 
improved access to basic public services.  
Participation is also considered to be a key aspect in increasing the citizen‟s ability 
to articulate demands and put pressure on politicians to increase access to public 
services. A recent study on participation and government responsiveness in 
Mexican municipalities carried out by Cleary (2007) has found that citizen 
involvement in policy implementation in the form of public protests, public 
meetings, and individual interactions with municipal officials are important 
determinants of government responsiveness. In line with Putnam‟s (1993) 
arguments regarding the effects of social capital on government performance, 
Cleary (2007: 285) points out that even in the absence of meaningful electoral 
competition „participation may stimulate a response from government officials if 
those officials are tied to their constituency via social networks‟. He also notes that 
governments with better information are more likely to be more responsive (Cleary 
2007: 285). In general, the hypothesis behind these arguments is that when the 
levels of political participation are high, governments will be more responsive and 
hence improve service provision. 
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Contrary to Hiskey (2003), Cleary (2007) argues that in the case of Mexican 
municipalities electoral competition has no significant effect on better public goods 
provision. His statistical analysis shows how variables related to political 
participation, such as literacy and voter turnout, have a significant effect on 
increasing access to basic public services. According to his results, increasing 
citizen involvement in policy implementation accounts for variations in the local 
government‟s capacity to improve basic service provision. In general, he argues 
that „increased participation is the most reasonable explanation for improved 
government performance in Mexican municipalities‟ (Cleary 2007: 296).  
Apart from the recent focus on democratic institutions and partisan politics as the 
main explanatory factors of variation in public service provision, other scholars 
have considered state capacity as an important aspect that influences public good 
provision. According to Díaz-Cayeros et al. (forthcoming: 264) „it is important to 
acknowledge that public service provision might be better or worse due to 
differences in bureaucratic performance‟. The literature considers that local 
governments can be thought to lack state capacity due to their small size, 
precarious public finances, the poverty of their inhabitants and low levels of service 
provision.  
Recent empirical studies have included a number of variables to account for state 
capacity. According to Díaz-Cayeros et al. (forthcoming), in exploring government 
performance it is important to control for the initial level of service provision as „it is 
easier to improve public services in places where there is virtually no provision of 
public services than to expand to 100 percent coverage‟ (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 
forthcoming: 274). A second element that may affect a municipality‟s capacity to 
deliver basic public services is the type of municipality: urban or rural. This variable 
has been used to control „for the greater difficulty in providing basic services in 
municipalities with populations living in small, relatively isolated communities rather 
than in a single municipal centre‟ (Hiskey 2003: 50-51).  
A third factor that affects the capacity of local governments to deliver public 
services to their population is the amount of resources that they have at their 
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disposal. This means that „all else equal, municipalities with larger budgets (…) 
should be able to provide better services‟ (Cleary 2001: 5). Although it might be the 
case that antipoverty resource allocation has been and is still affected by political 
motivations, whether or not performance is explained by the amount of spending 
that municipal governments have at their disposal remains to be examined. It is 
expected that with more resources and autonomy to allocate social infrastructure 
funds, local governments would be more effective in improving service coverage as 
they are better able to know what the real needs of the population are. It is 
expected that governments closer to the people would be more responsive and 
efficient, and thus, foster development and reduce poverty. The role of social 
infrastructure investment in general implies that as the investment in basic social 
infrastructure increases, government performance (measured as improvement in 
basic service coverage) should improve. 
In sum, as the most recent studies on local governments have shown, there is no 
consensus with regard to the factors that affect public good provision. In this 
sense, this chapter puts forward three hypotheses regarding the political and 
structural aspects that seem to be determinants of local government‟s ability to 
increase access to public services. Each hypothesis evaluates the different visions 
on the factors that are thought to influence the effective delivery of public services. 
 
5.2.1 Other variables affecting public goods provision 
 
One aspect that has been recently explored to explain this poor performance is the 
nature of local politics. In Mexico, as local politics have become more pluralistic 
and democratic, the political society at the local level has started to develop 
incentives to broaden their policy influence in order to maintain their political capital 
over their jurisdictions (Beer 2004). With more decision-making powers and 
resources, local political actors started to have more incentives to increase their 
possibilities to compete for political spaces in the future. This increasing desire 
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from local political actors to win local political positions is thought to have major 
effects on governments‟ performance. 
Given the current political conditions in Mexico, characterised by multiparty 
competition at all levels of government, the study of the effects of the local political 
logic has gained more importance. It is not until recent years that the literature has 
started to pay more attention to the substantial subnational variations in political 
environments and its effects on development.  
In this sense, other political variables that the literature considers as determinants 
of government performance are: a) the identity of the party in power, and b) the 
party relationship between municipal and state governments. It is believed that the 
ideological nature of the ruling party might have significantly influence policy 
outcomes. By looking at the available body of evidence on local party effects of 
local policies in the UK, Boyne (1996: 249) concludes that it is plausible that the 
party influence on local policies are likely significant and widespread.  
Recent empirical studies have noted that some political parties exhibit better 
performance than others depending on their ideological nature and/or their 
willingness to perform well to prove that they can govern. For the Mexican case, 
Hiskey (2003) suggests that it is difficult to give strong arguments regarding the 
particular performance of a political party. Yet, it is, at least, worth testing whether 
or not there are party-level differences in the quality of government among 
municipalities, controlling for other factors. 
In the case where the municipal and state governments belong to different political 
parties, Cleary (2001: 6) argues that it is plausible that „the governor could make 
life difficult for mayors who are of an opposing party‟. It is expected that 
municipalities with a mayor from a different party than the state governor will show 
a lower level of performance than municipalities where the mayor and governor 
belong to the same political party.  
An additional political factor linked to local government‟ performance is the political 
composition of the municipal councils. In Mexico, with the introduction of the 
proportional representation principle for seats on municipal councils in 1983, 
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„pluralism became a more regular feature of these councils‟ (Grindle 2007:78). 
Although the integration of the municipal councils (cabildos) is a result of the 
success of the candidate running for the presidency of the municipal government 
(as the mayor automatically gets the majority of the seats), it allows some 
multiparty representation within municipal councils. This fact has brought new life 
to the role of municipal councils in terms of policy decision-making and 
implementation. Today, „cabildos are more likely than ever before to meet in open 
sessions and play the role of public „watchdog‟ with oversight of programs and 
budget‟ (Ward 1998: 353), thereby enhancing responsiveness and accountability.  
Despite the positive expectations that multiparty representation has brought for 
municipal governance, it could be the case that it might have negative effects in 
terms of better service provision. It is possible that given the opportunity for 
multiparty compositions of municipal councils, municipal councils might become 
spaces of significant inter-party discord over resource allocation and 
administration. In particular, a more pluralistic representation within municipal 
councils could produce more conflict over the distribution of social and physical 
infrastructure (Grindle 2007: 79), having negative effects on the ability of local 
governments to produce more efficient public service provision. As Grindle (2007: 
78) suggests, „more competitive elections [have] often left behind divided councils, 
partisan bickering over the allocation of municipal resources, and administrators 
frustrated by gridlocked decision making.‟ 
With increasing levels of political competition politicians may have incentives to 
spend resources with the aim of improving their chances of winning elections 
rather than with the aim of satisfying citizens‟ preferences. In her study on 
competitive elections and government performance, Grindle (2007) found that 
although electoral contests at the municipal level in Mexico became more 
meaningful as a result of decentralisation to the municipal level, democratisation 
did not necessarily lead to less conflictive politics, easier decision making or good 
governance. High levels of political competition may lead to highly fragmented 
governments that could work against efficiency (Ashworth et al. 2006). Just as the 
lack of political competition might result in poor government performance, 
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extremely high levels of partisan fragmentation might be translated into inefficient 
service provision (Singer 2004). 
Finally, other factors could be also linked to effective public goods provision. 
Corruption might distort the composition of government spending (Baraldi 2008: 2). 
Recent studies have found that governments might choose to spend less on those 
areas where it is more difficult to extract lucrative gains than from other 
components of public spending. For example, public officials might choose to 
spend less on education or to favor investment in completely new projects rather 
than operation and maintenance, with negative effects on the wellbeing of the 
population (Ehrlich and Lui 1999).  
 
5.3 Hypotheses 
 
As described in the previous section, the literature offers three main explanations 
for the differential provision of local public goods. First, a wide range of empirical 
research posits that political competition is a necessary condition for the success of 
public service provision that emphasises citizen empowerment at the local level. 
This is because citizens living under competitive political regimes will be more 
likely to initiate and/or sustain the level of political participation required to achieve 
the development outcomes of public spending (Hiskey 2000). In this sense, it is 
possible that in more competitive political environments municipal governments are 
more likely to provide public goods to their population.  
Second, democratic accountability in the form of political participation is thought to 
determine success or failure in the provision of public goods. The literature 
suggests the need to explore the effect of citizen participation on the provision of 
public goods as the quality of government performance likely depends on a 
citizenry engaged in policy implementation. Thus, it is possible that municipal 
governments might provide public goods to the population when political 
participation is higher. 
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Third, there were great expectations that through strengthening local government‟s 
capacity by giving them more autonomy, resources and responsibilities, service 
provision would improve. Devolution of powers and resources is believed to have a 
positive effect on public service provision. In line with this optimistic view, great 
amounts of resources have been transferred to the lower tiers of government in 
Mexico with the expectation that this level of government would be more effective 
in improving access to basic services. In particular, decentralised antipoverty funds 
have been given to municipal authorities in an attempt to improve the social 
infrastructure of the municipalities.  While recognising that greater expenditures on 
public services does not necessarily translate to better service provision (in terms 
of quality and equal access), it is important to explore the extent to which the most 
recent antipoverty strategies are increasing access to basic services across 
municipalities. Thus, it is possible that decentralised antipoverty funds might 
increase the likelihood of a municipality‟s capacity to provide access to public 
goods.  
Keeping in mind other factors that might also account for variations in the provision 
of public goods at the local level, in this chapter I examine the impact of social 
spending in local public goods provision in the 122 municipalities of Estado de 
Mexico. The Mexican case is ideal for the testing of these hypotheses. First, in the 
last two decades, the provision of basic services for the poor has become a key 
aspect of local government activities in Mexico. By transferring resources and 
decision-making powers, the decentralisation process of the last two decades has 
awakened the once dormant local governments. With more resources and 
responsibilities than ever before, local governments in Mexico have become de 
facto participants within Mexico‟s federal system. Second, since the introduction of 
FAISM, Mexico‟s most recent antipoverty fund that aims to improve basic 
infrastructure needs of poor communities, municipal governments have had 
considerable policy discretion in the allocation of infrastructure investment. This 
allows us to test the capacity of local governments to use social infrastructure 
funds efficiently with no intervention from other levels of government. Third, and 
most importantly for this chapter, the Mexican case allows us to examine how local 
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governments, exposed to new conditions of increasing political competition, 
respond to citizens‟ demands for basic service provision.   
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to the measurement of the variables 
and to the main statistical results and conclusions. 
 
5.4 The Model 
 
To date, there has been no systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of FAISM at 
the municipal level. No quantitative research has been carried out with to evaluate 
the impact of these decentralised transfers to provide basic public services to the 
poor under recent conditions of multiparty politics and decentralisation. The data 
set constructed for this research represents a first attempt to explore the extent to 
which FAISM funds can effectively improve basic service delivery at the local level. 
Most of the research carried out to explore the impact of FAISM on the reduction of 
poverty in Mexican municipalities has been based on qualitative empirical data 
drawn from specific case studies (Rocha 2005). Since it has been difficult to find 
reliable and comparable data across municipalities, other studies have focused on 
the effects of political variables on the distribution of resources of federal programs 
at the municipal level (Perez 2007) but not on the actual use of such resources by 
municipal authorities.  
For the purposes of this chapter, I estimate the effects of political variables on the 
change in access to drinking water, electricity and sewerage. I have chosen these 
development indicators because the data on these indicators is available for 
comparison across both censuses at the municipal level in Mexican municipalities. 
A second reason for my choosing these indicators is that there is broad consensus 
in the literature that access to public goods can effectively improve the welfare of 
inhabitants in any given population (Diaz-Cayeros et al. forthcoming). Finally, a 
third reason for the use of these indicators as a dependent variable is that article 
115 of the Mexican constitution explicitly assigns responsibility to municipal 
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governments for the provision of these three basic services36.  Although federal 
spending (such as FAISM) is allocated to the municipalities to improve basic social 
infrastructure, it is the municipal authorities who have the last word regarding the 
actual use of those resources. 
Specific spending data from FAISM on the three basic services mentioned above 
were reported by 122 municipalities in Estado de Mexico during 2000 and 2005 
which makes it possible to examine the extent to which FAISM spending is 
associated with changes in public goods provision. Basic service provision is a 
principal component of FAISM allocations and represented around 20 percent of 
total per capita FAISM investment during the 2000-2005 period. It is worth noting 
that we do not include education and health services since their provision is 
primarily the responsibility of state and federal governments and because it is 
difficult to find reliable data about school and health clinic coverage. In the case of 
potable water, sewerage and electricity, access to these services depends upon 
provision by municipal governments. 
 
5.4.1 Dependent variables 
 
In order to evaluate the change in public good provision, three basic services have 
been selected: potable water, sewerage and electricity. Municipal development 
data between the years 2000 and 2005 have been collected which make it possible 
to estimate basic services coverage achieved during those five years. For this 
case, data from the Mexican National Statistics Office (INEGI) includes the number 
of inhabitants at the municipal level with access to water, sewerage and electricity 
services in 2000 and 2005. 
In line with Hiskey‟s (2003) analysis on government performance, the dependent 
variables of this analysis are the changes in the percentage of households at the 
                                                 
36
 Data regarding other responsibilities of municipal governments such as public security, road maintenance, 
etc. are either non-existent or are not of sufficient quality, thus it is problematic to use them as a measure of 
government performance. 
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municipal level with access to drinking water, sewers and electricity between the 
2000 and 2005 censuses. They are measured by the changes in the percentage of 
households with access to drinking water, sewers and electricity between the 2000 
and 2005 censuses specified as follows: (percentage of population receiving 
service in 2005 less the percentage of population receiving service in 2000).  
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of dependent variable 
  Sewerage Water Electricity 
 2000 2005 change 2000 2005 change 2000 2005 chan
ge 
Mean 80.76 88.57 7.81 89.42 90.56 1.14 96.31 98.17 1.86 
Standard 
deviation 
20.51 13.65 -6.86 12.47 12.19 -0.28 4.63 2.25 -2.38 
d1 (10%) 47.08 66.91 19.83 73.64 75.75 2.11 90.9 95.23 4.33 
q1 (25%) 62.11 77.04 14.93 85.1 88.93 3.83 94.78 97.56 2.78 
Median 91.27 96.52 5.25 94.55 94.77 0.22 98.47 99.13 0.66 
q3 (75%) 98.36 99.23 0.87 97.75 98.18 0.43 99.14 99.56 0.42 
d10 
(90%) 
98.75 99.73 0.98 99.37 99.39 0.02 99.57 99.77 0.2 
 
There are important differences between the provision of sewerage services in 
poor and rich municipalities. The visible disparities across quartiles of 
municipalities highlight the poor‟s lack of access to basic services. For example, 
the first decile of the distribution (d1) had an average coverage of 47.08, while the 
top decile (d10) had approximately two times greater coverage at 98 percent. 
However, the gap has somewhat narrowed since improvements in sewerage 
services have progressed more rapidly among the lower half of the distribution. 
The median municipality in 2000 would fail to provide this essential public service 
to almost 10 percent of the population. 
In the case of water, the differences in provision of this essential service are not as 
large as in the case of sewerage but they are nonetheless important. In this case, 
in the year 2000, the median municipality had reached 94 percent coverage while 
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the first decile of the distribution had an average coverage of 73 percent. In other 
words, in the case of potable water municipalities would fail to provide this 
essential service to roughly one fourth of its inhabitants. It is worth noting that in 
the case of the water provision, the municipalities in the first decile of the 
distribution are not the ones showing the largest improvements, as in the case of 
the other two services. Despite the fact that it is expected that those municipalities 
lagging behind in service coverage would have the largest improvements, it seems 
that those municipalities actually found it more difficult to increase service 
coverage in 2005 despite their low initial level of service provision in the year 2000. 
The provision of electricity also shows fewer differences between rich and poor 
municipalities than the other two cases. In this case, even in the first decile of the 
distribution, by the year 2000 these municipalities had already reached 90 percent 
coverage. 
 
5.4.2 Explanatory variables  
 
Political competition  
One of the independent (political) variables of central interest for this analysis is the 
level of political competition as measured by the effective number of electoral 
parties competing in local elections estimated for each municipality in Estado de 
Mexico37 (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 This measure is an indicator that counts parties after weighting them by size. 
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Table 6. ENP municipal elections in Estado de Mexico 
ENP Freq. Percent 
Two party 
(ENP<2.4) 
14 11.57 
Three party 
(2.4<ENP<3.4) 
73 60.33 
Multiparty 
(ENP>3.4) 
34 28.1 
Total 121 100 
 
In 2000, 60 percent of the municipalities presented an important fragmentation of 
the party system. Elections were contested and, in most cases, three or more 
political parties had candidates that obtained significant shares of the municipal 
votes. 
 
Party ideological nature  
In order to capture the ideological nature of municipal governments I have used the 
Mean Left-Right Position (MLRP) which measures „how far to the left or the right 
the average party was in each election, based on the left-right positions of all the 
parties and their shares of the vote‟ (Coppedge 1998: 556). According to this index, 
if all parties were on the right, the index would equal 100. Conversely, it would 
equal -100 if all parties were on the left, 50 or -50 if all parties were centre-right or 
centre left, respectively, and zero if all parties were centrist. In the case of Estado 
de Mexico, for the year 2000 the MLRP ranges from -37.91 to +24.79, with an 
overall mean of -.16. In this sample, roughly 50 per cent of the municipalities are 
within the centre-left spectrum.  
Since one of the goals of this chapter is to examine the extent to which the 
ideological distance between the members of the municipal council and the Mayor 
is associated with improvements in basic service provision, I have also calculated 
the MLRP of the municipal councils and estimated the ideological distance 
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between the council and the head of the municipal government. I have estimated 
this variable with the percentage of representation of each political party within the 
municipal councils. 
 
Political participation 
Since accountability in public service delivery might be associated with political 
participation and electoral competition (Hiskey 2003; Cleary 2007), turnout will be 
used as a proxy of participation. It is assumed that higher turnout levels indicate 
higher levels of participation. This variable will also be used to test whether or not 
participation is associated with higher levels of basic service coverage at the 
municipal level. 
The remaining independent variables will include a cumulative FAISM spending 
per capita measure with only those funds specifically designated for basic services 
of water, sewerage and electricity between 2000 and 2005. I estimate one 
measure for each service. Since the dependent variable covers the period between 
2000 and 2005, I use total per capita amount spent on these basic services during 
this five-year period. This allows me to analyse the impact of FAISM on changes in 
the provision of the basic services: potable water, sewerage, and electricity. As 
mentioned before, the expectation for this variable is that the higher the per capita 
spending levels of each service, the greater the expansion of the service in 
municipality in question. I will also run the model differentiating between rich and 
poor municipalities. Also included is the type of municipality (urban or rural) to 
control for difficulties in providing basic services to populations living in rural 
municipalities.  
 
State capacity and other control variables 
The remaining independent variables for this model intend to account for other 
factors that might explain variation in basic service provision levels across the 122 
municipalities of Estado de Mexico. First, change in a municipality‟s population has 
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been linked to a municipality‟s capacity to perform well. Thus, the population 
change between 2000 and 2005 is estimated to control for the impact that variation 
in the population might otherwise have on the change in service provision. The 
idea is to control for „any effects population gains or losses may have had on the 
change in basic service provision‟ (Hiskey 2003: 49).  For exploratory purposes, it 
is expected that the causal impact of this variable may run in both directions 
depending on the nature of the population change.  
An additional control variable is the initial level of basic service provision. In this 
case, a municipality‟s 2000 level of basic service provision is included for each of 
the services in question. It is expected that those municipalities lagging behind in 
public services would be the ones showing the largest improvements (Díaz-
Cayeros et al. forthcoming). 
Dummy variables indicating whether the municipal president is of a different party 
than the governor will be included in the model. The idea is to explore the extent to 
which municipalities with a Mayor belonging to a different party than the state 
governor can improve service coverage within their population. Finally, a dummy 
variable indicating if the municipality belongs to the metropolitan area of Mexico 
City will be included to examine how a municipality‟s proximity to a larger urban 
centre is associated with improvements to basic service provision. 
 
5.5 Results and discussion 
 
This analysis includes three models of the determinants of changes in the 
percentage of the population with access to basic services. Each model 
corresponds to one of the public services included in the analysis: potable water, 
sewage and electricity. The models include three types of variables: state capacity, 
political variables and participation as determinants of changes in basic service 
provision. The estimations were run in STATA with robust standard errors (OLS).  
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Table 7. Determinants of the Change in Basic Service Provision (OLS) 
DV: Change in local public goods coverage   
 Water 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Sewerage 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Electricity 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Constant 
 
 
-14.57 
(9.37) 
 
23.08*** 
(8.23) 
4.24** 
(1.85) 
Initial level of 
provision 
 
-.022 
(.102) 
 
  
% change in 
population  
 
-5.33 
(4.05) 
 
-4.77** 
(1.90) 
-2.59*** 
(.89) 
Population 
 
 
1.40 
(1.87) 
-1.64 
(1.34) 
-2.17 
(3.39) 
Type of 
municipality (1 = 
rural) 
 
.962 
(1.36) 
 
8.67*** 
(1.33) 
.63** 
(.30) 
FAISM 
spending/cap 
 
.022* 
(.011) 
 
.016 
(.013) 
.026*** 
(.002) 
Electoral 
competition  
(1 = two parties; 2 
= three parties; 3 = 
more than three 
parties) 
1.89* 
(1.01) 
-2.54** 
(1.00) 
-.37 
(.25) 
Municipal MLRP  
 
.060* 
(.03) 
 
-.035 
(.04) 
.001 
(.008) 
  
Ideological 
distance Mayor – 
Cabildo 
 
.019 
(.082) 
 
.033 
(.062) 
.004 
(.013) 
Juxtaposed Mayor 
 
-.44 
(1.69) 
 
-.15 
(1.01) 
-.48 
(.32) 
Electoral 
participation 
 
.18* 
(.100) 
 
-.18* 
(.10) 
-.03 
(.025) 
 
 
ZMVM 
(metropolitan area 
of Mexico City) 
 
 
 
-1.70 
(1.22) 
 
-2.34 
(.90) 
-.30 
(.198) 
 
R-squared  
 
0.26 .68 .77 
N=121. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 
follows: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
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As similar studies have noted (Hiskey 2003, Diaz-Cayeros et al. forthcoming), the 
improvements in the provision of each of the basic services analysed in this 
chapter are significantly associated with the initial levels of provision38. This finding 
indicates that municipalities with the worst indicators of service provision are the 
ones that have improved the most quickly. Thus, in general, there is a positive 
trend across the municipalities of Estado de Mexico to increasing access to basic 
services. 
The first model relates to the determinants of the change in water service 
provision. The results confirm expectations regarding the association between our 
three variables –electoral competition, state capacity and participation– and 
changes in basic service provision. First, higher levels of political competition, 
measured by the number of political parties competing in each municipality, seem 
to be positively correlated with increasing levels of service provision. In line with 
the hypothesis that „in more competitive political environments municipal 
governments might be better able to provide public goods to their population‟, it 
could be argued that, despite the fact that municipal re-election39 is not permitted in 
the Mexican legislation, politicians still have incentives to respond to the population 
demands through improving access to water services.  
Most of the municipalities of Estado de Mexico show high levels of political 
competition and most of them have experience alternation of power in recent 
elections, therefore, it could be the case that the short experience with democratic 
politics has put pressure on local politicians to deliver better services, and in the 
                                                 
38
 It is important to mention that I regressed first both the initial level of service provision of sewage, water and 
electricity in the 122 municipalities of Estado de Mexico and the level of service provision achieved in 2005 to 
see if there is a significant positive relationship between these variables. As it was expected, there is a strong 
correlation between the initial level of provision and the level of provision five years later in the three cases. In 
order to test if the coefficient on the initial level of service provision is equal to one in the regressions 
mentioned above, I performed an F Test for each of the three regressions with the test command using 
STATA. The results confirm that in the case of sewage and electricity the coefficient of the regressions is equal 
to one. In the case of water, it is not equal to one. The test was performed in order to clarify the extent to which 
the initial level of service coverage is associated with the changes experienced on the provision of the three 
basic services which is the dependent variable of my statistical model. In order to clarify the model that 
attempts to examine the determinants of changes in service provision and based on the tests mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, I decided to run the water model with the initial level of service provision as one of the 
independent variables. In the case of sewerage and electricity I removed the initial level of service provision as 
this variable was masking out most of the effect of the other independent variables. 
39  
According to Cleary (2007: 296), „the prohibition against re-election and the three-year term make sustained 
responsiveness quite difficult‟. 
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case of infrastructure investment to allocate resources to improve the infrastructure 
needs of the population. An additional explanation is that municipalities that have 
exhibited greater competition from two or more political parties, aiming political 
support from broader sectors of the population have more incentives to invest in 
projects that benefit large proportions of the population.  
Second, as argued in previous sections of this dissertation, decentralisation has 
strengthened the capacity of local governments to respond to local demands by 
giving them more resources and responsibilities. According to the results, there is 
some evidence to suggest that through FAISM spending, the municipal 
governments of Estado de Mexico have been able to improve water service 
provision during the period of analysis. There is a positive correlation between per 
capita FAISM spending in water related projects and improvements in access to 
this basic service. This finding suggests that when antipoverty spending is 
allocated to projects categorised as public goods, important improvements can be 
achieved in terms of basic service provision. In addition, despite the fact that a 
great deal of FAISM resources are allocated for private goods, the share of 
resources invested in public goods provision seems to be spent effectively. In line 
with our second hypothesis, it could be argued that decentralised antipoverty funds 
have increased the likelihood of the municipality‟s ability to improve access to 
public goods. 
Third, the evidence is consistent with the prediction that municipal governments 
are more effective in providing public goods to the population when electoral 
participation is higher. In line with Cleary‟s (2007) findings that increased 
participation is a reasonable explanation for improved service provision, the 
findings of the determinants of changes in water provision in the municipalities of 
Estado de Mexico suggest that in municipalities where the possibilities of effective 
citizen participation are higher political representatives are under greater pressure 
to respond to their demands. Thus, it could be argued that in places where citizens 
participate more in public affairs water service provision tends to improve. 
124 
 
 
The second model tests the determinants of the change in sewerage service 
provision. As expected, socio-demographic variables are associated with changes 
in sewerage services coverage. For instance, important changes in population 
make it more difficult for municipalities to increase service coverage (it is more 
difficult to increase coverage when the population increases). A second important 
finding is that rural municipalities tend to increase sewerage services coverage. As 
anticipated, as rural municipalities lag in providing this basic service to their 
populations, improvements are more noticeable. In general, rural municipalities 
have problems of institutional capacities that might undermine their abilities to 
deliver basic services. Yet, our findings suggest that despite the possible 
limitations that rural municipalities might encounter in terms of their capacity to 
deliver public goods, they have been able to make significant progress in improving 
access to this basic service. 
With respect to the other independent variables of interest the results are mixed. 
As I found in the water model, political competition is associated with better levels 
of sewage services coverage. Yet, in this case, improvements in service provision 
are associated with a different type of political competition. It seems that, 
municipalities with electoral competition between two political parties –as opposed 
to multiparty politics as in the case of water– seem to show larger improvements in 
service coverage. In this case, moderate electoral competition with enough parties 
to make the election competitive and to generate organised competition but with 
few enough to provide incentives for parties to build large electoral coalitions, puts 
pressure on local governments to compromise with the provision of programmatic 
(long term) public goods. Again these findings suggest that in the presence of 
political competition between two political parties, local authorities might have more 
incentives to benefit large sectors of the population through public goods provision. 
In terms of electoral participation, it is striking that the sign of the coefficient of this 
variable is negative. This suggests that those municipalities that show lower levels 
of electoral participation appear to have some improvements in sewerage services 
coverage. Recent research has found that, „the groups that are politically more 
visible at the local level are the ones who tend to benefit the most from FAISM (…)‟ 
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(Rocha 2005: 356). It is not necessarily the poor who are setting spending priorities 
in the communities. In this sense, it seems that municipal authorities encounter 
more pressure to allocate resources from organised groups that are more 
interested in „[having a] commercial kiosk or otherwise „beautify‟ the municipality 
rather than addressing needs that may be much more elemental (…) but also a lot 
less visible‟ (Rocha 2005: 356). My findings are consistent with this study in the 
sense that local officials find it more politically rewarding to attend to the demands 
of more empowered citizens who do not necessarily represent the interest of the 
poorest sectors of the population. Therefore, in those places were participation is 
low, improvements to basic demands from the poor, like sewerage, are possible. 
This does not mean that participation is bad for service delivery. What my findings 
suggest is that the current community participation mechanisms at the municipal 
level are not effectively incorporating the demands of the poor.  
The reasons for the lack of incorporation of the demands of the poor into the 
allocation of FAISM funds are found in the decision-making process to select public 
works and projects. In some cases, it is the municipal officials who actively 
promote the development of projects, taking into consideration the cost of the 
public work and the priorities set by the municipal government and the petitions 
from the population. These petitions are the result of the collection of demands that 
organised groups make to candidates during electoral campaigns. Electoral 
promises become the main instrument for exchanging possible benefits in the form 
of public goods in return for electoral support. It is during electoral campaigns that 
the consolidation of alliances between candidates and the different local political 
groups – that later dominate the spaces of citizen participation – takes place, with 
important implications for the final destination of antipoverty funds. During the 
electoral contests, organised groups, which are lead by party affiliates most of the 
time, put pressure on politicians and eventual political authorities to offer future 
allocations of public spending according to their priorities and those of the specific 
sectors of the population that they claim to represent (FUNDAR 2006). Rocha 
(2005) has also found cases where municipal presidents collect requests for public 
works and basic infrastructure from the community during electoral campaigns and 
126 
 
 
draw plans of action based on those requests once they take office. In these 
cases, „the groups that are politically more visible are the ones who tend to benefit 
the most from FAISM‟ (Rocha 2005: 356). 
These mechanisms of political bargaining show the strategic importance that the 
control of public funds has in local political contexts and how local elites and party 
affiliates seek to capture resources that, as in the case of FAISM, are aimed to 
provide basic services to the poorest sectors of the population.  
An additional example of how municipal authorities undermine social participation 
in the decision-making process of the FAISM-financed projects is observed in the 
role of officials responsible for the departments of public works in the 
municipalities. According to a study carried out by FUNDAR in 2006 regarding the 
monitoring of social programs in electoral contexts, mayors, through the 
Directorates of Public Works, decide which projects will be carried out during their 
administration. The study shows cases where, despite that some municipalities 
carries out consultations with the population to include possible petitions from 
different localities within the community, it is the Council for Municipal Development  
that determines which projects will be carried out from a list prepared by the 
Directorate of Public Works (FUNDAR 2006). 
The third model explores the determinants of the change in electricity services. In 
this case, only variables related to state capacity seem to be associated with 
changes in coverage of this service. Decentralised infrastructure investment 
through FAISM appears to be positively associated with changes in electricity 
coverage. My findings are consistent with previous studies that note that ‟in the 
case of electricity, resources seem to be well targeted according to the needs of 
the municipalities (World Bank 2006a: 72). Thus, municipal governments have 
shown that they have the capacity to deliver this basic service effectively to their 
inhabitants. 
Regarding the other variables of interest explored in this chapter, the fact that they 
are not significant determinants of change in electricity service provision might be 
explained by the high levels of service coverage among different types of 
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municipalities. In the case of this basic service, even the poorest municipalities of 
Estado de Mexico have had relatively high levels of coverage since 2000 (in 2000, 
the first decile of the municipalities had reached 90% coverage). An additional 
explanation for the lack of association between electoral competition and 
participation is related to the fact that due to high levels of coverage, local 
politicians have few incentives to allocate electricity resources as the potential 
electoral benefits of these allocations could be limited to significantly small sectors 
of the population. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
FAISM‟s aim to increase social infrastructure is a key aspect of Mexico‟s poverty 
reduction strategy. According to the World Bank (2006b: 169), „infrastructure plays 
a role in assuring basic subsistence, as in the case of potable water, and health, in 
the case of sanitary disposal of waste and electricity for cooking and safe heating. 
It is also crucial for accessing employment and markets, via transitable roads, and 
for human development, via roads to access education and health facilities, and 
electricity to allow these facilities to function adequately‟.  
To date, Mexico has made important progress in increasing the levels of coverage 
of basic public services. However, although Mexico‟s investment and coverage are 
higher than the Latin American average, there are still important sectors of the 
population that lack access to basic services or that face serious problems of 
quality and reliability of infrastructure services.  
The analysis carried out in this chapter has explored the factors that are linked to 
improvements in access to three basic services at the municipal level: water, 
sewerage and electricity. In particular, I have tested for the effects of state 
capacity, electoral competition and participation on public service provision. The 
results suggest that FAISM allocation of public goods presents significant 
improvements over the previous antipoverty strategies. The results of this study 
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show that public goods allocations through FAISM have enabled local 
governments to improve access to basic services to the population.  
Despite these advantages, FAISM has important limitations in terms of 
accountability and monitoring that increase the chances of local authorities to 
allocate resources to actions that could not be considered as social infrastructure 
investments. This chapter has shown that FAISM resources that were allocated to 
financing social infrastructure projects in water, sewerage and electricity services 
(public goods) seemed to have increased the number of people with access to 
these basic services. Municipal strengthening through the decentralisation of 
resources and responsibilities seems to have paid off in terms of improving service 
provision. These findings are a positive sign regarding the prospects of FAISM for 
improving access and quality of basic services providing that the institutional 
limitations of accountability, monitoring and evaluation are improved in the short 
term. 
According to the World Bank (2006b: 210) one of the main challenges of FAISM is 
to strengthen accountability „both upward and downward through systematic 
evaluation of results [and] monitoring spending efficiency‟. The limitations of this 
fund in this respect might serve to undermine the prospects that more democratic 
politics at the local level have for service delivery. As mentioned in previous 
chapters of this dissertation, the political context at the local level has experienced 
significant changes in Mexico. Today, most municipalities have experienced 
political alternance. Elections have become free and transparent, and in most 
cases there is strong competition between two or more political parties. There have 
been great expectations that these changes would have a positive effect on service 
provision at the local level.  
The analysis of the links between the political variables (electoral competition and 
participation) and changes in basic service provision shows mixed results. While 
competition among two or more political parties seems to be associated with 
increases in basic service provision in water and sewerage services, higher levels 
of political participation seem to be only significant determinants of increases in 
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changes in the provision of potable water. These findings indicate that, in the case 
of sewerage, local politicians are more effective providers of this basic service in 
municipalities where they face moderate or high levels of political competition.  
In the case of sewerage services, it seems that it is that when people participate 
fewer increases in the provision of this basic service are possible. The fact that 
lower levels of participation are associated with changes in the provision of 
sewerage services suggests that in those municipalities where participation is low, 
some level of improvement to access to basic services is possible. Community 
participation is a key aspect for the allocation of FAISM funds, however, it seems 
that when people participate, it is usually the more empowered sectors of the 
population –that already have access to basic services– who are setting spending 
priorities, thus excluding the poor from receiving the benefits of basic infrastructure 
investments.  
In sum, it could be argued that basic service provision has improved through pro-
poor policy interventions. Apparently, the decisions taken by municipal officials 
regarding the actual use of social transfers have been effective in improving 
access to basic services. Despite the fact that significant number of antipoverty 
transfers have been subject to political manipulation through the allocation of 
private goods at the local level, public goods spending has been an important 
factor that has induced improvements in basic service provision. 
The statistical analysis in this chapter has shown different patterns of improved 
service delivery that are shaped, in various ways, by the political dynamics at the 
local level. In general, although the results are far from conclusive, it can be argued 
that apart from the beneficial effects of increased pro-poor spending, meaningful 
elections seem to have beneficial effects in the provision of some basic services.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation has explained the extent to which a scheme of decentralised 
disbursements from the centre to municipal governments with pro-poor objectives 
could serve to provide basic social infrastructure to the poorest communities of the 
country. This dissertation has also provided an account of how local political 
institutions determine the final destination of these resources, as well as providing 
some evidence regarding the impact of these allocations, influenced by political 
factors, on basic service provision. This section highlights the importance of 
studying the politics of resource allocation, summarises the most relevant empirical 
findings, and briefly explores possible research and policy implications.  
 
6.1 Studying the politics of pro-poor policies 
 
The recent social policy transformations in Mexico were expected „to have the 
potential to decrease clientelistic practices‟ (Pérez 2007: 8). In particular the 
decentralisation of social policy through the creation of FAISM created great 
expectations that the political manipulation of antipoverty funds would be 
eradicated since the new formula based system „appeared to have set the basis for 
the elimination of rampant presidential discretion in the allocation of resources‟ 
(Pérez 2007:8), which had characterised previous poverty alleviation programs. 
At the same time, the recent transition to democracy that started at the municipal 
level in Mexico provided reasons to believe that through transparent and clean 
elections, citizens would be able to reward or punish the performance of local 
politicians.  
While FAISM represented an instrument to transfer important amounts of 
resources and provided an opportunity for local governments to get directly 
131 
 
 
involved in the implementation of social policy, little was known regarding the 
success of this strategy in improving the living conditions of the population. 
Moreover, little was known regarding the actual use of the resources and, more 
importantly, whether they had been subject to political manipulation from local 
political actors.  
This dissertation studied the extent to which FAISM has served to provide basic 
social infrastructure to more disadvantaged sectors of the population of the 
municipalities within Estado de Mexico. In doing so, and given the need to consider 
the role of political institutions in analysing policy implementation and outcomes, 
this dissertation developed a framework to explore antipoverty spending from the 
perspective of the political motivations behind the distribution of public funds.  
The theoretical discussion offered in this dissertation has explored the incentives 
that politicians have when choosing between two types of goods: public and 
private. The characteristics of these two types of public investment and their 
possible effects on policy outcomes have provided a better picture of the policy 
choices that local politicians make when deciding how to distribute social spending.  
As previously mentioned, antipoverty spending is potentially vulnerable to being 
used by politicians as an instrument for gaining political support. The examination 
of FAISM allocations in one Mexican state has offered the opportunity to test 
various premises regarding the linkages between local political institutions and 
politically motivated allocations of public. 
In particular, the examination of FAISM was an opportunity to engage in a detailed 
analysis of municipal spending. It allowed for an exploration of the role played by 
local municipal authorities in the implementation of decentralised antipoverty 
spending and offered an opportunity to examine the extent to which the decisions 
taken at this level of government had an impact on the effects of pro-poor policy 
interventions. This disaggregation and classification of FAISM spending data from 
122 municipalities in Estado de Mexico over a nearly ten-year period was the first 
attempt to create a detailed account of the choices that local politicians make over 
resources that aim to benefit the poorest sectors of the population; in a country that 
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has a long tradition of clientelistic relationships between citizens and politicians, 
and has recently experienced deep democratisation and decentralisation reforms.  
The study of political institutions and their effects on policy implementation helps to 
shed new light on the reasons behind the failure of local governments to improve 
service delivery. This dissertation has focused on the analysis of the linkages 
between political variables, decentralised policy making, and implementation in 
order to shed light on the reasons behind the prevalence of clientelistic practices in 
Mexico despite recent democratic developments.  
 
6.2 Summary of main findings and contributions 
 
One of the challenges in the process of allocating antipoverty funds is mitigating 
the risk of their capture by local politicians and subsequent allocation to individuals 
or specific sectors of the population in ways that can benefit politicians through the 
exchange of goods and services for votes –clientelism–. As has been shown in this 
dissertation, the lessons learned from previous antipoverty programs in Mexico, 
where the distribution of resources was politically motivated raised concerns 
regarding the effectiveness of these efforts in their fight against poverty. In this 
context, the creation of FAISM was considered a major reform towards the de-
politisation of decentralised antipoverty spending. However, as this dissertation has 
shown, an important amount of FAISM disbursements are allocated to private 
goods –clientelism–. It seems to be the case that local politicians allocate 
antipoverty funds with political motivations in order to guarantee the political 
survival of themselves, their party and their political aides.  
This dissertation shows how the three major political parties competing in local 
elections in Estado de Mexico invested a great deal on clientelism as opposed to 
more programmatic forms of public spending. Clientelism has permeated the 
political spectrum and is not an exclusive feature of one particular political party. 
This dissertation has also shown that local politicians have been using government 
resources to build clientelistic networks particularly in years when elections are 
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held. It seems that municipal authorities align FAISM disbursements in accordance 
with the electoral strategy of their political party. This dissertation also confirms 
what previous studies have found regarding the effects of the level of development 
on clientelism. In this case, the poorest municipalities of Estado de Mexico spent 
more on clientelism than more developed ones. Thus, it can be argued that the use 
of social spending as a vote generating mechanisms is a common practice in 
contexts with high incidences of poverty and where votes are likely to be bought 
through the  allocation of individualised “cheap” private goods (Perez 2007: 3).  
Despite the resilience of clientelism as a political practice in the local Mexican 
context, this dissertation argues that the allocation of FAISM resources might also 
be mediated by other factors. Through the analysis of the political determinants of 
resource allocation it has been found that clientelistic disbursements decrease as 
the number of political parties participating in local elections increases. The 
transition towards democratic politics in Mexico, where political parties can 
effectively compete in free and transparent elections, appears to have a positive 
effect on undermining the use of antipoverty funds for particularistic ends.  
This dissertation has also shed light on the impact of FAISM allocations, influenced 
by political factors, on changes to the percentage of the population with access to 
three basic services: water, electricity and sewage. The results show how FAISM 
disbursements for the provision of public goods have enabled local governments to 
improve the population‟s access to some basic services.  
This dissertation has described how the institutional weaknesses of FAISM, in 
terms of accountability and monitoring, increase the opportunities for local 
politicians to redirect public funds towards actions that cannot be considered 
investments to social infrastructure. Yet, despite these institutional limitations, it 
has been found that when FAISM resources are allocated to financing investments 
in water, sewerage, and electricity projects, some degree of improvement in the 
provision of these services can be achieved.  
In terms of political variables and their effects on improvements to basic service 
provision, this dissertation has found that meaningful competition between political 
parties can induce local governments to spend on the provision of public goods 
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and thereby increase the population‟s access to basic services. It is argued in this 
dissertation that although clientelistic spending continues as a common practice in 
the allocation of public funds, some level of improvement in service delivery is 
achieved through public goods investment.  
In sum, this dissertation has shed light on the understanding of clientelism, and 
how this political practice prevails even in contexts that have undergone major 
political and economic reforms. It confirms the need to explore local political 
conditions to better understanding why decentralisation has failed to deliver on its 
promises of effective service provision. This dissertation has also contributed to the 
debate regarding the impact of democratic politics on the implementation of pro-
poor policies and offered a detailed account of the role played by local political 
institutions in determining the effective allocation of antipoverty funds. 
 
6.3 Research and policy implications 
 
This dissertation provides evidence that clientelism persists as a common political 
practice across municipalities in Estado de Mexico. It shows how political 
motivations on the part of local municipal authorities have an impact on the final 
destination of decentralised antipoverty spending.  
The FAISM institutional arrangement „served to limit the federal Executive‟s 
discretion in the allocation of government expenditures‟ (Perez 2007:14). The 
formula-based system for allocating FAISM resources to states and municipalities 
seems to have undermined the political control that the central government 
previously had to distribute basic social infrastructure investments to poor 
communities. With the creation of FAISM, decisions over the final destination of 
antipoverty funds are put in the hands of local municipal authorities.  
Unfortunately, the lack of monitoring and accountability mechanisms for the use of 
FAISM at the municipal level means that local politicians could distribute 
antipoverty funds with a great deal of autonomy. This autonomy to decide the final 
destination of FAISM resources, it is argued in this dissertation, suggests that the 
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political motivations of elected municipal officials and their political aides have a 
significant impact over the actual use of FAISM. The evidence gathered here 
illustrates that politicians tend to strategically allocate antipoverty funds with the 
aim of securing electoral support. The empirical evidence from this research thus 
confirms that social policy implementation is influenced by the local political system 
and therefore that political factors determine the final destination of antipoverty 
funds. 
The fact that local municipal authorities use important FAISM resources as a vote 
seeking mechanism, particularly in contexts with low levels of development, has 
important implications for policymaking. While the transfer of decision making 
powers and resources for the provision of basic services can strengthen local 
governments‟ capacity to respond to citizen demands, in contexts were „political 
institutions of contestation and accountability are lacking and poverty is 
widespread, social policy [will continue to run] the risk of being used by elected 
politicians for purposes other than improving the well being of those in greater 
need.‟ (Perez 2007: 3). In the absence of accountability and monitoring 
mechanisms, social policy can potentially be used as a political tool for local 
authorities to enhance their chances of political success.  
A second expectation of decentralising the disbursement of antipoverty funds to 
lower levels of government is that it will enhance citizen involvement in public 
affairs. It is expected that citizens will have better opportunities to channel their 
demands and complaints for better and broader service provision to governments 
that are closer to the people and directly responsible for the provision of public 
services. Yet, although further exploration is needed in order to gain better insight 
into the extent to which citizen involvement in the implementation of FAISM has 
contributed to better service provision, the results from this dissertation show that, 
in the case of FAISM, there is no clear link between participation and better service 
provision. While levels of political participation are associated with improvements in 
the provision of potable water, it seems that participation has no effect on 
improvements to the provision of other basic services. 
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Social policy at the municipal level in Mexico has been greatly understudied. In 
particular, there is little research on how politics and policy interact at the local level 
or on how these interactions might affect social policy interventions. This 
dissertation has offered an account of how social spending decisions are made at 
this level of government and what the factors are that influence the choices that 
local politicians make in the distribution of antipoverty funds.  
The Mexican experience of decentralised antipoverty spending offers „a cautionary 
note on current development practice calling for further decentralisation as a 
means to make government more responsive and social policy more pro-poor‟ 
(Rocha 2005: 357). This research provides new insights regarding the possible 
limitations of decentralisation to improve local government‟s performance and, in 
particular, to produce a more efficient allocation of public funds. As previously 
mentioned, advocates of decentralisation argue that government performance will 
improve as soon as local governments are strengthened through the devolution of 
resources and responsibilities to deliver public services. However, decentralisation 
does not necessarily translate into more efficient use of resources. Given the 
evidence shown in this dissertation, policymakers should take into account the 
possible implications of furthering the decentralisation of social policies to lower 
levels of government. The recent calls to decentralise other targeted strategies of 
poverty alleviation should take into consideration that politicians might still use 
significant resources for political gain, even within contexts of democratic politics.  
Focusing exclusively on decentralisation, as a means of improving efficiency of 
public service provision, neglects a wide variety of relevant development and 
governance problems. If decentralisation is to be a successful mechanism to 
improve service delivery, this research has shown that it is essential to incorporate 
the influence that politics can play in the implementation of social policies at the 
local level. It shows how apart from a new institutional design for the distribution 
and allocation of public funds, a more detail account of the political logic behind the 
actual use of antipoverty funds is key to understand how and when decentralised 
antipoverty funds could in fact become more efficient mechanisms for the 
distribution of public goods. 
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This dissertation has also contributed to the debate regarding the impact of 
democratic politics on government performance. It is broadly believed that 
„competitive elections (…) stimulate local office holders to improve government 
performance‟ (Grindle 2007: 168). This research has shown that although 
multiparty competition created incentives to allocate public goods that benefit large 
sectors of the population, it did not prevented the prevalence of clientelistic bonds 
between citizens and politicians. With the arrival of democratic politics, there were 
great expectations that „politicians in office [would] try to perform well because they 
prefer to have their parties win subsequent elections rather than other parties (…) 
or they [would] want to do well in office because they hope to run for higher level 
office on the basis of their record of good performance‟ (Grindle 2007: 168). 
However, access to significant amounts of resources40 in which municipal 
authorities have a great deal of autonomy over their use, and the lack of effective 
accountability and monitoring mechanisms, opened the door for the allocation of 
public spending with political motivations. As Grindle (2007: 169) notes, winning 
positions in local governments „provided access to important resources to distribute 
to constituents and clienteles and an opportunity to use local office as a 
“trampoline” to higher office‟.  
Finally, this research highlights the need to study social policy from a local 
perspective and to pay special attention to political dynamics and their effects on 
policy implementation. As „local policy making is embedded in the political system 
and gets determined by political institutions‟ (Perez 2007: 2), much work remains to 
be done in the search for how politics affect social policy-making and 
implementation. Further research is needed in the field of local political institutions 
and their influence on social policy interventions.  
 
                                                 
40
 In the period 2000 and 2008, FAISM funds have increased 82% in real terms; (Pardinas & Granados 2010). 
 
138 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Ackerman, J. & I. Sandoval (2007), „Fiscalización intraestatal y la protección de los 
programas sociales en México. Teoría, práctica y propuestas‟, Candados y 
Derechos: Protección de Programas Sociales y Construcción de 
Ciudadanía, México, D.F.: PNUD. 
Acosta, M. (2006), „Monitoreo de Programas Sociales en Contextos Electorales: 
Análisis de las Sentencias emitidas por la Sala Superior del Tribunal 
Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación‟. 
Aguilar, A. & Cullen, A. (1997), „Mexican Federalism: The Paradox of 
Centralisation‟, paper presented to the Workshop „North American 
Federalism and NAFTA: Three Perspectives‟. University of California at 
Berkeley. 
Amieva-Huerta, J. (1997), „Mexico‟, in Ter-Minassian, T. (eds.), „Fiscal Federalism 
in Theory and Practice‟, Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
Ard, M. J. (2003), „An Eternal Struggle. How the National Action Party Transformed 
Mexican Politics‟, Westport: Praeger.  
Armesto, A. (2009), „Governors and Mayors, Particularism in the Provision of Local 
Public Goods in Mexico and Argentina‟, paper delivered at the 2009 
Congress of the Latin American Studies Association. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
Armesto, A. (2008), „Particularism in the Subnational Provision of Local Public 
Goods in Mexico and Argentina‟, Mexico: ITAM-CEPI Working Paper 16.  
Ashworth,J. et al. (2006), „Political Competition and Local Government 
Performance: Evidence from Flemish Municipalities‟.  
Bailey, J. (1994). „Centralism and political change in México. The case of National 
Solidarity‟, in Cornelius W. A., Craig L. A. & Fox J. (eds.). Transforming 
State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy. La Jolla: 
University of California, San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies. 
Baraldi, A. (2008), „Effects of electoral rules, political competition and corruption on 
the size and composition of government consumption spending: an Italian 
regional analysis‟, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 8, 
No. 1:  1-35. 
Beer, C. (2004), „Electoral Competition and Fiscal Decentralisation in México‟, in 
Montero A. & D. Samuels (eds.), Decentralisation and Democracy in Latin 
America. University of Notre Dame Press. 
Beno de Mesquita, B. et al. (2002), „Political institutions, policy choice and the 
survival of leaders‟, British Journal of Political Science, No. 32: 559-590. 
Boyne, G. A. (1996), Assessing Party Effects on Local Policies: a Quarter Century 
of Progress or Eternal Recurrence?‟, Political Studies, XLIV: 232-252. 
139 
 
 
Boyne, G. A. (1998), „Party competition and local spending decisions‟, British 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1: 210-222. 
Bruhn, K. (1996), „Social spending and political support: the lessons of the National 
Solidarity Program in México‟. Comparative Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2: 151-177. 
Brusco, V., Nazareno, M & Stokes, S. (2004), „Vote Buying in Argentina‟, Latin 
American Research Review, Vol. 39, No. 2: 66-88. 
Cabrero E. & Martínez-Vázquez, J. (2000), „Assignment of Spending 
Responsibilities and Service Delivery‟, in Achievements and Challenges of 
Fiscal Decentralisation: Lessons from Mexico Marcelo M. Giungale and 
Steven B. Webb (eds). Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Cabrero, E. & Carrera A. (2004), „Descentralización Fiscal y Debilidades 
Institucionales. Las Paradojas del Caso Mexicano‟, in Juan Pablo Guerrero 
(ed), Impuestos y Gasto Público en México desde una Perspectiva 
Multidisciplinaria, México, D.F.: CIDE-Miguel Ángel Porrúa. 
Calvo, E. & Murillo, M. (2004), „Who delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine 
Electoral Market‟, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 4: 742-
757. 
Chand, V. K. (2000), „Mexico‟s Political Awakening‟. Kellog Institute for 
International Studies, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press. 
Chubb, J. (1981), „The social bases of an urban political machine: the case of 
Palermo‟, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 1. 107-125. 
Cleary, M. (2001), „Electoral Competition and Government Performance in Mexico‟, 
paper prepared for the XXIII International Congress of the Latin American 
Studies Association, Washington D.C. 
Cleary, M. (2007), „Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government 
Performance in Mexico‟, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 
2: 283-299. 
Contreras, O. & V. Bennet (1994) „National Solidarity in the Northern Borderlands: 
social participation and community leadership‟, in Cornelius, W. A., Craig A. 
L. & Fox J. (eds.), Transforming State-Society Relations in México: The 
National Solidarity Strategy. La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, 
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies. 
Coopedge, M. (1998), „The Dynamic Diversity of Latin American Party Systems‟, 
Party Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4: 547-568. 
Cornelius, W. A. & Craig A. L. (1988), „Politics in Mexico: An Introduction and 
Overview‟, San Diego: Centre for U. S.-Mexican Studies, University of 
California. 
Cornelius, W. A. (2000), „Blind Spots in Democratisation: Sub-national Politics as a 
Constraint on Mexico‟s Transition‟, Democratisation, Vol. 7, No. 3: 117-132. 
140 
 
 
Cornelius, W.A., Craig A. L. & Fox J. (1994), „México's National Solidarity Program: 
an Overview‟, in Cornelius W. A., Craig A. L., & Fox J. (eds.), Transforming 
State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy. La Jolla: 
University of California, San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies. 
Costa, J., E. Rodriguez & D. Luna (2000), „Political Competition and the Allocation 
of Public Investment in Mexico‟, London, UK: LSE. 
Craig, A. (1990), „Institutional Context and Popular Strategies‟, in Foweraker J. and 
Craig, A. (ed.), Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico, London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Crook, R. & A. Sverrison (2001), „Decentralisation and Poverty-Alleviation in 
Developing Countries: a Comparative Analysis or, is West Bengal Unique?‟, 
Brighton: IDS Working Paper 130. 
Crook, R. & J. Manor (1998), „Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and 
West Africa‟, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Crook, R. (2003), „Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: the Politics of 
Local-Central Relations‟, in Public Administration and Development, Volume 
23, Number 1: 77-88. 
Dawson, R., J. A. Robinson (1962), „Inter-party competition, economic variables, 
and welfare policies in the American States‟, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 25, 
No. 2: 265-289. 
De la Torre, R. (2005), „El Indice de Desarrollo Humano y la Asignación del Gasto 
Público por Entidad Federativa en México‟, Serie Análisis del Desarrollo, 
México, D.F.: Universidad Iberoamericana. 
Díaz-Cayeros & S. Silva (2004), „Descentralización a Escala Municipal en México: 
la Inversión en Infraestructura Social‟, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas, 
Unidad de Desarrollo Social, CEPAL, México D. F. 
Díaz-Cayeros (2003), „Decentralisation, Democratisation and Federalism in 
Mexico‟, Stanford University. 
Díaz-Cayeros, A. & B. Magaloni (2003), „The Politics of Public Spending. Part I The 
Logic of Vote Buying‟, paper prepared as a background paper for the World 
Bank World Development Report 2004, Washington D. C.  
Díaz-Cayeros, A. et al (Forthcoming), „Strategies of vote buying: poverty, 
democracy and social transfers in México‟. 
Dresser (2008), „País Botín‟, Reforma, Octubre, México, D.F. 
Dresser, Denise (1994), „Bringing the poor back in: National Solidarity as a strategy 
of regime legitimation‟, in Cornelius W. A., Craig A. L. & Fox J. (eds.), 
Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity 
Strategy. La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies. 
141 
 
 
Dumont, P & F. Caulier (2003), „The “effective number of relevant parties”: how 
voting power improves Laakso-Taagepera‟s Index‟. 
Echeverri-Gent, J. (1992), „Public participation and poverty alleviation: the 
experience of reform communists in India‟s West Bengal‟, World 
Development, Vol. 20, No. 10: 1401-1422. 
Edmonds E. (1997), „Fiscal Decentralisation and Municipal Governance in Mexico. 
The Case of Chihuahua‟, paper prepared for delivery at the 1997 Meeting of 
the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, México. 
Edmonds E. (1998), „The Implications of Electoral Competition for Fiscal 
Decentralisation and Subnational Autonomy‟, paper prepared for the 1998 
meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago Illinois. 
Ehrlich, I. and F. Lui (1999), „Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic 
Growth‟, Journal of Political Economy, No. 107: 270-293. 
Finan, F. (2004), „Political Patronage and Local Development: a Brazilian Case 
Study‟. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
Foweraker, J. (1990), „Popular Organization and Institutional Change‟, in 
Foweraker J. and Craig, A. (eds.), Popular Movements and Political Change 
in Mexico, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Fox, J. (1994a) „Targeting the Poorest: the Role of the National Indigenous Institute 
in Mexico‟s Solidarity Program‟ in Cornelius W. A., Craig A.L. & Fox J. 
(eds.), Transforming State-Society Relations in México: The National 
Solidarity Strategy, La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, Center for 
U.S.-Mexican Studies. 
Fox, J. (1994b), „The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship. Lessons 
from Mexico‟, World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2: 151-184. 
Fox, J. (1995), „Governance and Rural Development in Mexico: State Intervention 
and Public Accountability‟, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 32, No. 
1: 1-30. 
FUNDAR (2006), „Monitoreo de Programas Sociales en Contextos Electorales: 
Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal (FISM). Monitoreo de las Obras 
Aprobadas y de los Recursos Ejercidos‟.  
Gamboa, R. (1999), „Conditional Transfers to Promote Local Government 
Participation: The Case of Mexico‟, in Kiichiro F. & Luiz R. De Mello (eds.), 
Fiscal Decentralisation in Emerging Economies, Governance Issues, Paris: 
OECD. 
Gibson, L. (2004), „Federalism and Democracy. Theoretical Connections and 
Cautionary Insights‟, in Gibson E. (ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin 
America, John Hopkins University Press. 
142 
 
 
González Tiburcio, E. (1994), „Social reform in Mexico: six thesis on the National 
Solidarity Program‟ in Cornelius W.A., Craig A. L. & Fox J. (eds.), 
Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity 
Strategy, La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies. 
Grindle, M. (2000), „Education Reform in Mexico: Where are the Parents?‟, 
DRCLAS News, Harvard University. 
Grindle, M. S. (2007), „Going Local. Decentralisation, Democratisation and the 
Promise of Good Governance‟, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Haggard, S. & Webb, S. (2004), „Political Incentives and Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico Compared‟, in Montero A. & 
Samuels D. (eds.), Decentralisation and Democracy in Latin America‟, 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
Handelman, H. (1997), „Mexican Politics: the Dynamics of Change‟, New York: St. 
Martin‟s Presss. 
Hasnain, Z. (2008), „The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties 
and the Incentives for Patronage, 1998-1999‟, The Pakistan Development 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 2: 129-151. 
Hernández, F. & B. Jarillo (2006), „Is local beautiful? Decentralisation in Mexico in 
the presence of elite capture‟, Documento de Trabajo, No. 360, CIDE. 
Hernández, Merino & Rascón (2003), „Social Development in Mexico‟, Working 
Paper No. 7, México, Ministry of Social Development. 
Hiskey, J. (2000), „Does democracy matter? Electoral competition and local 
development in Mexico‟, paper prepared for delivery at the 2000 meeting of 
the Latin American Studies Association, Miami. 
Hiskey, J. (2003), „Demand-Based Development and Local Electoral Environments 
in Mexico‟, Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1: 41-59. 
Kaufman, R. & G. Trejo (1997), „Regionalism, Regime Transformation, and 
Pronasol: The Politics of the National Solidarity Programme in Four Mexican 
States‟, Journal of Latin American Studies, No. 29: 717-745. 
Kauneckis, D. & K. Andersson (2006), „Making decentralisation work: a cross-
national examination of local governments and natural resource governance 
in Latin America‟, paper submitted to the American Journal of Political 
Science. 
Kitschelt H. & S. I. Wilkinson (2007), „Citizen-politician linkages: an introduction‟, in 
Patrons, clients and policies, in Kitschelt & Wilkinson (eds), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kitschelt H. (2007), „The demise of clientelism in affluent capitalist democracies‟, in 
Kitschelt & Wilkinson (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
143 
 
 
Laakso, M. & R. Taagepera (1979, „Effective Number of Parties: a Measure with 
Application to West Europe‟, Comparative Political Studies, No. 12: 3-27. 
Litvack, L., J. Ahmad & R. Bird (1998), „Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing 
Countries‟, Washington, D. C. Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Network. The World Bank. 
Lujambio, A. (1998), „Mexican Parties and Congressional Politics in the 1990‟s‟, in 
Serrano, M. (ed.), Governing in Mexico: Political Parties and Elections, 
London: University of London. 
Lustig, N. (1994), „Solidarity as a strategy of poverty alleviation‟ in Cornelius W.A., 
Craig A. L. & Fox J. (eds.), Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: 
The National Solidarity Strategy. La Jolla: University of California, San 
Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies. 
Magaloni, B. et al (2002), „The erosion of party hegemony, clientelism and portfolio 
diversification: The Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (Pronasol) in Mexico‟ 
Magaloni, B. et al (2007), „Clientelism and portfolio diversification: a model of 
electoral investment with applications to Mexico‟, in Patrons, clients and 
policies, in Kitschelt & Wilkinson (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mayer-Serra C. & B. Nacif (2002), „La Lógica del Cambio Político en Mexico‟, in 
Mayer-Serra C. E. & Nacif B. (eds), Lecturas sobre el Cambio Político en 
México. México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
Méndez, I. (2007), „El Papel del Gobierno y los Partidos en la Protección de los 
Programas Sociales‟, Candados y Derechos: Protección de Programas 
Sociales y Construcción de Ciudadanía, México, D.F.: PNUD. 
Merino, G. (1997), „Las Transferencias de la Educación Federal en México: una 
Evaluación de sus Criterios de Equidad y Eficiencia‟, Gestión y Política 
Pública, Vol. 1, primer semestre de 1997: 77-122. 
Middlebrook, K. (1986), „Political Liberalisation in an Authoritarian Regime: The 
Case of Mexico‟, in O‟Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. & Whitehead, L. (ed.), 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Latin America, London: The Johns 
Hopkins Press Ltd. 
Milesi-Ferreti, G., et al. (2000), „Electoral systems and public spending‟  
Mizrahi, Y. (2004), „Twenty Years of Decentralisation in Mexico: A Top-Down 
Process‟, in Oxhorn, P., Tulchin, J. S. & Seele, A. D. (eds), Decentralisation, 
Democratic Governance, and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective, 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Molinar, J. & Weldomn J. (1994), „Electoral determinants and consequences of 
National Solidarity‟ in Cornelius W. A., Craig A. L. & Fox J. (eds.), 
Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity 
144 
 
 
Strategy. La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies. 
Montero, D. & Samuels D. (2004), „The Political Determinants of Decentralisation 
in Latin America. Causes and Consequences‟, in Montero A. & Samuels D., 
Decentralisation and Democracy in Latin America‟. University of Notre Dame 
Press. 
Moser, C. (2004), „Poverty reduction, Patronage or Vote Buying? The Allocation of 
Public Goods and the 2001 Election in Madagascar‟, Cornell University. 
Nacif, B. (2002), „The New Relationship between the Executive and Congress in 
Mexico‟, paper presented in the Seminar: Divided Government in México: 
Risks and Opportunities, Mexico, D.F.: IBERGOP, CIDE. 
Nath, V, (1999), „Political Decentralisation – A Complementary Rather than a 
Substitution Approach‟, London, LSE. 
Nickson, R. (1995), „Local Government in Latin America‟, London: Boulder, Co: 
Lynne Rienner. 
Olvera, A. (2000a), „Civil Society and Political Transition in Mexico‟, Brighton: IDS. 
Olvera, A. (2000b), „Civic Alliance: Pro-democratic Social Movements, Civil Society 
and the Public Sphere‟, Institute of Historical and Social Research, 
Universidad Veracruzana. 
Ornelas, C. (2000), „The Politics of the Educational Decentralisation in Mexico‟, 
México: UAM. 
Ortega, R. (2000), „Comparing Types of Transitions: Spain and Mexico‟, 
Democratization, Vol. 7, No. 3. 
Pardinas, J. (2005), „Mexico: Democracy without Accountability?, LSE. 
Pardinas, J. & Granados, E. (2010), „¿El Municipio: La Institución de la Opcaidad?, 
México: CIDE-serie El Uso y Abuso de los Recursos Públicos. Cuadernos 
de Debate 5. 
Pardo, M. (2009), „Política Social‟ in Bizberg I. and Meyer L. (eds), Una Historia 
Contemporánea de México. México, D.F.: Océano-COLMEX. 
Pérez, G. (2007), „Social Development Policy, Expenditures and Electoral 
Incentives in Mexico‟, in Ibero Forum, Vol. 2, No. 3: 1-26. 
Persson, T. & Tabellini G. (2000), „Political Economics. Explaining Economic 
Policy‟, Cambridge: MIT. 
Philip, G. (2002), „The Presidency, the Parties and Democratization in Mexico‟, 
Democratization, Vol. 9, No. 3. 
Polo, M. (1998), „Electoral Competition and Political Rents‟, Milan: IGIER and 
Bocconi University. 
145 
 
 
Prud‟home, J. (1998), „The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE): Building an Impartial 
Electoral Authority‟, in Serrano, M. (ed.), Governing in México: Political 
Parties and Elections, London: University of London. 
Putnam, R. (1993), „Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy‟. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Raich, U. (2000), „Impacts of Expenditure Decentralisation on Mexico Local 
Governments‟, México, D.F.: CIDE. 
Ramírez, M. (1989), „Mexico‟s Economic Crisis. Its Origins and Consequences‟. 
New York: Praeger. 
Rocha, A. (2005), „Less Political and more Pro-poor? The evolution of social 
welfare spending in Mexico in a context of democratisation and 
decentralisation‟, North-Süd Aktuell, Vol. 3, No. 4:  346-359. 
Rodríguez, V. (1993), „The Politics of Decentralisation in Mexico: From Municipio 
Libre to Solidaridad‟, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 12, No. 2: 
133-145. 
Rodríguez, V. E. & Ward P. (1994), „Political Change in Baja California. Democracy 
in the Making‟. University of California, San Diego. Center for U.S.-Mexican 
Studies. 
Romero, J. (2007), „Clientelismo, patronazgo y justicia electoral en México. Una 
lectura institucionalista‟, Candados y Derechos: Protección de Programas 
Sociales y Construcción de Ciudadanía, México, D.F.: PNUD. 
Santin del Rio, L. (2004), „Decentralisation and Civil Society in Mexico‟, in Oxhorn, 
P., Tulchin, J. S. & Seele, A. D. (eds), Decentralisation, Democratic 
Governance, and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press. 
Schedler, A. (2001), „The Democratic Revelation‟, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, 
No. 4: 5-19. 
Schneider, A. (2003), „Who Gets What from Whom? The Impact of 
Decentralisation on Tax Capacity and Pro-poor Policy‟. Brighton, IDS 
Working Paper 179 
Shirk, D. (1999). „New Federalism in Mexico: Implications for Baja California and 
the Cross-Border Region‟, briefing paper, Department of Political Science, 
University of California, San Diego.  
Singer, M. (2004), „Local Parties and Local Politics: Electoral Fragmentation and 
Municipal Budget Choices in Bolivia and Mexico‟, paper prepared for the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 
Illinois. 
Singer, M. (2006), „On Municipal Governance and Poverty: Evidence from Bolivia‟, 
paper prepared for the Duke University Workshop on Poverty and 
Democracy, Durham, North Carolina. 
146 
 
 
Somuano, M. et al (2006), „Análisis de la Vinculación del Gasto de Programas 
Sociales con Variables Electorales‟, Monitoreo de Programas Sociales en 
Contextos Electorales, México, D. F.: El Colegio de México.  
Stokes, S. (Forthcoming), „Political Clientelism‟. 
Tulchin, J. & Selee, A. (2002), „Mexico‟s Politics and Society in Transition. 
Introduction‟, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Turner & Hulme (1997), „Governance Administration and Development‟, New York: 
Palgrave. 
Ugalde, L. C. (2010), „Por una Democracia Liberal‟. Nexos. Noviembre. 
Veltmeyer, H., Petras J. & Vieux, S. (1997), „Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in 
Latin America‟, London: Macmillan Press. 
Wallis, D. (2001), „The Mexican Presidential Election and Congressional Elections 
of 2000 and Democratic Transition‟, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 
Vol. 20, No. 3. 
Wantchekon, L (2003), „Clientelism and Voting Behavior. Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Benin‟, World politics, No. 55: 399-422. 
Ward, P. (1998), „From machine politics to the politics of technocracy: charting 
changes in governance in the Mexican municipality‟, Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, Vol. 17, No. 3: 341-365. 
Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2007), „Political competition, poverty, and incentives for good 
government and clientelism in Argentina‟, paper prepared for the meeting of 
the Midwest Political Science Association. 
Whitehead, L. (1994), „The Peculiarities of „Transition‟ a la Mexicana‟, in Harvey N. 
& Serrano N. (ed.), Party Politics „An uncommon Democracy‟: Political 
Parties and Elections in Mexico, London, University of London. 
Willis, E., Garman C. & Haggard S. (1999), „The Politics of Decentralisation in Latin 
America‟, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 34, No. 1: 7-56. 
World Bank (2001), „Decentralisation and Governance: Does Decentralisation 
Improve Public Service Delivery‟. PREM notes, Washington, D. C. 
World Bank (2004), „World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for 
Poor People‟, Washington, D.C. 
World Bank (2006a), „Decentralised service delivery for the poor‟, Vol. 1, 
Washington D.C. 
World Bank (2006b), „Decentralised service delivery for the poor‟, Vol. 2, 
Washington D.C. 
Yaschine, I. (1999), „The Changing Anti-Poverty Agenda: What Can the Mexican 
Case Tell Us?‟, Brighton, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 2: 47-60. 
147 
 
 
Yong, H. (2001), „The Politics of Public Spending in a “Developmental State”: 
South Korea, 1987-1997‟, paper prepared for delivery at the workshop, The 
Comparative Political Economy of Developed and Less Developed 
Countries. Yale Centre for International and Area Studies, Yale University. 
 
148 
 
 
ANNEX 
Annex 1. Classification of FAISM expenditure by type of good 
 Clientelism   
Programme Private good Club good  Public good Other 
Trade and distribution   Milk shop; art craft 
market 
 
Potable water   Wells; perimeter 
walls; conduction 
lines; distribution 
network; system; 
tanks; water treatment 
plant 
Payments 
Community 
development 
Equipment; food 
supply 
 Milk shop; perimeter 
walls; social 
assistance centre 
 
Irrigation  Dam; canal; irrigation 
system; equipment; 
materials; fertilizers; 
soil improvement; 
productive projects 
  
Drainage and 
sewerage 
  Sewerage; well; 
drainage 
 
Public buildings    Payments; public 
buildings 
improvement; 
equipment; vehicles 
Electrification   Rural and urban 
electrification; well 
electrification 
 
Basic education 
support 
Scholarships; school 
meals; food supply 
   
Projects    Public work plans and 
projects 
Municipal 
strengthening 
(institutional capacity) 
   Capacity building; 
infrastructure; 
equipment; vehicles; 
plans and projects; 
petrol; technical 
assistance 
Basic education 
infrastructure 
  Infant school; primary 
school; secondary 
school; TV school 
programme; sport 
centre 
 
Health infrastructure   Perimeter wall; health 
centre; health clinic; 
medic units 
 
Housing improvement Rural and urban 
housing 
 Public lavatories  
Ecology   Latrine; water 
treatment plant; septic 
tank; garbage dump 
Payments 
Public security   Public security unit  
Urbanisation   Street pavement; 
public lightning; 
sidewalk; walking 
path; hydraulic 
concrete; pedestrian 
bridge 
 
Employment Employment 
programme 
   
Transport   Rural roads; 
highways; pedestrian 
bridges 
 
Note: Adapted from Magaloni et al. (2007) 
 
